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ARTICLES 
An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to 
Protect the Global Environment 
HowARD F. CHANG* 
ABSTRACT 
In this article, Professor Howard Chang addresses the role of trade restric­
tions in supporting policies to protect the global environment and proposes a 
more liberal treatment of these environmental  trade measures than that adopted 
by dispute-settlement panels of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). The GATT Secretariat has recommended that countries like the 
United States rely on "canots" rather than "sticks" in order to induce the 
participation of other countries in multilateral environmental agreements. Pro­
fessor Chang defends the use of sticks on the ground that they encourage more 
restrained exploitation of the environment pending a multilateral agreement. 
First, sticks discourage countries from hanning the environment. Second, 
cmTots create perverse incentives. Countries may seek to convince others that 
they detive large benefits from exploitation by engaging in a great deal of 
exploitation, so that other countries will offer larger catTots to induce their 
restraint. Professor Chang also addresses how GATT should limit the use of 
trade restrictions to prevent the protectionist abuse of trade measures. 
INTRODUCTION 
This article addresses the role of trade restrict ions in supporting policies 
to protect the global environment. The issue of environmental t rade mea­
sures was raised most prominently in  1 99 1  and in 1 994, each t ime by a 
controversial decision by a d ispute-settlement panel of the General Agree-
'0 1 995 by Howard F. Chang .  
' Associ a te P ro fessor o f  Law,  U nivers i ty o f  Southern  C a l i fo rn i a  Law Ce n te r .  A. B.,  1 982,  
J . D . ,  1 987 ,  H a rvard U n ivers i ty ;  M . P . A . ,  1 985 ,  P r i nceton U n ivers i ty ;  P h . D . ,  1 9 92, M assachu­
se t t s  I nsti tu t e  o f  Tech no logy . I wish to thank  Sco t t  A l tman ,  Je n n i fe r  Ar l en, Joh n  Barton ,  
Lucian Bebchuk ,  J ean -P ie rre Beno i t ,  S teve Charnovi tz ,  R i ch a rd Craswe l l ,  B ruce H ay,  Ke i t h  
Hy l ton ,  Lou i s  Kap l ow,  Gregory Kea t ing, M i c h a e l  K no l l ,  M a r t i n  Lev i n e ,  R ic h a rd Revesz,  
H i l a ry S igman ,  Larry S i mon , M ichae l  S ha p i ro, S teve n S h<lVe l l, Edwi n  Sm i th ,  Ma t t hew 
Sp i tzer ,  P a u l  S tephan  lll, Chr is top h e r  Stone,  and James S t rnad ,  as we l l  as s em ina r  par t ic i ­
pan ts a t  the U n ivers i ty  o f  Sout h e r n  Ca l i forn i a  Law Cen te r, a t  H a rvard Law Schoo l ,  a t  t h e  
Nort hwestern U n ivers i ty School  o f  Law, and  a t  t h e  1 994 m e e t i ngs o f  the  Ame r ican L a w  and  
Economics Assoc i a t i on and  of  t h e  Canad i an  Law a n d  Economics Assoc i a t i on ,  for h e l pfu l  
d iscuss ions and com ment s .  I a lso gra tefu l l y  acknowledge fi n anc i a l  support  from the Conrad 
N .  H i l ton  Endowed Fund  f or  the Im prove m e n t  o f  the Admin i s t ra t ion  o f  Just i ce .  
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ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) .' Both GATT panels he ld that a ban 
by the United States on imports of tuna from specified countries  violated 
GATT Article XI, which prohibits quantitative import restrict ions . 2 The 
United States had banned these tuna imports pursuant to n at ional  l egis la­
tion , the Marine Mammal P rotection Act of 1 972 (MMPA),3 wh ich in­
cludes provisions l imiting the number of dolphins that m ay be kil led 
through tuna fish ing. The reasoning advanced by each GATT panel has 
potentially sweeping implications for a wide variety of U .S .  env ironmental 
laws and international environmental treaties  that rely on trade restric­
tions for enforcement .  The looming conflict between trade l iberalization 
and environmental protection has placed these p roblems high on the 
GATT agenda.4 
The rul ing by the first GATT panel on August 1 6, 1 99 1 ,  which held that 
the U.S .  ban on Mexican tuna  violated the GATT, shocked and outraged 
environmental ists in the United States .  The decision confirmed environmen­
tal ists' suspicions that trade agreements could undermine their  efforts to 
protect the environment worldwide.5 In  response to the GATT panel 's  
decision , environmental groups cal led for a grassroots campaign to b lock 
the efforts to strengthen the GATT that were being made through the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.6 Numerous commentators pro­
posed amendments to the GATT i n  response to the 1 99 1  panel ' s  decision .7 
I. G e n e ra l  Agre e m e n t  o n  Tariffs a n d  Trade ,  Oct .  30, 1947, 61 Sta t .  p t .  5, 55 U. N.T. S .  187 
[he rei naf ter  GATT] . 
2. See Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tww, GATT Doc.  
D S29 I R ( subm i t  ted to the part ies M ay 20, 1 994 )  [he  re i  n afte r 1994 Decision]; Report of the 
Panel, United StMes-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc.  DS2 1 I R (su b m i t t ed  to t h e  
part i es  Aug.  1 6 ,  1991) i n  GATT, BASIC INSTRUMENTS 1\ND SELECTED DOCUI\IENTS 155 ( 3 9 t h  
Supp .  1993) [here i n a ft e r  1991 Decision]. 
3. 16 U . S .C .  §§ l36 1 - 1 42 l h  (1988 & Supp .  I V  1 992 ) .  
4 .  The n ext  rou n d  o f  t rade  n egot i a t ions  u n d e r  t h e  GATT w i l l  t ake  u p  t h e  i s sue  o f  t h e  
env i ro n m e n t .  See Members Agree on Inclusion i n  GATT Talks of Environment, 1 1  I n t ' l  Trade 
Rep .  ( BN A )  98 ( J a n .  19, 1 994) .  The  U n i t e d  S ta tes has agreed wi th other cou n tr i e s  to  se t  u p  
a Com m i t t ee  o n  Trade a n d  t h e  Env i ro n m e n t  to address these issues i n  t h e  Wor ld  Trade 
O rga n iza t ion .  See GATT Trode-Em·ironment Panel's Work Wiff Begin Soon Ajier Mid-April 
Signing, 1 1  I n t ' l Trad e  R e p .  (BNA)  498 ( M ar .  30. 1994) . 
5 .  5!ee, e.g. , Dav id  P h i l l ips ,  Dolphins and GATT. in THE C\SE AGAil\ST FREE TR/\DE: 
GATT, NAFTA, AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE POWER 1 33 ,  138 (1993) ("[T]he 
ominous  g l i mpse prov ided  by the  t u n a / d o l p h i n  case  cou l d  be s i mp ly  t h e  fi rs t  o f  m a ny 
regard ing  t he s ac r i fices GATT woul d  h ave u s  make  i n  t h e  n ame of t r ade ." ) .  
fi. To mob i l i ze  support ,  t h ese grou ps p l aced f u l l -page adve r t i semen t s  i n  m aj o r  newspapers 
and  posters all ove r  Was h ing to n ,  D .C.  dep i c t i ng  a "GATTZILLA'' m o n s t e r  c rush i ng  t h e  
U . S .  Cap i to l  u n d e r  i t s foot ,  c l u t c h i n g  a d o l p h i n  i n  one  h a n d  a n d  a can of  D DT i n  t h e  o t h e r .  
See D!\ "i lEI. C. ESTY, GREEN!l\G THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, ."\NO THE FUTURE 34-35 
( 1 994 ) :  H i la ry F. Fre n c h ,  The GATT: i\1enuce or Alfy?, WORLD W/\TCI!, S e p t . -Oc t .  1993, a t  
12. 
7. See, e.g., M a t thew H .  H u rlock.  Note ,  The G.-JTT. US. Lall' and tire Envimnmeni: A 
Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna/ Dolphin Decision. 92 COLUI\!. L. REV. 2098 
( ILJlJ2): Eliza Patterson ,  GATT and the E.n1·ironnrent-Rules Clwn:;es to tvfini111ize /ld1·erse 
Tmde and E.Jn·ironntcrt!al Ejfeus . .J. WORLD TR.\Dt:, J u ne 1 992 .  a t  99. 
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Nevertheless, a 1 992 specia l  report by the GATT Secretariat displayed the 
same general hostility towards environmental trade measures evinced by 
the 1 99 1  GATT panel .8 
To avoid a pol itical backlash i n  the United States that woul d  j eopardize 
U.S. approval of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
the Mexican government decided not to press for official adoption of the 
1 99 1  panel report by the GATT Counci l . The European Community, 
however, chal lenged the M MPA on s imi lar grounds before another  GATT 
panel ,  which on May 20, 1 994, ruled against the United States .9  The 1 994 
decision stirred further opposition among environmental ists to trade agree­
ments in general and posed an additional  chal lenge for the Cl inton Admin­
istration as it sought ratification of the GATT agreement that emerged 
from the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations .  Environmentalists warned 
that the Uruguay Round accord would strengthen a trade regime that 
threatens our environmental laws : when U .S .  environmental l aws are ruled 
to be inconsistent with our obligations under that regime, Congress would 
have to "[ e ] ither gut the challenged U .S .  law or face perpetual trade 
sanctions aga inst ANY American industry the compla in ing country 
chooses ." 10 United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor quickly 
announced that the United States would  seek reconsideration of the 1 994 
panel report by the same panel or ful l  substantive review by the GATT 
Counci l . 1 1 Although the United States may b lock adoption of the 1 994 
pane! report, l ike the 1 99 1  panel report, it nevertheless provides a disturb­
ing preview of positions that future panels are l ike ly to take in the new 
World Trade Organization (WTO) ,  wh ich has been estab l ished pursuant 
to the Uruguay Round accord . 12 As environmental ists i n  the United States 
were qu ick to point out, in the WTO,  countries wil l  no longer be able to 
block adoption of objectionable panel reports, as they could in the past 
8. See GATT, Trade and the Environment, in l ll\TERN,\TION:\L TK1\DE 90- 9 1 ,  at 1 9  ( 1 992). 
9. See 199-1 Decision. supra note 2 .  
10. Whr Is !vfickey Kantor Deceiving You About GATT/, N.Y. TiivlES, Aug .  1 ,  1994 , at A15 
(advertisement by Pub l i c  C i t i zen ,  Greenpcace, and Ci t ize n's C l ea r i nghouse for Hazardous 
Wastes). After the 1094 panel dec i sio n , Lori  Wa l l ach. Dit·ector o f  Pub l i c  Cit ize n ' s  Trade 
Program. staled: '·This dec is ion is proof positive that en\'iro n men t a l  l aws are undermined by 
GATT. Many l aws w i l l  be louncl i l legal  by GATT a n d  then Congress must eli m i na te  t h e  l aws 
ur face perpetual . . . s�m ct ions .·· Thomas L. Friedm<tll. U.S . .  Japan Back Talks on Trade, 
NY. T!ivtEs, May 24. 1994. at Dl, Dl6. 
11. Sec Kantor Says United Stares Will Ask ji;r Full Ret inr in Tuno-Dolphin Ruling. 1 1  ln t ' !  
Trade Rep. (BNA} 01-i (iv!ay 25, 1994). 
12. The Ur uguay Rou nc! agree men l inc! udcs the G 1-\ TT i 09.1, wh ich is the o rigi nal 1 94 7 
agreement as ame n d e d and modified through the Uruguay Round, <!long wi th a l l  the 
�mci ll arv agreements. as mod i fied. rela ting to t he GATT Jl),l7: the Genera: 1\greement on 
T'raclc in 5J:rvice:.� (CJ/��.TS): the l\grccn·1r:-nt on Tr{�dc-RcLtl�cl J-\sp(:ct�; cJf Intel lectual Prop­
en\· Rights (TFZI?S)� �tn under��tanding on dispute s�.:ttlcnl�nt prnvisinns: a �rrade Policy 
F�cv�e\\i Iv1echt:ni�;nl {-fPI<.fv.i): an annex \Vith fou:· pturi!(!tcr�d tigrt:entent��: ��nd lh� V./TO 
C'httrtcr it:..;c!L .).;_'c Juli>� H. �; .. �.CKSOi'i ET !\L . . LFc;,\L PRUBLE\\S uF !>:TFI::.>.I .. \TiO�<.\L REL,\-
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under the GATT. 1 3  
In  both the 1 99 1  case and the 1 994 case, the United S tates i nvoked 
GATT Article XX, which provides a l ist  of general exceptions to all GATT 
obl igations. Article XX l ists a variety of national measures that are recog­
n ized as d irected toward legit imate goals .  In particul ar, the Uni ted States 
claimed that the ban on tuna imports was a measure "necessary to p rotect 
human, animal or p lant  l ife or health" within the meaning of Article 
XX(b) and "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources" 
within the meaning of Article XX(g) . 1 4 Although the language in these 
p rovis ions is broad, the 1 99 1  panel held that these exceptions were in­
tended to apply only to measures to protect animal l ife and n atural 
resources within the jurisdiction of the party applying them. 15 The 1 994 
panel rejected the geographic restriction adopted by the 1 99 1  p anel, but 
nevertheless ruled against the United States on the ground  that the U.S .  
ban on tuna imports was  a trade measure that  would succeed i n  p rotecting 
dolphins only by changing the policies of other countries . 
This article draws on economic theory to support a more l iberal read ing 
of Article XX that i ncludes neither geographic restrictions nor an absolute 
prohibit ion on trade sanctions. A more appropriate rule would also per­
mit ,  for example, uni lateral trade restrictions that protect either the global 
commons or endangered species found abroad. This critique of the panels '  
interpretations of the GATT focuses on the criterion of economic effi­
ciency: the analysis evaluates alternative interpretations of the GATT 
largely on the basis of aggregate costs and benefits, measured i n  terms of 
what individuals are wil ling to pay to avoid particular costs or to gain 
J 3.  See Kantor Says United Sta tes Will Ask for Full Review in Tuna-Dolphin Ruling, supra 
note  I I. Under  pr ior  GATT prac t i ce ,  any cou n t ry cou ld  b lock  GATT Cou n c i l  adopt i o n  o f  
p a n e l  dec is ions  r u l i n g  aga in s t  i t .  U n d e r  t h e  new WTO, howeve r, cou n t r i e s  can  b l ock 
dec i s ions  aga ins t  t h e m  only if t h e re i s  a conse nsus  t h a t  the pane l  dec i s ions  s h o u l d  not be  
adopted . 
14. See 1991 Decision, supra note  2, pa ras. 3 .33 ,  .40,  a t  1 70 ,  1 72: 1994 Decision, supra n ote 
2, para .  3 .7, at 1 0 . 
1 5 .  See 1991 Decision , supra note 2, pa ras.  5 . 25 , . 3 2 ,  a t  198, 200-0 1 .  Some com m e n t a to rs 
h ave a lso d efended t h i s  v iew.  See. e.g., Ted L. McDorm a n ,  The GATT Consistency of U.S. 
Fish flllport Enzbcugoes to Stop Drijinet Fis!Jing and Save Whales. Dolphins and Turtles, 24 
GEO. WASf·! .  J. lNT'L L & ECON. 477,522 ( 1 991)  ( st a t i n g  t h a t  a coun t ry m ay use t h e  GATT 
Ar ticl e  XX( b )  except ion  o n ly if t h e  me asur e  i s  necessary to p rotect  a n i m a l  l i fe or h e a l t h  in 
t h e  cou n t ry us ing t h e  m e asu r e ) .  The  GATT pane l a l so c i t ed  a na rr ower  grou n d  fo r h o l d i n g  
t h e  U . S .  ban  o n  M e x i c a n  t u n a  t o  be  a v io l a t ion  o f  the  GATT: t he  pane l  com p l a i n e d  t h a t  t h e  
Un ited S t a tes  l i n k e d  i t s  ce i l i ng on  t h e  n u mb e r  o f  do lph i ns t h a t  t h e  Mex(ca n  t u n a- fi s h i ng tlee t  
cou ld  k i l l  du r ing a pa r t i cu l a r  pe r iod  to t he  ac tual k i l l i ngs by t h e  U .S .  t u n a-fi s h i n g  flee t  du r i ng  
t h e  same per iod .  The Mex i can  government  cou ld not  k now whe the r, a t  any  p a r t i c u l a r  t i me. 
t h e i r  po l i c i e s  sa t i s fi ed  U .S .  requ i rements .  Sec /99/ Decision, supra note 2 .  paras .  5 .28 ,  .33, at  
1 99-20 1 .  The broader ra t iona les  advanced by the GATT pane l  might  t herefore be  c h a racter­
izccl <IS mere dict a .  See D av id  Palmeter. En1·imnmcnt and Tmdc: Much .,J,do Ahout  Little:>. J. 
WOIU.D TI{;\DL J u n e  1 993 ,  at 55, 65-oG. The  panel emp hasized t hese broader thcmics, 
h<lWc.vcr·, and  the  GATT Secrct<tri<tt <il su appt.:ars to endor�e them .  Sec GATT. supm note  8 .  
1 
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particular benefits . 16 I wil l refer to other considerations relevant to  the 
interpretation of the GATT, such as the text of Article XX and normative 
principles other than economic efficiency, 17 but an emphasis on economic 
theory seems appropriate in l ight of the great influence of that  theory in 
advancing the most important arguments in favor of free t rade . By framing 
the analysis in  these terms, th is  article  defends the use of trade measures 
to protect the global environment while appealing to the normative frame­
work that i s  dominant among many i nfluential criti cs of environmental  
trade measures. 1 8 Furthermore, this article proposes an alternative interpre­
tation of GATT Article XX in terms that balance environmental concerns 
against the concerns expressed by the GATT panels, while remaining 
within the normative framework  thought most congenial to the case in 
favor of l iberalized trade. 
Part I describes some of the trade measures that could be threatened by 
the GATT panels '  i nterpretations of GATT Article XX, and then explains 
the MMPA, GATT Article XX, and both GATT panels' decis ions in 
greater detai l .  Part  I I  offers a cri t ique of the panels' decisions and the 
posit ion of the GATT Secretariat from the perspective of global economic 
welfare . First , this policy analys is begins with the crit ical defect in  the 1 9 9 1  
panel 's reasoning: although that panel favored multi lateral agreements 
over un i lateral trade measures to protect the global environment, i t  fai led 
to exp lain how countries are to induce others to jo in mult i lateral efforts. 
The 1994 panel raised similar problems by rul ing against the use of trade 
measures to induce cooperation by other governments. The GATT Secre­
tariat, however, has explained that i t  favors the use of subsidies as "car­
rots" over the use of trade measures as "sticks." Second, l offer a crit ique 
of the "carrots only" approach endorsed by the GATT Secretariat .  Using 
16. Those who hold a n  ethical belief that i t  i s  simply wrong t o  harm the environment 
would not be satisfied by an economic analysis that merely assigns an economic value to this 
belief. The analysis in this art icle makes the conservative assumption that it is appropriate to 
value the environment only instrumentally, then builds a case for trade measures to protect 
the environment that does not require agreement with those who attach eth ica I signif1cance 
to the environment beyond its utility to humans. Those holding such ethical beliefs will have 
all the more reason to favor an inte rpretation of Article X X  more liberal than that presented 
by the GATT pa nel. 
17. For example . T also discuss issues of distributive justice. sec infi·a Part !Icl and 
accompanying notes, and of national sovereignty. sec infi·a Part TVA2bii and accompanying 
notes. 
1 8. Sec. e.g .. Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and the Elmron111ent: The False Conflic(l, in TR,\DE 
A:-JD ·1Ht=: ENVIRONiviENT: L;\W, Eco:-�OMICS, .·\i\D PuucY 159 (Durwoocl Zaelke et al. eels .. 
1993) (e:;say by a leading international economist. who served as Economic Policy Advisor to 
the Director-General of the GATT): Arvincl Subramanian, Trude Mmsures for Em·ironment: 
A Ncarl1· Empty Box:?. WoRLD ECON . . Jan. llJlJ2. at 13.5 (art ic le by an Economic Affairs 
Orlicer in the GATT Secre tariat ) ; see also TilE GREENING OF WoR LD TRA D E  ISSUES (Kym 
Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds .. llJI.J:2) (culkction of revised versiuns of background 
papers written by intern�ttion�tl economists �tnd nJmmissioned for the report by the GATT 
Sccrel:triat. Sllfii"ll note 8). 
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concepts from game theory, I defend unilateral st icks (and mult i lateral 
s ticks against countries not parties to the environmental p rotection agree­
ment )  as necessary to restrain more effectively exploitation of the environ­
ment pending a mult i lateral agreement. Finally, I address some possible 
p roblems posed by the use of sticks in general, and I advance some reasons 
to think that the use of st icks is  nevertheless more likely to p romote global 
economic welfare than the "carrots only" approach . 
Part I I I  turns to trade measures in  particular and explores the p roblems 
that would arise if  GATT Article XX allowed the use of trade measures to 
p rotect the global environment without any restrict ions or qual ifications .  
In  particular, I d iscuss how protectionist interests  could capture the domes­
t ic political process and exploit such an Article XX exception for their own 
ends. Finally, Part  IV offers an interpretation of Article XX that p laces 
appropriate l imits on the use of trade measures to guard against p rotection­
ism, while allowing the use of those trade measures that pose relatively 
l ittle risk of protection ism. 
I. BACKGROUND 
First, a few examples of environmental trade measures will serve to 
i l lustrate what is at  stake i n  the tuna/ dolphin controversy. These examples 
will prove to be useful as hypothetical cases in a discussion of possible 
future GATT disputes . Second, a review of the tuna/ dolphin controversy 
itself will provide the basis for a preliminary critique of each GATT 
panel's legal reasoning based on the text of Art icle XX. 
A. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
On the international level ,  various trade measures have been used or 
proposed to protect environmental interests. 10 The Montreal Protocol, 
which seeks to protect the earth's ozone layer by reducing emissions of 
chemicals l ike chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and halons, i s  one example of 
an international agreement that employs trade measures.20 The Montreal 
Protocol completely proh ibits trade in these controlled chemicals with 
nonsignatories , while allowing trade in these chemicals to cont inue (sub­
ject to restri ct ions) among signatories unt il the year 2000.21 These mea­
sures place nonsignatories at a commercial d isadvantage by denying them 
access to suppliers and to markets that remain avail able to signatories, and 
19. For a much more com pre h e ns ive survey of enviro n m e n t a l  trade measures. see Steve 
Charnov i t z .  A To.ronomv of Environil?enta! Trade J'v!easurcs, () GEO. i'iT.L ENVTL. L. REV. I 
( 1993). 
2.0. Montr,cal Protocol l111 Substances that Deplete the Ozone L1ycr, Sept. 16. 1987, S. 
TR[,.\TY Doc. No. 10. !DOth Cong., 1st Sess. (llJ87). 
2.1. Sec id. art. 4. paras. 1-2. al 5. 
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thus provide incent ives for these countries to join the Montreal P rotocol . 22 
Even more vulnerable to attack under the GATT are uni lateral trade 
measures taken by the United States pursuant to i ts national environmen­
tal laws. These l aws go still further in the use of trade measures to p rotect 
environmental interests .  For example, i n  1 97 1  the U.S .  Congress added the 
Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen 's Protective Act of 1 967,23 and in 
subsequent years the United States has i nvoked the Pelly Amendment 
with increasing frequency to protect wildl ife .24 As subsequently amended, 
the Pelly Amendment now authorizes the President to prohibit  the impor­
tation of any product from a foreign country whose nationals conduct 
fishing operations that "diminish the effect iveness of an i nternational 
fishery conservation program" or engage in t rade that " diminishes the 
effectiveness of any international program for endangered or  threatened 
species . "25 Pursuant to the Pelly Amendment, on August 5, 1 993,  Secre­
tary of Commerce Ron Brown certified that Norway may be subject to U.S .  
trade sanctions for i ts resumption of commercial hunting of minke whales, 
despite a moratorium on this whaling by the International Whaling Commis­
sion.26 
Similarly, also pursuant to the Pelly Amendment, President Bi l l  Clinton 
announced on April 1 1 , 1 994 that the United States would  prohibit  the 
importation of all wildl ife products from Taiwan because the sale of 
rhinoceros horns and tiger bones in Taiwan was undermining the Conven­
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wi ld Flora and 
Fauna (CITES) .27 The CITES prohibits commercial trade in species threat­
ened with extinction .2K The CITES itself provides that i t  "shall in no way 
affect the right of Parties to adopt" sti l l  "str icter domestic measures 
regard ing the conditions for trade" for species l isted under the CITES and 
" domestic measures restricting or prohibit ing trade" for species not l i sted 
22. It i s  u nc l ear  whe the r  t rade res t r i c t ions  t hat  are <tuthorized by a m u l t i l at e r a l  agreemen t  
a rc  cons i s t en t  w i t h  t h e  GATT panel's i n terpre t a t ion  o f  t h e  GATT. See inji-a no tes  83-86 and 
a ccom panying  text. 
23. Pe l l y  Amendment ,  Pub .  L. No. 92-2 1 9 , § 8, 85 Sta t .  786 ( 1 97 1 )  (cod i fied as amended  a t  
22 U .S . C .  § 1 978 (1988  & Supp .  I V  1 992)). 
24. See S teve Charnovi tz ,  Encouraging Enl·iromnelllal Cooperation Through the Pefly Am end-
11/CIII, 3 J .  E:--;v·T & DEv. 3 ( 1 994) .  
25 .  See 2 2  U.S. C. § 1 978(a ) (  1 ) -(2) ( 1 988 & Supp. I V  1 9<J2 ) .  
2h. President Clinton Delays Whaling Sancrions on Norway, 1 0  lnt' l  Trade Re p .  (BNA) 1 678 
(Oc t .  6 ,  1 993) .  The  C l i n ton  administration has  ye t  to i mpose any sanc t ions  o n  Norway.  See 
Aiso in the News, ll I n t ' l  Trade Rep. (BNA) 873,87-1 (June I, IY94) .  
27. See Presidelll Clinron Announces Sanctions o n  Taill'an for Rhino, Tiger Pans Trade, J I 
In t ' l  Trade Rep .  (BNA) 576 (Apr .  13. 1 99-1). The Un i t ed  States l i fted  t hese  sanc t ions  on  
June  30, 1 995. a ft e r Ta iwan amended i t s  l aws  t o  i m p rove w i l d l i fe conserva t i o n .  Sec Clinton 
Lifrs Sancrions on Tai11·an Fol!oll'ill!; Wildli(e Prorccrion SfL·ps, 1 2  lnt' l  Trade Rep .  (BNA) 1 1 35  
( Ju l y  5 .  19Y5). 
2:). Cunvcntiun on l nternat ion �d Trade in End<tngercd Species Df ·wi ld  Flora and Fa u n a ,  
Ofh'lzcdfor.ligualurc Mar. .1, lY73. 27 U .S.T. 1()�.:7. 993 U.�.T.S. 2-13jhe re i n a ft e r  CITES\. 
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under the CITES?Y The CITES does not authorize these measures so 
much as it acknowledges that parties may have the right to take these 
measures already. 
The United States is not the only party to the GATT that h as employed 
uni lateral trade measures to protect environmental interests .  The Euro­
pean Union (EU), even as it  criticizes the United States for its uni lateral 
trade measures, has adopted similar measures . Out of concern for the 
welfare of animals captured using particularly cruel and p ainfu l  methods, 
the European Communitl0 (EC) in 1 99 1  imposed a ban, to take effect in 
1 996, that will p rohibit  imports of certain furs from any "country where the 
leg-hold trap is st i l l  used . "3 1 The EC regulation was d irected at fur from 
Canada and the United States in particular, in the hope that  these two 
countries would be induced to cooperate in the development of in terna­
t ional "humane trapping standards ."32 The Canadian government invoked 
the GATT dispute-settlement process in an effort to block the ban .33 To 
resolve the dispute, the EU, the United States, and Canada have agreed to 
form a working group to formulate standards for traps.34 
Other trade measures to protect the environment have been proposed in  
the U.S .  Congress.35 Senator David Boren of  Oklahoma introduced a bi l l  
that proposed a far more sweeping l ink between trade and environmental 
protection abroad than any attempted by previous legislat ion .36 That bi l l  
complained that " United States industry cannot reasonably be expected to 
incur increasing capital costs of compliance with environmental  controls 
while its foreign competitors enjoy a substantial and widening competit ive 
advantage as a result of remaining unfettered by pollution control obl iga­
tions ."37 In response, the bi l l  declared lax "environmental safeguards" to 
be an impermissible subsidy and authorized special duties against imports 
29. C ITES, supra n o t e  28, a r t .  X IV ,  para .  1, 27 U . S . T. at 1108, 993 U .N .T .S .  a t  253 .  
30. A s  of November 1993, when the Maastricht Trea ty o n  European Union came into 
force .  t h e  Europe an  Com m u n i ty ( EC) became known as t h e  E u ropean  U n i o n  ( E U ) .  See 
JACKSON ET 1\L., supra note  12 ,  at 187-88. Th i s  ar t i cle t h erefore refe rs  to the E u ropean  
Un ion  ( EU )  aft e r  November  Jl)93 and  to the European Com m u n i ty ( EC )  before November  
1993 . 
3 1. Counci l  Regula t ion  3254/91, 1991 O . J .  (L 308) 1, 1. The embargo was t o  t a ke ellect i n  
1995, but  the EU d e l ayed i t s  i m p l e m e t a t ion  for one year. See Also in the News, 12  I n t ' l  Trade 
Rep .  (BNA) 908, 911 ( May 24, 1995). 
32. Jd.; see S t eve Ch arnovi tz ,  Environnzenwl Trade Aieusures: J'vful!ilareral or Unih1rera/?, 23 
EWTL. POL'Y & L. 154, 1 5 7  ( llJ93 ) .  
3.1. See Also in the News, 11 ln t ' l  Trade Rep .  (BN A )  968, 969 ( J u n e  15, 1994). 
34. See U.S., EU lU [.rtend Conzpensalion Pau Until End of This Year. Officiuls Say, 12 ln t 'l 
Trade Rep .  (BNA) 944 ( M ay 3 1. 1995). 
35. One b i l l  i n t roduced wou l d  h ave suspe nded  du ty- free t r ea tmen t  u n d e r  t h e  Gen e ra l i zed 
Sys t em of  Pre ferences  for  wooJ art ic l e s  i mported from <IllY h ardwood-expor t i ng cou n t ry that 
fa i l e d  to i n�t i tute <I S<ltisfactory re fores ta t ion  p rogram. See H.R. 27S2. JOist Cong .. lst Sess. 
( 1989) . 
.3G. Sec S. 90-1. IU::'cl Cong .. lst Sess. ( ILJ91 ). 
37. M � 2(5), at 2-3. 
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from countries whose policies did not meet U.S .  standards?8 This type of 
proposal t reats exports by these producers as "ecodumping," a form of 
unfa ir  trade justifying countervail ing duties to offset the lower costs en­
joyed by the foreign producer.39 
B. THE MARINE MAMMAL P ROTECTION ACT 
The U.S .  Congress passed the MMP A with the stated goal of reducing 
the incidental kill ing of marine mammals in the course of commercial 
fishing to insignificant levels approaching zero.40 The M MPA includes 
special p rovisions to l imit  the number of dolphins kil led through tuna 
fishing in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP) .  In the ETP, groups of 
dolphins often swim over schools of yellowfin tuna .  Fishing fleets in the 
ETP take advantage of this phenomenon by looking for dolphins as they 
come to the surface to breathe and then encircling them with mile-long 
"purse seine nets" to catch the tuna below. As a result of these practices, 
U .S .  fishermen in the early 1 970s k illed as many as 400,000 dolphins 
annually .4 1 
In 1 972, Congress responded with the MMPA,42 which subjects the U.S .  
fishing industry to l icensi ng and regulatory requirements that l imit  the 
total allowable number of dolphins killed annually through U.S. fishing 
practices .43 The MMPA was extremely successful in reducing the number 
of dolphins k illed by U .S .  fleets to fewer than 20,500 per year in the 
1 980s,44 and to a mere 1 004 by 1 99 1 .45 While U.S .  dolphin k i l l ings fell ,  
however, foreign tuna fishing efforts grew. By the mid- 1 980s, foreign 
fishing fleets accounted for several t imes more dolphin deaths than U.S .  
fishing fleets.46 Fishing vessels could reflag and thereby avoid  the regula-
38 .  !d. § 3 ( a) ,  at 3 -4 .  Ear l i e r  b i l l s wou l d  h ave i m posed du t ies  to o ffset compet i t ive 
advantages flowi ng from l e n i e n t  env i ro n m e n t a l  s tandards abroad b u t  were l im ite d to part icu­
lar products. See, e.g. , H . R. 1 905,  99th Cong. ,  l s t  Sess.  1 ( 1985 ) ("A b i l l  to offset the 
competitive advan tage w h i c h  fore ign coal  produce rs h ave as a resu lt  of not h av ing  to m e e t  
e nvi ro nm enta l ,  h ea lth ,  we l fare and sa fe ty  req u i rements  o f  t h e  k i nds i mposed on U n i ted  
States coa l  producers ,  and fo r  oth e r  purposes" ) :  S .  353 ,  99 t h  Cong . ,  1 st S ess .  1 ( 1 985) ( "A 
b i l l  t o  i n crease t h e  du ty on  i m ported copper by an  amoun t  w h i c h  offsets the cost i ncu rred by  
copper  prod ucers i n  t h e  U n i ted  S t a tes  i n  meeti ng domestic env i ronme ntal r equ i reme nts " ) .  
39 .  ESTY, supra note 6, a t  1 63 .  
4 0 .  1 6  U . S .C. § 1 37 l ( a ) ( 2 )  ( 1 91-m & Supp I V  1 992 ) .  
4 1 .  T a k i n g  and  I m porting Mar i ne  Ivlamma l s  I n c i d e n t a l  to Com m e rc i a l  F i sh i ng Ope ra-
t ions ,  55  Fed.  Reg. 1 1 .92 1 ,  1 1 ,92 1 ( 1 990) . 
42 .  Mar i ne  Mamma l  Protection  Act o f  1 972 ,  Pub .  L. No. 92-522 , 86 Stat. 1 027 .  
43 .  1 6  U . S . C. § §  l 3 7 l ( a ) ( 2 ) ,  1 3 74 ( 1988 & S u pp .  IV 1 992 ) .  
44 .  Tak ing  ancl I m por t ing  Mar ine M am m a l s  Inc iden ta l  to Com m e rc i a l  F i s h i ng Opera ­
t ions ,  55  F e d .  Reg. 1 1 ,9 2 1 ,  1 1 ,92 1 ( 1 990 ) .  
45 . P h i l l i ps ,  supra n ute 5 . at 1 35 ( " US d o l p h i n  mort �t l i ty was reduced from 1 2,643 i n  1 989 
to 5 , 100 in 1990 to 1 ,004 in 1 99 1  . . . .  ' ' ) .  
46. I n  1 987.  t h e  U .S .  t una  fl e e t  k i l l ed 1 3 .992 do lph ins .  w h i l e  fo reign flee t s  k i l l ed ove r 
1 03 . 000. H . R .  R E I' .  No.  970,  t OO th  Cong . .  2 cl S e s s .  1 5  ( 1 988 ) .  n:pri11 1cd in 1 9 8 8  U . S .C .C .J\ . N .  
6 1 54 .  6 1 5 6 .  
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t ions applied to U.S .  vessels.47 Congress responded with amendments to 
the MMPA to deal more effect ively with the foreign fteets .48 
As amended, the MMPA now includes a number of restrictions on fish 
imports. First , the MMP A requires the Secretary of the Treasury to "ban 
the importation of commercial fish or  products from fish which have been 
caught with commercial fishing technology which results in the incidental 
kill or incidental serious i njury of ocean mammals in excess of United 
S tates standards. "49 More specifically, the MMPA prohibits imports of 
yellowfin tuna harvested with purse seine nets in the ETP unless the 
government of the country using purse seine nets provides evidence of "a  
regulatory program governing the incidental taking o f  marine mammals 
. . .  that is comparable to that of the United States" and that achieves a 
dolphin kill rate "comparable" to that of the U.S .  fleet.50 I f  the foreign 
program is not comparable, then the United States must b an imports of 
yellowfin tuna caught by countries whose technology fails to meet U .S .  
standards. The MMPA requires not  only a direct ban on  yellowfin tuna 
imports from nations fai l ing to make this showing-the primary embargo­
but also a secondary embargo on yellowfin tuna imports from any " interme­
d iary nation" that fails to certify that it has not imported any yellowfin 
tuna from the primary nation within the last six months.5 1 
C. GATT ARTICLE X X  AND THE 1 99 1 GATT PAN E L  D E C I S I O N  
Pursuant to the MMPA, the United States imposed a ban on the 
importation of yellowfin tuna harvested with purse seine nets in the ETP 
by Mexico,52 which had the largest fish ing fleet in the ETP .5:i  Mexico 
complained that the ban violated the GATT, and at Mexico's request, the 
GATT established a panel in 1 9 9 1 to address the dispute.  That GATT 
panel concluded that the ban was a quantitat ive restriction prohib i ted by 
GATT Article XI .5-l The United States argued that the  MMPA came 
47.  Steve C h a rnovi tz ,  Dolphin und Tuna : An Ana lysis of t!ze Second GA T T  Panel Report. 24 
Envt l .  L. R e p .  ( Envt l .  L. l n st . )  ] ( J . 5o7 ,  1 0 , 5 6 9  ( 1 994 ) .  
48. See Mar ine  M a m m a i  Protec t ion  Act A m e n d m e nts  of  1 9 8 8 ,  Pub. L .  i'·fo .  l 00-7 1 1 , 
s e c .  4( a ) ,  § l 0 l ( a ) ( 2 ) ,  1 02 S t a t .  475 5 , 4765 - 611 :  Act of J u ly 1 7. 1 984. P u b .  L. N o .  \)g -364.  l i t .  L 
� l O I ( a ) ( 2 ) ,  9 ;)  S t a t .  440.  clclO. 
49 .  16 U . S .  C. § 1 3 7 1  ( a ) \ 2 )  ( ! 98�� & S u p p .  I V  1 9!i2 ) .  
50.  !d. § ! 3 7 l ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( i ) .  After 1 09 1 1 .  t o  b e  d �· e m e d  " c o m p a rai.-d c . "  t h e  avc r�tgc: i n c 1 ck n ta !  
dolphin  mort a l i ty r at e m u s t  P n t  exceed 1 . 25 t imes  t h e  ave rage fl)l" U . S .  v e s s e l s  fu r t h e  �: : t m c  
period. hi. § I 37 l ( a ) ( 2 ) ( B ) ( ! i ) i l l ) . 
5 1 .  M * J 37 l ( �1 ) ( 2 ) { C ) .  
5 2 .  ,)'cf! f"�/ o t i ce o f  E rn h �t r�n i"u i· -l�: i i n\:, .. i : n  �ru n �L 5 6  T=r: ct .  F.eg .  l 1 . ?· h 7  ( 1 9 9 1  ') . 
5 3 .  See Ch arnov i tz .  SUf}.,. .U i� C L �  -� 7 .  �t t l 0 . ) 7U .  
5 4 .  1 99 1  Decision .  Sl !j)r:t r: u t �_· : . p �: r �L 5 . l S � :J t 1 00 .  ; .. r t i c l (_:: ;{ I s :. a t �: ::; :  - - r---rc, p r�; h l l< t i o n �; o i· 
res t r i c t i o n !"  . . . s h a l l  b:.: i n >. t i t u t i:'� d  ur ;·:·: � t i n t ;; � i n c d  by a ny c o n t f�!c t i ng p a r ty u : 1  t he � n1 r.: �1 rUt t j u n  
nf �: n�.r prod u c t  o f  the  l i� t-r i � n ;·>' •. } r  �1 r1>·' �J t h e r  c��J n i ra c t i n g  p :: � r !_ y  . . . . . . G r-\  Trr. su_nru n c.1 t c  L d i" L  
� < L  6 i  S L d .  p t .  5 .  :.! t f.\ .-1 .:: . ) 5  iJ . t··-1 . -r . = .  d !.  2 2-!- . 2 2 6 .  
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within the Article X X  exceptions to the obligations under the GATT.55 In 
the parts re l ied upon by the United States, Article XX provides :  
S ubject t o  the requirement t h a t  s u c h  m easures a r e  n o t  appl i e d  i n  a 
manner which would constitute a m e an s  of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
d iscriminat ion between countries where the same conditions p revai l ,  or  a 
d isguised restriction on international  trade, nothing i n  this Agreement  
shal l be construed to prevent  the  adoption o r  enforcement by any con­
tract i ng party of measures: 
(b) necessary to protect hum an, animal  or plant l i fe or health;  
(g)  relating to the conservation of exhaustible n atural  resources i f  such 
measures are made effective in conj unction with restrictions on domestic 
p roduction or  consumption;  
56 
The GATT panel rejected the notion that Article XX(b) applied to 
"human, animal or plant l i fe or health outside the jurisdiction of the 
contracting party taking the measure ,"  even though that provision "refers 
to l ife and health protection generally without expressly l imiting that 
protection to the j ur isdiction of the contracting party concerned. "57 The 
panel simil arly rejected the "extraju risd ictional application" of Article 
XX(g) to natural resources outside the jurisdiction of the government 
taking the measure.5x 
The panel strained to reach its conclusions regarding Article XX through 
rather questionable reasoning. For example, the panel purported to base 
its conclusion regard ing Article XX(b) on "the d rafting history of Article 
XX(b ) ,  the purpose of this provision, and the consequences that the 
interpre tat ions proposed by the parties would have for the operation of 
the General Agreement as a whole .  "5') The only bit of drafting history t h e  
panel could invoke , however, w a s  the fac t  that  one earlier draft i n cluded 
some addit ional language : "For the purpose of protecting h u m a n ,  animai  
or plant l ife or h ealth ,  if  corresponding domestic safeguards under sim i l a r  
_l ' • • • ' • • , � r1( ) 'C' · t� . .J 1...- . con mt;ons exist m t n e m1 portmg cou n t ry.  ·· .even r \Ve co ns1oer t n 1 s  
----- · ----·- ---· 
:J ) .  Sc'e j 99j Decision � supra n c t e  2 .  p� �r�l S .  j _ � 3 ,  . -HJ.  a t  1 70, 172 .  
56.  G ,::,,TT . .  ;lpm n u t e  : . ct r t .  XX, b .l �; t �! t .  p t  5 .  at  ,\GU-f d .  55 U.N .T .S .  �1 t 262 .  
5 7  . ./ 9 91 i)ecis/f)! l ,  :: [ ipn; n o � e  2 .. p �-t !· : : .  �-; _ 2 5 ,  �l t l � �( 
5 ti .  ]r/. pt i l- �L � - �1 2 .  � i. L  2UU-G l .  
) l) _  it!. p �,, : ·�� - ) . 2:� .  t: t 1 9S .  
6 ( ) _  /"c/. !=: � l r�: . �� - 26 .  ;_:_ ! j ()�-� ( '�j U '  .. : l i !; g  !. h :� ! ' i e \\' -!o r:..:. "C>r ;_l !'t o r  t r� c  C h �\ r i e r  o f  t h e  : �� t t.' l' I-! :�l t \•: r: � l \  
-C! ·ad·..' 0 1\��� n iz�t t i !  _ _  ;n ) .  T�;;,:: �L- ;_-� rt �.: r:--: ! �1 t e :· cl n) p �;c-d t f-! 1 .-.:. �l �-�;J. t::· d ! �l i1 g u c�gc as - - u n n c ;__>�:�s �r:·�. - . - - � t : 1 ·.:� 
t h :.� C7/·� ·r-r p �t n c l  i 1� f�: r:.� t h �: t  · c h <: c u : ! -:: �.� r r : >> o ;· U1�..: (_: : · � �ft �.:: rs o f  J\ r t t �..:lt: �  :X}� ( b ) f•J c u s � d  o n  l h "-· 
:..1 s c  ;_:. f �� :.l n i t �try :ne c\S Lt�_- i �� t l� >, :.t L:.'�Lt t:_ rd J i fc � ) ;· h c- �l i t h  e: f h u rn :J n s ,  �� n i rn ;;. l s  or p i �� i } t S  ,-.,-- i i. ;-; i n  � h e:  
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l imi tation relevant ,  however ,  i t  merely impl ies that any measure must not  
discriminate between countries without justification. I n  par ticular ,  mea­
sures should generally apply to domestic products standards that are at 
least as stringent as those applied to imported products. The l imitat ion 
ident ified in the draft ing history of Article XX(b) regulates d iscriminat ion 
among producers based on nat ional i ty,  but i t  does not imply anything 
about the geographic location of the "human, animal or plant l ife" to be 
protected.6 1 
The GATT panel employed similarly dubious reasoning with respect to 
Article XX(g). First ,  i t  pointed to a p revious panel 's  holding that a trade 
measure must be "primarily aimed at  rendering effect ive" the " restrictions 
on domestic production or consumption" in order to be "made effective in 
conjunction with"  those restrictions.62 The panel went on to assert that  
" [a] country can effectively control the production or consumption of an 
exhaustible natural resource only to the extent that  the p roduction or  
consumption is  under  i ts jurisdict ion, "  and concluded that  "Art icle XX(g) 
was in tended to permit contracting parties to take trade measures p rimar­
ily aimed at rendering effective restrictions on production or consumption 
within their  jurisdict ion . "63 Given this interpretation, i t  is hard to see why 
the panel ruled against the Uni ted States :  the trade measures mandated by 
the MMPA are indeed "primari ly aimed at rendering effective restrictions 
on p roduction . . .  within their jurisdiction , "  namely, the restrict ions on 
U.S. tuna fishers,  who are within the prescriptive jurisdict ion of the United 
States . 
The panel held implicitly that  the natural resource i tself must be within 
the territorial jurisdiction of the country employing the trade measure. 
Article XX(g) , however, requires only that the measure be "made effective 
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consump-
w h i c h  p ro h ib i ts · ' a rb i t ra ry or u nju s t i fiab l e  d i sc r i m i n a t i on  between coun t r i e s"  and any "d is­
gu i sed restr ic t ion on  i n t e rna t i ona l  t rade," a l re ady expressed the s a me l i m i ta t i on  on  a l l  
Ar t i c l e  X X  exce p t ions .  See S teve Cha rnov i t z ,  Exploring the Environmen ta l  Erceptions in 
GA TT A rticle X , .1 . WORLD T R c\DE, Oct .  1 99 1 ,  a t  37 ,  44.  
6 1 .  S t eve Charnov i tz  has  c r i t i c i zed  the GATT pane l ' s  "domes t i c  o n l y" r e a d i ng o f  ' · t i fe or 
h e a l th "  in Ar t i c l e  X X ( b )  and  " n a tura l  resources" in Ar t i c l e  X X ( g ) ,  po i n t i ng to  ' · t h e  long  
h i s tory o f  env i ro n m e nta l  l aws and  t re a t i es concerned w i t h  sea l s ,  ma tch  worke rs.  f i s he r i e s ,  
e tc .-in o the r  cou n t r i e s as w e l l  as  i n  t he  i n te r n a t i o n a l  · commons . ' "  C h a r novi tz ,  supra note  
60, a t  52 .  Charnovi t z  o tTe rs a n  exce l l e n t  rev i ew o f  t h i s  h i story.  See id. a t  39-43 .  Cha rnov i t z  
adds  t h a t  · ' t h e  U n i t e d  S t a te s-t h e  au thor of  t h e  l anguage u l t i m a t e l y  adopted-c lea r l y  
be l i eved t h a t  A rt i c l e  XX(b )  wou ld  cou n tenan ce ex i s t i ng  U .S .  t rade l aws,  . .  w h i c h  i nc l uded  
u n i l a t e ra l  a s  we l l  as m u l t i l a te ra l  m e asures to p ro tec t  w i ld l i fe ou t s ide  U .S .  j ur i sd i c t i on .  !d. a t  
44-45 . 
62 .  1 99 1  Decision . supra note 2 ,  para .  5 .3 1 .  a t  200 ( q uo t i ng Report of rlu : Pan el. Can a d a ­
Measures Af.fi:cring Erporrs of Unprocessed Herring and Sal111on , GATT Doc .  L / 6 2 6 8 .  p; 1 ra .  4 . 6  
( adopted M a r. 22.  l l)88 ) .  in G A TT. B,\ S I C  1 0/STRU:\I ENTS X\ D SE LECTED DoCU :\ I F i'\TS n .  1 14 
( 3 5 t h  Supp .  J l)8l) J ) .  
(i_) _  !d. 
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t ion,"64 not that the government applying the measure exercise effective 
control over the natural resource. Thus, the 1 9 9 1  panel  adopted an i nterpre­
tat ion of "effective" supported neither by the text of Article XX(g) nor by 
the prior panel  decision that i t  c ited, which merely required the trade 
measure to be primarily aimed at rendering domestic restrictions effective . 
That prior panel decision only imposed condit ions on the pwpose of the 
t rade measure, not on i ts  effect iveness. 
The settlemen t  ult imately negotiated between Mexico and the United 
S tates suggests that the panel report may never be adopted by the GATT 
Council .65 Thus, the MMPA remains i n  place. The question of its legal i ty, 
however, was far from moot: the Uni ted States was soon defending the 
MMP A before another GATT panel .  
D.  THE 1 994 GATT PANEL DECISION 
Before the 1 9 9 1  panel decision, the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS) announced on June 12, 1 991  that it would begin to enforce the 
MMPA against several  intermediary nations, i ncluding members of the 
EC.66 In 1 992, the United States expanded the l ist of i ntermediary nat ions, 
and the EC and the Netherlands asked the GATT Council to establ ish a 
panel to address their complaints about the MMPA.67 The panel ,  estab­
l ished in  1 992, did not produce a report until 1 994. 
Like the 1 99 1  panel ,  the 1 994 panel  held that the MMPA violated 
GATT Article XI and did not fal l  within the exceptions l isted in Article 
XX. Unl ike the 199 1  panel, however, the 1 994 panel rej ected the not ion 
that  the "animal  or p lant l ife or health" described in Article XX(b ) or the 
" natural resources" described in Article XX(g) must lie with in the territo-
64 .  GATT. supra note l .  ar t . XX(g ) ,  6 1  S t a t .  pt .  5 ,  a t  A6 l . 55  U . N .T. S .  a t  262 .  
65 . I n  1 992 ,  a l l  s t a tes  w hose vesse l s  fi sh for  tuna  in  the  ETP,  inc lud ing  the  members  o f  the  
I n t e r-American  Trop ica l  Tuna Comm iss ion ( IATTC) ,  s igned a n  agreeme n t ,  to  take  eft'ect i n  
1 993. to  reduce  do l p h i n  morta l i ty i n  t h e  ETP .  The 1 992  agre e m e n t  i nc l u des  Co lumbia ,  Costa 
R ica ,  Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua . Panama ,  t h e  U n i te d  S t a t es, Vanua tu ,  and Ve nezue l a .  
See / 994 Decision , supra note  2 ,  paras. 2.3 . . 4, a t  3 & n . 2 .  A l t hough Mexico l e ft t h e  TATTC i n  
1 978, i t  h a s  p ledged t o  re jo i n .  C h a rn ov i tz ,  supra note  4 7 ,  a t  1 0 ,5 7 1 .  A s  a res u l t  o f  t h i s  
agre e me n t ,  t h e  Bush  adm in i s t ra t ion  sought  l eg i s l a t i on  to  l i ft t h e  t u n a  i m por t  b a n ,  b u t  fa i l e d  
to  persuade Congress .  T h e  Cl i n ton  Ad m i n i s t ra t i on  has  s i nce proposed a m e n d m e n t s  to t h e  
M M PA t h a t  would e n d  t h e  t u n ;l e m bargo for coun t r ies  p a rt i c i pa t i ng i n  t h e  T ATTC program.  
Sec Ad111in istration Calls jiH End to Tuna Emb(ngocs for !A TTC Coun tries , 1 2  I n t ' l  Trade Rep .  
( BN A )  1 1 0 1  (June 28 ,  1 995 ) .  A l th ough Mex ico 's  i n c i d e n t a l  d o l p h i n  k i l l s  fe l l  by 96% between 
1 986 and  1 994,  the ban on  t u n a  i m por t s  from Mexico re m a i n s  i n  p l ace .  See id .  a t  1 10 2 ;  see 
also Chr i s  Krau l ,  Angling for Relief' U. S. Ban on J'vlexican Tuna Batters Ensenada , L. A .  TL \I ES, 
M ay 30, 1 995,  at D J ,  07 ( "The n umber  of do lph in s  k i l l e d  by t u n a  boa ts  o pera ted  hy M ex ico 
a n d  o t h e r  cou n t ri e s  i n  t h e  E;1st e rn P;1 c i fi c  dec l i ned  from 1 33 .000 i n  1 986 to 4 .000 l as t  
year  . . . . . . ) .  
66. Not ice w I m p o rt e rs .  5 ()  F e e l .  Reg .  26,995 ( 1 99 1 ) . The  NMFS soug h t  c c rt i ti c a t i o n  fro m 
Cos t a  Rica .  France . I t a ly .  J a p a n .  � 1nd P a n �1 m a  rega rd ing  ye l lowfi n  t u n a  i m p o rt e d  from 
M e x i co .  
o 7 .  ! CJ!.J.f. Decision . supm n tll e  2 ,  pa ras .  1 . 1 .  2 . 1 4 , a t  I .  7 .  
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rial jurisdiction of the party i nvoking Article XX. That is ,  the 1 994 panel 
rej ected the arguments advanced by the EC and the Netherlands based on 
the "extrajurisd ictional" rationale of the 1 9 9 1  panel decis ion .68 The panel 
i nstead looked to the pla in language of Article XX and concluded that i t  
allowed countries to  protect resources outside their own territorial jurisd ic­
t ions.69 
The 1 994 panel st i l l  found against the Uni ted States, basing i ts holding 
on a d ifferent objection to the MMPA: 
[M] easures t a k e n  u n d e r  the  primcuy nation embargo pro h ib ited  i mports 
from a country of any tuna,  whether or not the part i c u l a r  tuna was 
h a rvested in a way that  harmed or  coul d  harm dolphins,  as long as t h e  
country 's  t u n a  harvesting practices a n d  pol ic ies  were n o t  comparab l e  t o  
those o f  the  United States . . . .  [T] h e  p ro h i b i ti o n  o n  imports of t u n a  i n t o  
the  United States taken under t h e  pr imary nat ion embargo coul d  n o t  
possibly, b y  i tself. further the  Uni ted  S tates conservation obj e ctives. The 
primary nat ion embargo coul d  achieve i t s  des ired effect o n ly i f  i t  were 
fol lowed by changes in  policies and practices in  the export ing coun­
t ries .70 
The panel s imilarly observed that :  
[M] easures taken u n d e r  the  intennedia1y n a t i o n  embargo prohib i ted  
imports from a country o f  any tuna ,  whether  or not  the p art icular  tuna 
was harvested i n  a manner that  harmed or  could harm d o lp h ins,  and 
whether  or not the  count ry had tuna harvesting pract ices and pol ic ies  
that  harmed or  could harm dolphins,  as long as i t  was fro m  a country 
that  imported tuna from countries m a i n tain ing tuna harves t i ng practices 
and pol ic ies  not comparable to  those of the United States .7 1 
The panel infe rred that both import bans "were taken so as to force 
other countries to change their policies with respect to persons and things 
within their own jurisdiction, since the embargoes requi red  such changes 
in order to have any effect on the conservation of dolph ins .  "72 The panel 
68 .  Sec id. paras .  5. 1 4, . 3 0 .  a t  5 3 ,  58. 
69. The 1 994 pane l  observed t h at " t h e  t ext  of Ar t i c l e  XX(g )  docs no t  s p e l l  ou t  a n y  
l i m i ta t i o n  on  t h e  loca t ion  of t h e  exhaus t ib l e  n a t u r a l  resources t o  be  conse rved . "  !d. rara .  
5. l 5 ,  a t  5 4 .  The pane l  found  " no va l i d  reason su ppor t i ng the  con c lus ion  t ha t  t he  p rovi s ions  
o f  Ar t i c l e  X X ( g )  app ly  o n ly to  . . .  resou rces l ocated w i t h i n  t he  terr i to ry o f  the  con t rac t i ng 
par ty i nvok ing  the  p rovis ion . · ·  !d. para .  5 . 20.  at 5 5 .  S i m i l a r ly ,  t h e  p a n e l  observed t h a t  " t h e  
text  o f  Art ic le  X X ( b )  docs n o t  s p e l l  ou t  a ny l i m i t a t ion  o n  t h e  locat ion o t· t h e  l iv i ng t h i ngs to 
b e  protec t e d , ' '  id.  para .  5. 3 1, a t  5 9, and concl uded  t h a t  ' · t h e  l i fe and h e a l t h  o t· d o l p h i n �  i n  t h e  
eas tern  t rop ica l  Pac i tl c  Ocean fe l l  w i t h i n  t h e  r ange o f  pol i c i e s  cove red b y  Art i c l e  
X X ( b )  . . .  Jd para .  5 . 3 3 .  at  59. 
7 0 .  !d. para .  5.24, at 5 0 - 5 7 .  
7 1 .  !d .  par: ! .  5 . 2 3 ,  at  5 o .  
7 2 .  !d. p a r a .  5 . 24 .  a t  5 7 .  
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held against the United States, concluding that 
measures taken so as to force other countries to change their  pol icies,  
and that were effective only i f  such changes occurred, could not be 
primarily a imed either at the conservation of  an exh austible n atural  
resource,  or at rendering effective restrictions on domestic production or  
consumption,  i n  the meaning of Article XX(g) . 73 
By similar reasoning, the panel concluded that these measures "could not 
be  considered ' necessary' for the protection of animal l ife or  health in the 
sense of Article XX(b ) . "74 
The panel reached these conclusions after  conceding that "the text of 
Article XX is not expl icit on this quest ion ."75 But i t  is part icularly hard to 
see how the language cited can possibly bear the meaning that the panel 
attributed to Article XX(b ) .  With respect to Article XX(b ) ,  the panel 
seems to have read "necessary" to mean "sufficient"-indeed, to mean 
"sufficient in  the absence of any change in  pol icy by foreign governments . "  
With respect t o  Art icle XX(g) , t h e  panel construed "effective" t o  mean 
"effective in  the absence of any change in  pol icy by foreign governments . "  
Much l ike the 1 99 1  panel ,  then, the 1 994 panel departed from the pla in 
and unqualified language of Art icle XX and based its i nterpretation of 
that text i nstead on "the basic objectives and principles" of the GATT.76 I 
wil l turn to the GATT panels' policy arguments in Part I I I .  
The analysis that fol lows crit icizes both  GATT panels' i nterpretations of 
Article XX, largely from an economic policy perspective. First , I explain 
why the general approach of both GATT panels would be likely to reduce 
global economic welfare. Second, I argue that contrary to the cla ims of 
both GATT panels,  " the basic objectives and principles" of GATT do not 
require the cramped read ings of Article X X  that they proposed .  Instead, a 
broader reading of Article XX would promote environmental p rotection 
and global economic efficiency without undermining the regime of l iberal­
ized t rade estab l i shed by the GATT. 
II .  AN ECONOM I C  CRITIQUE OF THE GATT PANELS' L I MITS ON 
A RTICLE XX 
Each GATT panel 's reading of the exceptions in  Artic le  XX of the 
GATT allows each government to choose the l evel o f  e nviro nmental 
protect ion within  i ts  territorial  j uri sdiction,  free from the t hreat of trade 
73 .  !d. para .  5 . 27 .  a t  5 7 .  
7 4 .  Jd. p a r a .  :'\ . 3 9 ,  a t  Cl l :  see id. paLtS .  5 . 3 6 - . 3 7 ,  a t  60 .  
75 .  !d. para .  ) . 38. a t () ]  (w i th  respe c t  t o  Art i c l e  XX( h ) ) :  s e e  id. p a r a .  5 .2 .5 .  �1 t 5 7  ( th ,_; tex t  
· ' d o e s  not  prov i d e  a c k ; t r  a n s w e r "  with  respe c t  tn Art ic le  XX(g) ) .  
76. !d. para� .  :'i . :c, . .  30.  a t  5 7 .  6 ! .  
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sanctions. 77 Economic theory, as well as notions of national sovereignty, 
suggest that countries should set environmental standards that  maximize 
national welfare in  light of local conditions, provided that there are no 
externalities across national boundaries. As long as there are no such 
spil lovers and governments choose the efficient level of environmental 
protection (by equating social marginal benefits and costs and thereby 
maximizing national social welfare) ,  competit ion in  international trade and 
investment wil l  be efficient . 78 We do not obtain these opt imal i ty results, 
however, in the presence of i nternational environmental external i t ies .  
A. THE ECONOMIC P ROBLEM: I NTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
EXTERNALITIES 
The effects of activi t ies on one side of a border need not be l imited by 
that border. Activit ies ent irely within one country can have effects withi n  
another country. Pollution travels across boundaries. CFC emissions de­
plete the earth's ozone layer, exposing the entire world to greater levels of 
ultraviolet radiation. Carbon d ioxide emissions and destruction of the 
tropical rain forest both contribute to global warming. In the presence of 
such transboundary externalit ies, no nation has the optimal incen tives to 
regulate activit ies within its borders that generate environmental harms 
elsewhere. Unless each nation internalizes the negative external i t ies gener­
ated by pollution, for example ,  each government wil l  have too l i ttle incen­
t ive to l imit pollution . 
Furthermore, as with transboundary externalit ies, activit ies by one na­
t ion in the global commons can also affect the interests of other nations .  
Countries exploiti ng the global commons can impose negative externalit ies 
on each other,  leading to the " tragedy of the commons . "79 These harmful 
spil lover effects, however, need not always be mutual; they can harm the 
interests of countries that are not participating in the exploitation in 
question .  The fishing practices at  issue in  the tuna cases, for example, were 
not purely " self-regard ing" : they ki l led dolphins in the global commons, to 
the detriment of a l l  who value dolphins .  In  this context, even if a l l  govern­
ments un ilaterally maximize national welfare , international regulat ions are 
still needed to protect the global environment from inefficient exploitat ion.  
These prob lems suggest that the GATT should allow individual countries 
77 .  See id. ; I 99 I Decision , supra note  2,  pa ras. 5 .27 ,  . 3 2 ,  a t  J 99-20 1 .  
7S . See Wal l ace E .  Oates  & Robert  M .  Schwab, Economic Coillperirion A 1non,t; Jurisdic­
tions: Efficiency Enhan cing or Distorrion Inducing:;, 35 J. PuB.  ECON.  333 ( 1 908) .  The same 
cons ide rat ions  app ly  to com pet i t ion  among s t a t e s  with d i fferen t  e nv i ron m e n t a l  regu l a t ions  i n  
a fed e r a l  syste m .  See Richard  L.  Rcvesz , Relzabiliraring In rersrare Co111peririon: I?erlunking rlze 
' Race-ro-rlze -Bolloll l · ·  Ra tionale for Federal Em·iron mental  Regu lation . 67 N . Y . u .  L. R E V .  
1 2 1 0 ( 1 99 2 ) .  
7 1.J .  Garre t t  H a rd i n ,  The Traged\· o r  the COIII I I/011S , 1 62 SCI ENCE 1 24 .3  ( 1 96 8 ) :  sec H �tnl l cl 
Demsctz ,  T01rard a Thi!On' u( Propcm· Rig/us . 57 A \·1 . Ecc m .  R e v .  P .-\ I' E R S  & P 1w c. 3-l-7 
( 1 96 7 ) .  
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to take steps to protect the global commons, and the United States argued 
before both GATT panels that such steps should include trade measures. 
The 1 99 1  GATT panel held, however, that "even if  Article XX(b) were 
in terpreted to permit extrajurisdictional protection of l ife and heal th ," the 
U .S .  ban on Mexican tuna imports would violate the GATT because i t  is 
not "necessary" to protect dolphins .80 GATT panels have strictly in ter­
preted the term "necessary":  t he Un ited S tates had the heavy burden of 
showing that there was no alternat ive measure less inconsistent with the 
GATT that i t  could reasonably have used instead .8 1  Mexico argued that 
b il ateral or multi lateral negotiat ions would be a better approach than 
uni lateral trade restrictions. The panel  agreed that a mul t i lateral  agree­
ment would be a l ess restrictive alternative, concluding that " [t )he  United 
States had not demonstrated . . .  that i t  had exhausted all options reason­
ably avai lable to it to pursue its dolphin p rotection objectives through 
measures consistent with the General Agreement, in particular through 
the negotiation of i nternational cooperative arrangements. "82 
Both panel decisions, however, l eave open some nagging questions 
about whether countries can , under the GATT, use trade measures that are 
authorized in mult i lateral agreements .83 To the extent that GATT signato­
ries agree in a mult i lateral agreement to be subject to trade measures as a 
80.  1991 Decision , supra note 2, para .  5 . 28 ,  a t  1 99. 
8 1 .  A GATT d i spute-se t t l e m e n t  pane l  has h e l d  t h a t  " a  contract ing party cannot  j us t i fy a 
measure  i nconsi s t en t  w i t h  anot h e r  GATT prov is ion as ' necessary '  i n  t e rms of Ar t i c l e  XX(d)  
i f  a n  a l t e rn a t ive measure wh ich  i t  cou l d  r e ason ab l y  be  expected to e mp loy and  w h i c h  is  not  
i n cons is t e n t  w i t h  o ther  GATT prov is ions  i s  avai l ab l e  to i t . ' '  Report of the  Panel, United 
Stares-Section 33 7 of rlze Tariff Act of 1930, GATT Doc.  L/ 6439, para .  5 . 2o ( adopt e d  Nov. 7 ,  
I 989 ) ,  in  GATT, BAS I C  INSTR U M ENTS A N D  S E LECTED D O C U M ENTS 345 , 392  (36 th  S upp.  
1 990 ) .  Another such p a n e l  appl i e d  the same i n t e rpre ta t ion to  "necessary " '  i n  Art ic le  X X ( b ) .  
See Report of rhe Panel, Tlzailand-Restricrions o n  importation of a n d  Internal  Taxes on 
Cigaretles, GATT Doc. DS l O / R, para .  74 ( adopted  Nov. 7, 1 990), in GATT, B A S I C  I N STRU­
MENTS i\ N D  S E LECTED D O C U M E!'.'TS 200, 223 ( 3 7 t h  Supp .  1 99 1 ) . For a cog e n t  cr i t i q u e  of  t h is 
s t r i c t  i n te rpre t a t ion of "n ecessary"  i n  Art i c l e  XX,  see  Cha rnovi tz ,  supra note 60, a t  48-50 .  
For a c r i t i que  and a proposa l  for a more reasonab le  a l t e rn a t ive ,  see  EsTY, supra note  6 .  a t  
48,  222  ( sugges t i ng t h a t  " necessary" be  i n t erpre t e d  to  mean  " not clearly d i sproport iona te  i n  
re l a t ion  to t h e  pu t a t ive env i ron m e n t a l  b e n e fi t s  and  i n  l i gh t  of  equa l l y  e ffect ive pol icy 
a l te r n a t ives t h at  are reasonably ava i l ab l e " ) .  
8 2 .  1 99 1  Decision , supra n o t e  2,  para .  5 .28 ,  a t  1 99 .  T h e  EC a n d  t h e  N e t h e r l ands  u rged t h e  
1 994 pane l  w i n te rpre t  t h e  word " n e cessary" i n  Art i c l e  X X (b)  i n  prec ise l y  t h e  same fash ion 
as t h e  1 99 1  pa n e l . See 1 994 Decision , supra note  2 ,  para .  3 . 75 ,  a t  3 1 ;  see a lso Dolphins and 
rhe  Trade f_ a lt 'S, W. \ S H .  PosT. M ay 27 ,  1 994 ,  a t  A24 ( ed i tor ia l  sugges t i ng  tha t  " ' [ t ] h e  wor ld ' s  
e nv i ro n m e n t  w i l l  be bes t  protected by . . .  coopera t ion .  not by t rade tigh t s' ' ) .  
83.  See US TR Official Examines Conjlicrs Berv.·een Trade. Environment Pa us , 1 1 I n t ' l  Trade 
Rep.  ( BNA)  9 1 3 ( J u ne � .  1 994 ) ( report i ng  on an  u n resolved con t rove rsy ove r whe the r  
i n ter na t i ona l  e nvi ronm e n t a l  agre e m e n ts take  precede nce over t h e  GATT) .  Th i s  u nce rt a i n ty  
has  had a c h i l l i ng  e ffec t  on ' i n t e rna t iona l  e tforts  to protect  t h e  g loba l  env i ronm e n t .  See S teve 
Ch arnovi tz ,  GA TT and rlze Environnzenr .  Exa111in ing rlze Issues, 4 I NT 'L  E 'i VTL.  ArT. 20:1, 2 1  o 
( 1 992 ) ( re por t i ng t h a t  " t h e  I n t e rna t i ona l  Conve n t io n  for t h e  Conserva t i o n  of  At l an t i c Tunas  
re cen t ly  b � ick e cl � 1way from � �  n e w  t ra cl e -base cl e n force m e n t  m e c h a n ism b e c a u s e  of p o t e n t i a l  
G f\ T T  cump l i c a t i n n s " ) .  
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mechanism to enforce the agreement, the GATT wil l  not bar  the use of 
those measures. If  a country joins this  type of mult i lateral agreement after 
i t  jo ined the GATT, i t  i s  a sett led pr inc iple of i nternational l aw that the 
more recent agreement wi l l  prevai l  over  the earl ier one, in th i s  case,  the 
GATT.:-;4 A more d ifficult quest ion ar ises i f  a country joins the GATT, or  a 
trade agreement negotiated pursuant to the GATT, after having agreed to 
trade measures i n  another accord .  The holding of the 1 994 GATT panel  
seems to rule out the use of trade sanctions in th is  context, regardless of 
the location of the natural resource i n  question .  The reason ing of the 1 9 9 1  
GATT panel i s  ambiguous with respect t o  th is  situation :  i ts  broad rat io­
nale prohibit ing all trade measures to p rotect environmental  i nterests 
outside a country's own jurisdict ion seems to bar trade measures even i n  
this case; yet i t s  narrower rat ionale favor ing mult il ateral agreements over 
uni lateral trade measures appears to endorse measures that are autho­
rized by multi lateral agreements .  
Furthermore, GATT signatories that have also joined a mult i lateral 
environmental agreement that authorizes trade measures may seek to use 
these measures against other GATT s ignatories that have not signed the 
environmental agreement .  The 1 994 panel decision apparent ly prohibits 
the use of any trade sanctions in  this  instance as well ,  because the environ­
mental agreement would not prevai l  over the GATT with respect to a 
GATT member that i s  not a party to the environmental agrcement . :-;5 The 
broader rationale for the 1 99 1  decis ion also seems to forbi d  the use of 
trade measures to protect "extrajurisdict ional" environmental i nterests i n  
th is  case . :-;6 The 1 9 9 1  panel 's narrower rationale ,  however, appears to leave 
this question open .  
The 1 99 1  GATT panel 's  reason ing suffers from a more bas ic defect: an  
internat ional agreement i s  not  with in the  control of  the  United States 
alone. :-;7 Other parties who harm the environment must a l so h ave some 
reason to come to the negot iat ing table and to reach an agreement .  The 
:-34 .  Sec V i e n n a  Co nve n t i o n  o n  t h e  L a w  of Tre a t i e s ,  opened for signature ]\;J ay 23 ,  1 969. a r t .  
30. 1 1 .5 5  U . N . T . S .  _)3 ! ,  3 3 9-4() ( prov i d i n g  for t h e  r igh ts a n d  llb i i g a t i o n s  o f  p a rt i e s  t o  
s u c c e s '; ive t r e 21 t i e s  r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  s a m e  s u b j e c t  m a t t e r ) .  i\1ore d i ffi c u l t  i s s u e s  a r i s e  i f  t h e  
n1 u l t i l a t e r a l  e n v i ron rn t: n t � d  agre e n1 e n t  d o e s  not  provide e ;,�p l i c i t ly  fo1 e n forcern e n t  t h ro u g h  
S 5 .  See id. ar t .  34,  l l 5 )  lJ . l''.) _ �r . S .  a t  3 4 1 ( ' " i\ t rea ty do�.; s  n o t  c re a tr::: e i t h e r  o b l i g a t i o n �  o r  
r i g h t s  fo r � \  t h i rd S t a t -:: >:vi t ho u t  i t s  cnnsc n t . ' l ) .  The e nv i rz_l n fT1 e n t a l  a.g r c ·..:: cn e n t  c o u l d  b i n d  3 
c u s t nlTl ? l·--,,. r d l e  of ; :1 r <_.: r r: ::•. l i u n :l l  ! a"v.  re cog n i zed a :� S 'J CJ� . · ·  I d. ( l r t .  ; i 5 5  LJ . T·,r . 1- . S .  �l t :; -� l :  
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types of trade measures condemned by both GATT panels can create the 
incent ives necessary for polluting countries to join a multi lateral agree­
ment that imposes environmental regulations on them. 
Of course, devices other than trade measures can induce the coopera­
tion of foreign governments .  Coun tries have many sanctions at their  dis­
posal, including the use of mil i tary force, suspensions of foreign aid, and 
restrictions on foreign investment,  as well  as restrictions on trade in  goods. 
Because the GATT addresses only some of these instruments, a prohibi­
t ion on trade st icks would not render the use of these other sanctions 
i l lega l .  Nevertheless, many of these other measures are often infeasible .  
The  use of  mil i tary force, for example, is far too costly to  be of  any use in 
conventional disputes over  environmental matters. Suspensions of foreign 
aid may sacrifice other i mportant foreign policy interests or have l i t t le 
effect on the governments of particular countries, including those that receive 
little foreign aid. Because these other sanctions on behalf of the environment 
may be costly or ineffective , trade restrictions have proven part icularly 
useful instruments in protecting environmental i nterests .  Over the past 
century, unilateral t rade measures have played an important role in spur­
ring the world community into action to protect environmental interests .x� 
Countries l ike the United S tates, however, are often urged to rely on 
carrots rather than st icks when pursu ing their environmental goals. For 
example, as an interested third party to the dispute before the 1 994 panel ,  
Venezuela argued:  "Posit ive incentives could be used more productively to 
further global environmental protect ion ."s9 In a 1 992 report ,  the GATT 
Secretariat made more specific suggestions:  
When cooperation is not  volu n tari ly forthcoming, posit ive incent ives are 
the best  way to achieve sustained inter-governmental cooperation. Posi­
tive incen t ives can i nclude offers of financial  assistance and t ransfe rs of 
e nvironmental ly frie ndly technology d irectly related to the p rob lem a t  
hand,  a s  wel l  as more broadly based offers, for example ,  to  i ncrease 
foreign aiel, to lessen debt problems and to m ake non-discriminatory 
reduct ions i n  t rade barriers . lJ0 
I call t h is view the "carrots on ly" solution.  
o8 .  See C h a r n ovi tz ,  supra n o t e  83,  a t  2 0 7 ;  sec a lso R i c h ard B .  B i l d e r, The Role of Unilateral 
Sta te A ction in Preventing interna tional  Environmental !njwy, 1 4  VA N D .  J .  TRAN S N i\T'L  L. 5 1 . 
82 ( 1 98 1 )  ( " T h e  e x a m p l e  s e t  by u n i l a t era l a c t i o n ,  t h e  m o r a l  a n d  po l i t i c a l  p re s s u r e  i t  c r e a t e s ,  
a n d  . . . t h e  t h re a t  a n d  costs of con t i n u e d  u n i l a te r a l  a pproaches .  may l e a d  o t h e r  s t a t e s  . . .  t o  
coo p e r a t e  i n  d ev e l o p i ng m u l t i l a t e ra l  s o l u t i o n s  t h ey m i g h t  n o t  o t h e rw i s e  b e  i n c l i n e d  t o  
se c k . " ) .  Th e U.S.  b a n  o n  t h e  i m po r t a t i o n  of e n d an g e r e d  s p e c i e s  i n  1 96 9 ,  f o r  e x a m p l e .  a n d  
s i m i l ar m e asu res by o t h e r  n a t io n s ,  I c c! to i n t e r n a t i o n a l  agre e m e n t  o n  t h e  C I T ES i n  l lJ 7 3 .  T h e  
i d e a  o f  u n i l :l t c r a l  t r�1 cl e m e as u r e s  t o  p r o t e c t  w i l d l i fe ,  however_  h as a n  eve n l o n g e r  h i s t o ry.  Sec 
C h a r n o v i tz .  supra n o t e  60. at 3 9 -4 1 .  
8 9 .  1 994 Decision , supra n o t e  2 ,  p a r a .  4 . 3 5 .  el f 4 7 .  
9 0 .  Ci .� TT. supra n o t e  8 ,  a t  3 6  ( foot n o t e  o m i t t e d ) .  
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B .  AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF THE " CA RROTS ONLY" S O LUTION 
An economic affairs officer in  the GATT Secretariat who is cr i t ical of 
environmental trade measures h as asserted :  " [T]he opposi t ion between 
trade and environment is a false one. The dist inction i s  rather between 
uni lateral and cooperative approaches to solving environmental  prob­
lems ."9 1 As I argue here,  it i s  instead the dis t inction between  uni latera l  
and cooperative approaches that i s  mis leading, because the  two ap­
proaches are not mutually exclusive. In fact ,  countries should use both 
approaches simultaneously: un i lateral t rade measures provide  an impor­
tant i nstrument that should work in tandem with mult i lateral negotiat ions .  
After al l ,  international negotiat ions are in real i ty a noncooperative b argain­
ing game played in the shadow of the "default" rules that p revai l  i n  the 
absence of an agreement .  
The "carrots only" contractual approach to the problem of negative 
external it ies corresponds with the type of solution indicated by a naive 
reading of the Coase theorem, which suggests that as long as p art ies can 
bargain with one another, they wi l l  reach an efficient solut ion regardless of 
the in i t ial allocation of legal r ights .92 Changing the legal rights al ters the 
welfare each party expects to enjoy i n  the absence of an agreement-that 
is ,  i t  moves the " threat point" in the negot iat ions .  This shift in the defaul t  
payoffs, however ,  merely real locates wealth ; i t  does not  render the out­
come inefficient .  In the international environmental context, the "carrots 
only" solution gives coun tries the right to harm the global environment 
and puts the burden on others to offer concessions sufficient ly valuable to 
the offending nat ions to induce them to stop. This solution amounts to an 
endorsement of  the "vict im pays" principle rather than the " pol luter pays" 
principle .93 
9 1 .  Subraman ian ,  supra note  18, at  1 43 .  
92 .  I f  a po l l u t e r  h a s  t h e  r igh t  t o  po l l u t e ,  b u t  t h e  v i c t im  p u ts a v a l u e  o n  po l l u t io n  
aba temen t  t h at exceeds  i ts costs ,  t h e n  t h e  v i c t i m  can  p a y  t h e  p o l l u t e r  to reduce  i ts e miss ions .  
I f  t h e  v i c t im has  t h e  r igh t  to s top the  p o l l u t i on ,  bu t  the  cos t  o f  aba tement  exceeds  i ts va l u e  to  
t h e  v i c t im ,  t hen  t h e  po l l u t e r  can pay  t h e  v i c t im to  a l l ow t h e  po l l u t i o n  to  con t i nue .  See 
Rona ld  H .  Coase ,  The Problem of Social Cos1, 3 J .L .  & Ecoi\i. 1 ( 1 960) .  
93 .  S ubraman ian  notes t ha t  in some cases many na t ions  may be  charac te r i zed  a s  po l l u ters :  
· ' t h e  search  for coopera t ive  so l ut ions  t h rough i n t e rna t i ona l  nego t i at ions  i n vo lves  dec i s ions  
regard i n g  the  approp r ia te  a l loca t ion  of  t h e  cos t s  o f  po l l u t io n  abateme n t  b e t w e e n  cou n t ri e s  
based  i n  par t  on  a p r io r  co l l e c t ive de t e rm ina t i on  as to who is  t h e  po l l u t e r  a n d  w h o  t h e  v ic t i m  
a n d  who shou ld  b e  accorded  prope r ty r i gh t s . "  Subram a n i a n ,  supra note  1 8 , a t  1 46-47 .  H e  
favors a ban on  u n i l a t e ra l  t rade m e as u res ,  because " [ l ] eg i t i m i s i ng u n i l a t e ra l  s a n c t i ons  wou l d  
amoun t  to  a l low ing  u n i l a t e ra l  de t e rm ina t i on  a s  to  w h o  i s  t h e  pol l u t e r  a n d  a l so  a s  t o  w h o  
s h o u l d  have t h e  property r i g h t s . "  !d. at  1 48. 
A pro h i b i t ion on u n i l a tera l  sanct ions ,  howeve r, a l so  amoun ts to a d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of 
proper ty r igh ts .  In par t i cu l a r, such  a pro h i b i t i on  i m p l i e s  t ha t  pol l u t e rs in a l l  cases h ave 
property r ights  aga i n s t  t hose coun t r i es  t h a t  w ish  to  curb  po l l u t i on ,  even w h e n  one coun try 
u n i l a t e ral ly res t ra ins  i ts exp lo i t a t io n  of t h e  g loba l  com mons and c a l l s  upon o t h e rs to fo l l ow 
s u i t .  The "carrots  o n ly ' · sol u t ion  i s  hard ly  n e u t ra l  i n  t h i s  respec t .  
1 995] ECONOMIC ANALYSIS O F  TRADE MEASURES 2 1 5 1  
The Coase theorem, however, assumes n o  transaction costs, so that 
there are no barriers to parties reaching these efficient  agreements .  In 
real i ty, transaction costs wil l  make these agreements d ifficult to reach : 
agreements wil l  take real t ime and effort to negotiate, and the part ies may 
sometimes fai l  to reach agreement altogether. For example, for many years 
b efore the 1 9 9 1  tuna dispute, the United States had attempted unsuccess­
fully to negotiate an international agreement with Mexico and other coun­
t ries to protect dolphins in  the ETP. 94 
Market fai lures are particularly acute in  the context of the global environ­
ment .  The l arge number of countries with a s take in the global environ­
ment wil l  lead to free-rider p roblems:  each country has the incent ive to 
wait for others to offer the carrots necessary to forge an agreement .95 The 
free-rider problem exists even if the true preferences of each par ty are 
common knowledge among all the other part ies .  Under condit ions of 
" symmetric information ,"  the problem amounts to a multi lateral version of 
the classic b i lateral prisoner's di lemma game, under which the dominant 
strategy of each party is  to refuse to cooperate, even if  each p layer would  
be better off under the  cooperat ive solution than  under the  noncoopera­
t ive equil ibrium.96 
Imperfections i n  information compound the free-rider problem among 
countries :  in reality, each government participating in the negotiat ions wil l  
94.  See J e ffrey L .  D uno fr. Reconciling Interna tional Trade with Preservation of tlze Global 
Commons: Can We Prosper and Protect? ,  49 WAS H .  & LEE L. R E V .  1 407 ,  1 4 1 9  ( 1 992) ( " [T] h e  
P a n e l ' s  asser t ion  t ha t  t h e  U n i ted  S t a t e s  had  n o t  e ngaged i n  m u l t i l a t e ra l  e fforts to  address 
t h e  t u n a / do l p h i n  prob l e m  i s  s imp ly i n correc t . " ) ;  see also S teve Charnov i tz ,  En vironmentalism 
Confron ts GA TT Rules: Recent Developments and New Opportunities, J .  W O R LD T R A D E ,  Apr .  
1 993 ,  a t  37 .  39  ( " [T] h e  GATT pane l  was q u i c k  to  c r i t ic ize the U n i t e d  States  . . .  but  o ffered 
no c r i t i c i sm o f  Mexico for s tonewa l l i ng  such arrange m e n ts for m any years . " ) ;  F re n c h ,  supra 
no te  6, at 1 4  ( " [ N] at ions  had b e e n  t ry i ng  for some t i m e  to reach an agre e m e n t  on d o l p h i n ­
fr i e nd ly  fis h i ng pract ices,  t hrough t h e  I n t e r-Amer ican  Trop ica l  Tuna  Comm i ss ion . " ) .  B e fore 
t h e  1 994 pane l ,  the U n i t e d  States s t ressed t h a t  i t  " had endeavored for more t h an 20 years  to 
reach m u l t i l a t e ra l  agre e m e n t  to protect  do lp h i n s  in  the eastern t rop ica l  Pac i fi c  pu rse se i ne  
f ish e ry . "  1 994 Decision , supra note  2 ,  para .  3 . 69 ,  a t  30 .  
95 . See MANC: U R  O LSON,  T H E  LOG I C  O F  COLLECT I V E  ACT I O N :  P U BL I C  G O O D S  A N D  T i l E  
T H E O R Y  OF G RO U P S  35  ( 1 965 ) ( " [ Tjhe Ienger the  group, the farther i t  will fall slum of providing 
an optimal amount of a collectil'e good ." ) ;  id. a t  28 (" [ Tjhe more individuals in tlze group, tlze 
more seriOI!S the suboptimality will be . " ) .  I ron i ca l l y ,  t h e  GATT pane l  c i t ed  t h e  l a rge  n u mber 
o f  i n t e res ted  par t ies  in  t h e  tuna ma t t e r  as  a r e ason to  prohibit the  t rade measures  taken by 
the  U n i t e d  Sta tes .  The  pane l  pre fe r red  " i n te rna t i ona l  coope rat ive a rrange m e nts .  wh i ch  
wou ld  seem to be des i rab l e  i n  v iew o f  t h e  fac t  t h a t  do lph i n s  roam t h e  wa te rs o f  many s ta tes  
a n d  the  h igh  seas ."  1 99 1  Decision . supra note  2 ,  para .  5 .28 ,  at 1 99 .  Such  an  agre e m e n t  may 
w e l l  be d es i rab l e ,  bu t  t he  ve ry fa ct  t h a t  n u me rous coun t r i es  wou ld  h �tve to par t i c ipa te  i n  such 
an  agre e m e n t  i s  a reason not to cou n t  on  such agre e m e n ts .  See C I I R I STOPI I E R  D. STOl\ E ,  THE 
G N xr Is  OLD ER TI I A N  MN\: GLOBAL E:--�v i R O N M ENT A N D  H U M / \ N  A G E N D , \  l 1 7  ( 1 993 ) ( " [A] 
treaty i s  c lear ly  eas ier  to conc lude ,  the fewer tlze number of na tions ll'lwse cooperation 1s 
required to make it effecril ·e . " )  
% .  That  i s ,  t h e  coopera t i ve sn l u t ion  ' " Pa re to-do m i nates"  t h e  · 'Nash  e q u i l i b r i u m . "  
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be uncertain about the preferences of the other governments .  Given these 
asymmetries in information, each country wi l l  have an incen t ive to  under­
state i ts  in terest in  protect ing the global environment (and to-overstate i ts 
i n terest in exploit ing i t )  in order to win a be tter deal  for itself in the 
negotiations. This "preference revelation" prob lem makes it d ifficul t  to 
induce each country to bear i ts fair  share of the costs of e nvironmental  
protection,  as  would be the case with any global publ ic  good .  
If  the parties reach an agreement at a l l ,  i t  wi l l  take t ime .  Sequent ial 
bargain ing models with asymmetric information suggest that  reach i ng an 
agreement  under these condi t ions may wel l  en ta i l  a significant and  costly 
delay.97 Over t ime, h aggl ing provides the part ies with further i n formation 
about one another's true preferences, and i t  is the very cos t l i ness  of  the 
passage of t ime without an agreement that p rovides th is  i n format ion .  
Countries most impatient for an agreement make greater concess ions in 
less t ime; those with the least  to lose from delay hold out longer .  
For a l l  these reasons, i t  is naive to cite the mere poss ibi l i ty of  i nterna­
t ional agreements as a panacea for global environmental p roblems .  Be­
cause strategic behavior can cause bargaining to fa i l ,  we cannot re ly on 
mult i lateral agreements alone to protect the global environment . 98 Even 
when bargaining eventual ly succeeds, harm to the environment  w i l l  occur 
prior to the conclusion of an agreement .99 Given the rea l i ty of strategic 
behavior, the allocation of legal r ights (the threat point) is  no  longer a 
matter of indifference from the perspective of efficiency. 1 00 In  a r eg1me 111 
97 .  See, e.g. , Pe te r  C .  Cramton ,  Bwgaining with Incomplete Information: A n  lnfinite- Horizon 
1Vfodel with Two-Sided Uncertaimy, 5 1  R E V .  ECO:-J.  STU D .  5 79 ( 1 984) ;  Drew F u d e n b e rg & Jean  
Tiro le ,  Sequential Bargaining wilh fncomplete Information , 50  R E V .  Eco N .  S T U D .  22 1 ( 1 983 ) ;  
S a n ford J .  G rossma n  & M o t ty P erry ,  Sequential Batgaining under Asymmetric Informa tion , 3 9  
J .  EcoN.  THEORY 1 20 ( 1 98 G ) .  
9 8 .  See W J L L I /\ M  J .  BAU M O L & W!\LL!\CE E .  OATES ,  T H E  THEORY OF E N V I R O N M E N TA L  
POL ICY 276 (2d ed .  1 98 8 )  ( " Because the  record of i n t e rn a t i o n a l  coopera t i on  on  o t h e r  c r i t i c a l  
m a t t e rs h a r d l y  insp i res  confidence  i n  t h e  p rospects for e fl'i cacious m u l t i l a t e r a l  m e a s u re s  for 
t h e  protect ion  of t h e  e nv i ronmen t ,  i t  m ay be esse n t i a l t o  des ign i ns t ru m e n t s  w h os e  e ffe c t iv e ­
ness does  not requ i re t h e  u n a n i mous co nse n t  of those i nvolved . " ) ;  B i lder ,  supra n o t e  88, a t  
9 1  (" It i s  t r u e  t h a t  t h e  i n te rn a t i o n a l  com mu n i ty h a s  . . .  b e e n  s l ow t o  ac t t o  m e e t  e nv i r o n m e n ­
t a l  c h a l l e nges,  and t h a t  t h e  m u l t i l a t e ra l  measures  adopted a re n o t  as  e ftec t i v e  a s  t h ey m ig h t  
be  . . . .  W h e n  t h e  a l t e rn a t ive to  u n i l a t e r a l  ac t ion  i s  d o i ng n o t h i ng, t h e  case  for u n i l a t e r a l  
ac t ion  . . .  seems c l ea r ly s t rengt h e n e d . ' ' ) ;  see a lso STO N E ,  supra no te  95 , a t  9 8- 1 1 6 ( descr ib i ng  
i m p e d i m e n ts to t h e  forma t ion  of i n t e rn :t t i ona l  e nv i ro n m e n t a l  agre e m e n ts ) . 
99.  See B i l der ,  supra note  88,  a t  95 ( ' ' W h i l e  m u l t i l a t e ra l  ac t ions  seem ge n e r a l ly p re fe r a b l e  
to u n i l a t e r a l  ac t ion ,  effec t ive m u l t i l a t e ra l  arrange m e n t  i n  many  cases m ay n o t  b e  p r a c t i c a l ly 
a t t a i nab le  . . . .  U n d e r  t hese c i rcu m s t a n ce s .  a respec tab le  argu m e n t  can  b e  m ad e  for t h e  
propri e ty  o f  u n i l a te ra l  ac t ion  o n  a t  l eas t an  i n t e r i m  bas i s  pend i ng  ach i eve m e n t  o f  e ffec t ive  
m u l t i l a t e ra l  a rrange m e n ts . ' " ) .  
1 00 .  See G u iDO CA L E B R ES I .  THE  Cosr O F  AccmEYrs 1 36--W ( 1 970 ) ; A .  M I TCH E L L  POL I N ­
S K Y ,  A N  l NTRODUCTJ O N  TO LAW r\ '-! D  ECONO i\ I I CS 1 5 - 25 (2d e el .  1 989 ) .  T h e  i ss u e  i n  t h e  
i n te rn a t i o n a l  law context  i s  s im i l a r  t o  t h e  a l loca t ion  o f  p roperty r ights  i n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  l aw 
con text . I n  t h e  do me s t i c l aw con text .  h igh t ransac t ion  costs  assoc ia ted w i t h  barga i n i ng ove r 
t h e  t r ans fe r  of property r ights  can m i l i t a t e  i n  favor of  l i �th i l i ty r u l es r�t t h e r t h a n  p rope rty 
l 
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which uni lateral st icks are prohibited, countries would be  more incl ined to 
engage in environmental ly harmful actions. We would expect the level of 
environmentally h armful activi ties to rise for two distinct reasons :  first, 
st icks deter overuse of the environment ,  and second, the use of carrots 
alone creates perverse incent ives .  
1 .  St icks Deter Overuse of the Environment 
Under the reasoning of the GATT panels, countries would  be  shielded 
from sanctions, and (at least under the reasoning of the 1 99 1  GATT 
panel) foreign p roducers would be shielded from extrajurisdictional trade 
measures, which otherwise would d iscourage each from harming the envi­
ronment. 1 0 1 These prohibit ions on the use of sticks would bring forth more 
environmental harm even in the absence of any prospect of negot iations 
toward a multi lateral agreement. Insofar as the environment is  a public 
good among multiple countries, we would expect to observe inefficiently 
h igh levels of environmental ly harmful behavior, because each par ty fai ls 
to  internalize the negative external i t ies associated with i ts  behavior. A 
prohibi tion on sticks would remove an effective deterrent to excessive 
exploita tion of the environment .  If we cannot use st icks to p rotect the 
global commons, for example, then unless and unti l  we obtain a mult i lat­
eral agreement, we are left with the usual free-rider problems that cause 
each party to overuse the natural resources held in common. Even  if some 
r u l e s  if cour ts  are l i ke ly  to  have be t t e r  i n format ion  on  t h e  v i c t im 's damages t h a n  on  t h e  
proper  a l locat ion  of proper ty r igh t s .  !d. In t h e  i n t e rna t i ona l  contex t ,  however ,  w e  h ave y e t  to  
r each  such  issues w i t h  respect  to many g loba l  e nv i ron m e n t a l  i n t e res ts ,  because a consensus 
o n  the appropr i a te  a l loca t ion  o f  lega l  e n t i t l emen t s  i s  oft e n  l ack ing .  Because t hese i n t e rests 
a re subjec t  to i l l -defined  proper ty r igh t s ,  i n t erna t iona l  agre e m e n ts fa i l  to prov ide  t h e  GATT 
or any  o t h e r  i n te rna t i ona l  body w i t h  t h e  au thor i ty to e n force e n t i t l em e n ts to m any of t hese 
i n t e rests ,  t hrough the award o f  d a m ages or  t h rough a ny o t h e r  means .  I n  t h e  absence o f  a 
wor ld  gove rnmen t ,  sovere ign coun t ri e s  mus t  work ou t  t hese i ssues t h rough i n t e rn a t io n a l  
ba rga i n i n g  and ,  pend ing  a n  agree m e n t  o n  t h ese m a tters ,  c a n  o n ly p ro tec t  t hese i n t e rests 
t h roug h  s e l f- h e l p .  This a r t i c l e  addresses the ques t ion  of w h i c h  ru l e s  regard i ng e nv i ro nm e n t a l  
t rade  measu res  wou l d  p rovide  a be t t e r  b a s i s  for s u c h  b a rg a i n i n g  from t h e  perspect ive o f  
economic  e ffic i ency .  
1 0 1 .  As one comm e n ta tor  obse rves :  
A pr i nc ipa l  advan t age of u n i l a te ra l  s t a t e  env i ro n m e n t a l  a c t i o n  is  t h e  promptness 
w i t h  wh ich  s ta te  power and sanc t ions  can  be e tlcc t ive ly b rough t  to b e a r  aga i nst  
conduct or  ac t iv i t i e s  t h rea ten ing env i ro n m e n t a l  i n j ur y .  Thus,  the i n cen t ives to  ca tch  
endangered spec ies  w i l l  be  i m m e d ia te l y  reduced when a s i gn i fican t  impor ter  u n i l a t ­
e r a l ly i m poses s ta te  res tr ic t ions  aga i n s t  impor t i ng  t h e s e  spec ies  or  t h e ir p roducts .  
I n  some cases ,  the  a l t erna t ives to  u n i l a t e ra l  ac t ion m ay be  no regu l at i o n  at  a l l ,  l e ss 
e tt"ec t ive regu l a t i on . or long de l ays u n t i l  regu l a t i o n  i s  i m p l emen ted .  There  m ay be  
var ious po l i t i c a l ,  economic ,  m i l i t a ry ,  or  t e chn i ca l  reasons why m u l t i l a te ra l  agree­
ment i s  l i ke l y  to p rove i m possib l e  o r  ex t re m e l y  d i ffi c u l t  to a c h i eve . . . .  I n  prac t i ce ,  
u n i l a tera l  ac t ion i s  fre q u e n t ly j u s t i fi ed  o n  the  g ro u n d  t h a t  t he  u rge ncy and gravi ty  of  
the  t h reat  to wh i ch i t  i s  a response s imp ly docs  not  p e rm i t  t h e  de l ays a n d  u ncer ta i n ­
t i c s  i nvolved i n  a t t empt s  to secure  m u l t i l a t e ra l  act i o n .  
B i l d e r .  supra n o t e  8 8 .  a t  79-80 .  
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countries were to reach an agreement to p rotect the environment ,  other 
countries wil l  h ave an incent ive not to  sign the agreement-they would 
p refer  to "free r ide" on the  restrain t  exercised by signatories to the 
agreement .  
2 .  Carrots Create Perverse Incent ives 
The prospect of being the beneficiary of carrots in a mult i lateral agree­
ment would create additional positive incentives to harm the environment. 
In  the absence of sticks to induce cooperation, a mult i lateral agreement 
must offer the polluting countries carrots :  concessions by those countries 
that value the environment and must secure the cooperation of other 
countr ies withou t  resort to unilateral sanctions .  By moving the threat point 
in the b argain ing game away from environmental ly friendly coun t ries and 
toward those that  harm the environment,  we reduce st i l l  further the 
incentives to exercise restraint in exploit ing the globa l  environment . 1 02 The 
use of subsidies or  other rewards to encourage pollut ion abatement has a 
number of perverse incentives .  
a.  More Countries Will Pollute. I n  regulat ing a polluting industry in  the 
domest ic context, a government agency can use a system of subsidies 
rather than Pigouvian t axes . 1 03 Either instrument would encourage indi­
vidual firms to choose the efficient  l evel of pol lut ion abatement ,  but the 
subsidy would make the industry in  question more profitab l e  than i t  would 
be otherwise. Lured by the prospect of these profits, more firms would  
enter t he  industry than wou ld otherwise, and  the ne t  resul t  could be  more 
pollution rather than less .  The subsidy can create incentives that are 
ident ical to those of the Pigouvian t ax only if the government pays the 
subsidy not only to actua l  pol luters, but also to potential en trants in to the 
pol lut ing industry and to those polluters who exit  the indust ry. 1 04 These 
potential  entrants may be infinite in number, however, and even if they are 
fin i te in number,  they may be d ifficult to ident ify .  
S imi larly, a mult i lateral agreement that rel ies on subsidies rewards 
countries for harming the environment;  only those who pol lute receive the 
subsidy. This prospect makes environmental ly harmful activity rat ional for 
countries that would  otherwise be indifferent or even dis incl ined to harm 
1 02 .  R i c hard H. S n ape ,  Tlze Environ11 1enr, lnrernauonal  Trade and Competiriveness, in T H E  
G R EE N I NG O F  W O R L D  T R A D E  I S S U E S ,  supra note  1 8 , a t  73,  85 .  warns  o f  t he  " i n c e n t ives w h i c h  
s u c h  compensat ion  m ay prov ide  for t h e  a d o p t i o n  of  p roduc t ion  processes w h i c h  are  no t  t he 
most  pol l u t ion -e fli c i e n t  from a world perspect i ve . · ·  Snape ,  however,  does n o t  e l aborate ,  nor  
does he  a n a lyze prec i se ly how such compe nsa t i on  crea tes  such i ncen t ives .  
1 0 3 .  I f  an  env i ro n m e n t a l  age ncy were to l e vy a tax per  u n i t  o f  po l l u t i o n  e q u a l  to t h e  
margi n a l  dam ages acc ru i ng  to a l l  v i c t i ms ,  t h e n  t h i s  ' · P igouv ian t ax' '  wou l d  se rve to i n t e rn a l ­
i z e  t h e  exte rn a l  costs t h a t  t h e  pol l u t e r  i m poses o n  o t hers .  See D,\ U M O L  & O t\TE S,  supra no te  
98,  a t  2 1 - 2 2 .  
10 4 .  See id. a t  2 1 1 - 28.  
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the environment .  Countries would be encouraged to "enter" the polluting 
i ndustry by offering producers lax environmental regulations .  Unless the 
agreement offered carrots to al l  such potential  entrants ( to keep them 
from entering the industry) as well as to all actual industry participants ,  i t  
would lead more countries t o  adopt lax environmental regulations.  Coun­
tries wil l  have reduced incentives to regulate their own producers :  rather 
than regulating spontaneously without getting a carrot, some countries wil l  
be induced to delay in  order to receive a carrot in exchange for restricting 
pollution later .  Even if this effect did not lead to higher levels of environ­
mental harm after the agreement, we would expect i t  to lead to higher 
levels of such harm in  the per iod leading up to an agreement .  
In  theory, i f  w e  could ident ify al l  potential entrants, w e  could avoid  this 
perverse i ncentive by paying them all carrots, regardless of whether they 
actually enter the industry by adopting lax regulations.  This solution is not  
only expensive but also difficult to implement without perfect i nformation 
on the polit ical costs and benefits of environmental regulat ion in other 
countries . In the absence of this information, countries wil l  adopt l ax 
regulations i n  order to ensure that they wil l  qualify for carrots. Thus, the 
p rospect of carrots offered under a mult i lateral agreement creates a per­
verse incentive for more countries to harm the environment in anticipation 
of such an agreement . 105 
b. Countries Will Pollute More. Furthermore, the fact that the size of 
these carrots will be determined by a bargain ing process wil l  encourage 
each polluting country to pollute still more . Those that would already be 
incl ined to harm the environment would be encouraged by the bargaining 
process to harm i t  to an even greater extent  to qualify for larger carrots. 
These strategies would yield positive payoffs for the offending countries 
because they could use the threat of cont inuing their environmentally 
harmfu l  activit ies to extort carrots from other coun tries. 
Why would other countries pay this "ransom" if they know that these 
activit ies are not what the "blackmail ing" countries would consider opti­
mal in the absence of the prospect of a ransom? If we assume conditions of 
symmetric information, the true preferences of each party would be com­
mon knowledge among a l l  parties. In such a model, it must be in a 
blackmail ing country's interest to carry out i ts threat ex post if the threat is  
to be credible ex ante.  If a blackmail ing country can make such a threat 
credible,  then game theory suggests that i t  may indeed be able to extract 
concessions from another country by taking actions that harm the interests 
of the other country, even if that action is  also costly to the blackmail ing 
1 05 .  I n sofar as a cou n t ry a l s o  s u tlers s o m e  e n v i ro n m e n t a l  h a r m  from t h i s  s t r a t e gy ,  t h e s e  
p o l i c i e s  wo u l d  e n t a i l  s o m e  cos t .  Neve r t h e l ess ,  g i v e n  a n  a d d i t i o n a l  b e n e fi t  from t h e s e  p o l i c i e s  
1 11 t h e  form o f  c a rr o t s ,  s o m e  co u n t r i e s  t h a t  wou l d  o t h e rw i s e  e x e r c i s e  r e s t r a i n t  i n  p o l l u t i ng 
w i l l  ti n d  i t  now w o rt h w h i l e  to b e a r  t h e se e nv i ro n m e n t a l  costs .  
2156  
country. 1 06 
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Consider  a model of this strategic game with two part ies ,  symmetric 
information, and mult iple t ime periods, but a final period known to both 
parties (a  "finite time horizon") . I n  each period, the blackmai l ing country 
threatens to take a costly action in  the next t ime period unless the 
blackmailed country makes a concession .  This  game i s  repeated as part of 
a larger "supergame."  I t  would not be in the interest of the blackmail ing 
country to carry through with i t s  threat in  the final  period because there is 
no future period in which to reap a carrot. Recognizing this fact ,  the 
blackmailed country would not pay the carrot in  the penult imate period.  
By the same reasoning, the blackmail ing country wil l  have no incent ive to 
carry through with i t s  threat in  the penultimate period ei ther .  107 Indeed, 
by backward i nduction, the same logic wil l  apply in all previous per iods.  
The dominant strategy in each period wi l l  be for the bl ackmai l ing country 
not to carry out i t s  t hreat and for the blackmailed country to  refuse to 
pay. 1 08 What then makes such threats credible? 
The economic l i terature has analyzed this  type of strategic behavior 
most often in  the field of industrial organization, in the con text of compet­
ing firms. I d igress briefly here to describe these models and the ir  results, 
because they offer lessons directly applicable to the con text of interna­
t ional  bargain ing to prevent environmental harm. The threats described in  
the context of international environmental barga in ing games correspond 
to predatory pricing, e i ther threatened by an incumbent monopolist to 
deter entry by other firms or conducted by an ol igopolist seeking to drive 
i ts competitors out of the market. Models of predatory pr ic ing must 
explain why a firm would find it rational to engage in such pric ing when 
these strategies are costly and therefore raise problems of cred ib i l i ty .  With 
symmetric information and a fin i te time horizon, a compet i tor contemplat­
ing exit from the market, or a potent ial compet i tor contemplat ing entry 
in to the market, would not find the t hreat of predatory pric ing to be 
cred ible .  I 09  
1 06 .  See Jona than  Ea ton  & Max im E n ge rs ,  Sanoions ,  100 J .  P o L.  EcoN. 899  ( 1 992) . Eaton 
and  Enge rs mode l the  use o f  sanc t ions ,  i n c l u d i n g  t rade sanc t ions ,  as  the  a c t i o n  t h a t  i s  cost ly  
to  both par t i e s  bu t  can  ext ract a concess ion  from the ' · ta rge t " of the  sanc t ions .  The same 
mode l ,  howeve r, can  descr ibe cost ly  ac t ions  by one  cou n t ry t ha t  harm an e nv i ronmen ta l  
i n t e res t  va l ued  by  t h e  o t h e r  count ry. The  fi rst  cou n t ry can  u ndertake t h i s  ac t ion  to  wrest  
concess ions from the t arget  coun t ry .  
I 07.  Know i ng t ha t  the b l ackma i l ed  coun t ry w i l l  recogn ize t he  outcome in the fi n a l  pe r iod,  
the b l ackm a i l i ng cou n try w i l l  unders t and  that  i t  c a n no t  change t he b e l i e fs of the b l ac k m a i l ed  
cou n t ry regard ing t h e  fin a l  period by ca r ry i n g  o u t  i ts t h re a t  i n  t h e  p e n u l t i m a t e  per iod .  
1 08 .  I n  t he  l anguage o f  game  t h eory,  t hese  t h rea ts  are not  cred ib l e  e n o ug h  to  make t h e  
paym e n t  o f  carrots ra t ional i n  a "subgame per fe c t  e q u i l i b r i um . "  
1 09 . Sec Re inha rd S e l t e n .  The Chain Store Paradox, 9 TI I EO RY & D E C I S I ON 1 27 ( 1 97R ) .  
Accord i n g  t o  t he "cha i n  s tore" paradox,  a n  i nc u m b e n t  f i rm se l l i ng  i n  m u l t i p l e  marke ts wou ld  
neve r engage i n  cost ly  preda t ion .  regard less  or  t h e  num ber  or  markets i n  wh ich  the  i ncum­
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In  models with asymmetric information, however, threats of predation 
are credible .  In these models, even in  games with finite t ime horizons, 
predatory behavior occurs in equi l ibrium because predation today builds a 
reputat ion for predation that affects predictions by others about the l i kel i ­
hood of predat ion tomorrow. 1 1 0 Suppose, for example, that an i ncumbent 
monopol i st knows i ts  own costs of production (either h igh or low) ,  but a 
potential  entrant does not know the i ncumbent 's  costs. A h igh-cost incum­
bent may price as i f  it were a low-cost i ncumbent,  even though this price is 
too low to maximize i ts  short-term profit, in order to masquerade as a 
low-cost firm and thereby confuse the potential  entrant .  I n  th is  "pooling 
equ i l ibr ium,"  the potential entrant i s  unable to disti nguish between h igh­
cost and low-cost fi rms. Because this " l imit  pricing" strategy may lead the 
potential  en trant to fear low-cost compet i t ion i n  the next period and may 
thus succeed in  deterring entry, the strategy maximizes the long-term profit 
of the h igh-cost i ncumbent. 1 1 1  In this model, the h igh-cost predator threat­
ens low pri ces in the future by charging low prices in the present ("bluff­
i ng" predat ion) ,  in order to extract a future "concession" (a  decision not 
to enter the market) from the potent ial  entrant .  1 1 2  
"Separati ng equil ibria" are also possible i n  these models. I n  these cases, 
the low-cost i ncumbent chooses a price so low that a h igh-cost i ncumbent 
does not find i t  worthwhile to imitate the low-cost incumbent's pr ice ,  even 
though this price is too low to maximize the low-cost incumbent 's  short­
term profit .  The low-cost i ncumbent finds this " l imit pric ing" strategy 
worthwhi le ,  because i t  signals the incumbent 's  low cost and thereby deters 
entry by the potential entrant, and so maximizes the long-term profit of the 
low-cost incumbent .  To price any higher would not convince the potential 
preda tory p r i c i ng in  some markets  so as to es tab l i sh  a rep u t at i on  tha t  w i l l  de ter  e n t ry and  
t h ereby i nc rease p ro fi t s  i n  o t h e r  marke ts .  
1 10 .  An a l t e r n a t ive model  wou l d  re ta in  t h e  assumpt ion  o f  symme t r i c  i n fo rma t ion  a n d  re l y  
i n st e ad o n  i nfin i te t i me horizons to avoi d  t he  l og ic  o f  backward i n d uc t ion  t h at c auses  t he 
e q u i l i b r i um w i t h  success fu l predat ion  to u n rave l . The  Fol k Theorem ho lds t h a t  a n  i n fi n i te ly 
repea ted  game can  h ave a wide var ie ty  of subgame p erfect  e q u i l ib r i a  i f  t h e  p l aye rs a re 
s u flic i en t ly p a t i e n t-th a t  i s ,  i f  they  do no t  d i sco u n t  t h e  future too much .  See D rew Fuden ­
b e rg & Er i c  M as k i n ,  The Folk Theorem in  Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incom­
plete Information , 54  ECO N O M ET R I C/\ 533 ( 1 986 ) .  In par t i cu la r ,  t h i s t heorem i mp l i e s  t h a t  t h e  
t h r e a t  o f  p reda tory b e h av ior  can  be  cred ib le  a n d  e ffe c t ive because t h e  p layers n eve r expect  
t he  game to  e ncl . Eaton and  Engers. supra note  1 06 ,  show how t h re a ts o f  cos t l y  ac t ions  can  
be  cred ib l e  and  e fTec t ive i n  extrac t i ng  concess ions  i n  a mode l  w i t h  symmet r i c  i n format ion  
and  an  i n fi n i te t ime hor izo n .  
1 1 1 .  See P a u l  M i lgrom & Joh n  Rober ts ,  Limit Pricing and Enuy Under Incomplete Informa­
tion: An Equilibrium A nalysis, 5 0  ECO N O M ET R ICA 443 ( 1 982 ) . 
1 1 2 . O n e  can  ex tend  t h e  same model  to predatory pr i c i ng  by a n  es tab l i shed  firm t h a t  seeks  
to convey bad  n ews to a compet i tor  about  fu t u re profitab i l i ty and t h e reby to i n duce the 
comp e t i to r  to  ex i t .  Th i s  predat ion  can  be profi t a b l e  i f  t h e  fi rm faces a cost  o f  re -en t ry .  See 
J o h n  Robe rts ,  A Signaling Model of Predatrny Pricing, 38 O x F O R D  ECOI\.  P A P E R S  75 ( 1 986 )  
( sup p . ) :  D avid Schar fs t e i n .  A Policy to  Pn'l 'Cnt Rational Tr'st-J'vfarket Predation, 2 RAND J .  
ECO N .  229 ( 1 984 ) .  
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entrant ,  who would therefore enter the market and reduce the  incum­
bent 's  profits. 
An ol igopolist can use the same type of predatory pricing  strategy as 
par t  of a bargain ing game.  Consider a duopolist that offers to buy out i ts 
sole competitor. A high-cost firm proposing a takeover  m ay engage in 
predation to mimic a low-cost firm i n  a pool ing equil ibrium. Alternat ively, 
a low-cost firm may engage in predation to signal its low costs in a 
separating equil ibrium. I n  ei ther case, predatory behavior by the firm 
convinces its competitor that future p rices in the market wi l l  be low and 
thereby improves the terms of the potential takeover. By pricing low, the 
duopolist can i nduce its competitor to sell i ts business at a low price in  a 
merger. 1 1 3  Here, the predator obtains a concession in the form of its 
competitor's agreement to accep t  a low offer. 
Thus, game theory suggests that threats to harm the global environment 
could be credible insofar as the b lackmailed country may not know whether 
or not a particular level of environmental protection is truly optimal for 
the governmen t  of the blackmai l ing country. I n  real ity, one government 
cannot observe the polit ical and economic costs and benefits that other 
governments face as they contemplate regulations to restra in exploitat ion 
of the global environment by their own nationals . 1 1 4  Under condit ions of 
asymmetric information, countries may seek to convince others that they 
derive l arge benefits from exploitation and suffer large costs from environ­
mental protection by engaging in a great deal of exploitat ion and in very 
l i t t le regulation.  If  this "predatory" behavior succeeds in conveying this 
impression, then other countries wil l  bel ieve that they must offer the 
predatory countries l arge carrots in  order to induce the predators' re­
straint as part of a multi lateral agreement .  
Countries that actually have low costs of regulat ion may masquerade as 
coun tries with high costs of regulation in order to take advan tage of these 
carrots in a pooling equil ibrium .  Alternatively, h igh-cost countries may 
have to exploit the environment more and to regulate less i n  order to 
signal their h igh costs successfully in a separating equil ibrium.  They wil l  
harm the environment more than they would otherwise so as to differenti­
ate themselves from low-cost countries that would otherwise mimic the 
behavior of high-cost countries .  In  either a pooling or a separating equil ib­
rium, countries choose to infl ict greater harm on the environment in order 
1 1 3 .  See Garth  Sa loner, Predation, Merger and Incomplete Information , 1 8  RAND J .  Ec:oN .  
1 65 ( 1 987) .  
1 1 4.  These cos t s  and  bene fi ts are espec ia l l y  d ifficu l t  for  an outs ider  to eva l ua te .  In  t h e  
predatory pr ic ing  context ,  t h e  d i ffi cu l ty o f  obse rving  a fi r m 's costs was t h e  m a i n  source o f  
uncer ta i n ty .  I f  t h ese  costs cou l d  b e  obs e rved.  t hey  wou l d  no t  he d ifli c u l t  t o  m e as ur e .  I n  t h e  
form at ion  o f  p ub l ic po l i cy ,  t h e  pol i t i ca l  costs a n d  b e n e fi ts t h at e n t e r  t h e  gove rnmen t 's 
ca l c u l at ions  are not  on ly d i fl icu l t  to obse rve ,  b u t  a l so i n h e r e n t ly cl i fli cu l t  to m e as ur e .  
l • 1 
.\ 
l • j 
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to qual ify for carrots in the future . 1 1 5  
c. Bargaining Will Delay Agreement. The same dynamic cont inues through­
out the bargain ing process, leading low-cost coun tries to turn down offers 
of carrots they in fact consider more valuable than their environmentally 
harmfu l  behavior. They do so to mimic h igh-cost countries ,  in the hope of 
obtaining a better offer in the future. In a "bluffing equil ibrium," low-cost 
countries hold out for larger carrots and thereby delay resolution of the 
environmental problem. 1 1 6 Thus, a "carrots only" regime may not only 
i ncrease the level of pollut ion, but also extend the period during which 
inefficiently high l evels  of pollution persist .  
d. Advantages of Sticks. If countries that value the environment are per­
mi tted to use sticks rather than carrots, they can avoid these perverse 
incentives .  If a particular l evel of environmentally harmful behavior tr ig­
gers trade sanctions, and environmental regulat ion leads to the removal of 
those sanctions, for example, then a country will have nothing to gain by 
pretending to find such l evel s  of environmental ly harmful  behavior in i ts 
i nterest .  To the extent that the severity of these sanctions turns on ob­
served l evels of environmental harm, the use of sanctions wi l l  d iscourage 
l ax environmental regulations. First ,  greater levels  of harm wil l  increase 
the stake of the country employ ing sanctions in preventing the harmful 
activity. This effect will i ncrease the costs that this country i s  wi l l ing to 
bear, i ncluding the costs of more draconian sanctions.  Second,  i f  the 
sanctioning country infers, from either the intransigence of the polluting 
country or its levels  of pol lut ion,  that this " target" country enjoys large 
benefits from i ts own environmental ly harmful activity, then i t  wi l l  bel ieve 
harsher  sanctions are needed to ach ieve i ts obj ective . With st icks, a coun­
t ry that s ignals an incl ination to harm the environment can bring greater 
penalt ies upon itself; with carrots, the same s ignal can yield greater re­
wards . 1 1 7 
1 1 5 .  See APPENDIX, infra , for a for m a l  mode l  o f  t h i s  s ign a l i ng gam e .  Aft e r  deve lop ing  t h i s  
mode l a n d  wri t i ng  t h i s  a r t i c l e ,  I l e a r n e d  about  a n  i ndepeml e n t  e f or t  to d eve lop  a forma l  
mod e l  o f  t h i s  t ype  of ba rga i n i ng by Jona than  Eaton  a nd Max im Enger s .  See JONATI IAi\ 
EATON & M A X I M E N G E R S ,  TH REATS A N D  P R O M I S ES ,  (Na t iona l  B ur e a u  o f  Economic  Research ,  
Work ing  Paper  No .  4849 ,  1 994 ) .  A l though Eaton and  Enge rs use  a d i ffe re n t  mode l ,  t hey 
a l so  find  t h a t  a syste m  of  rewards can h ave t h e  pe rverse e ffec t  of encourag ing  po l l u t ion  
because  t he po l l u t ing cou n t ry has  t h e  i n cen t ive to  m is l ead  o t h e rs abou t  i t s  costs and  benefi t s  
from po l l u t i ng.  I n  t h e i r  mode l , t h e re i s  o n ly one  poss i b l e  l eve l  o f  po l l u t ion  g rea t e r  t h a n  zero,  
and a p o l l u t ing  cou n t ry " b l u ffs " by c h oos ing to pol l u t e  in  sp i te of  an  o tter of  a reward i n  t h e  
firs t  per iod ,  s o  as to rece ive a b e t t e r  o ffe r  i n  t h e  second p e r i o d .  See id. a t  8 - 9 ,  1 3- 1 6 . I n  my 
mode l ,  t h e re i s  a con t i n u u m  of poss i b l e  l eve l s  o f  p o l l u t i on ,  and a po l l u t ing  coun t ry s i gna l s  i ts 
" type ' "  t h rough t h e  l eve l  o f  pol l u t i o n  t ha t  i t  chooses pr ior  to t h e  offe r of a ca rrot .  Th i s  
framework revea l s  p e rve rse e ffe cts ,  no t  on ly  i n  a " b l u tfi ng ' '  e q u i l i b r i um l i k e  t h at descr ibed 
by  Eaton and  Engers ,  i n  wh ich  d iffe r e n t  types  pool , but  a l so  i n  a separa t i ng e q u i l i b r i u m .  
1 1 6 .  See E .. \TON & ENGE RS, supm no te  l l 5 .  a t  8 - 9 ,  1 3 - 1 6 . 
1 1 7 .  Grea t e r  pena l t i e s  m ay not  fo l low from th i s  s igna l  i f  t h ese greater  p e n a l t i es a re a l so 
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The foregoing analysis suggests that the "carrots only" solut ion to envi­
ronmental problems is costly in terms of economic efficiency .  Asymmetric 
information not only implies that bargaining may fai l ,  but also creates the 
poss ibi l i ty that carrots wil l  i nduce environmentally costly signaling behav­
ior. Given the defects of the "carrots only" solution, trade restrict ions  and 
other sticks become more attractive as alternat ive or addit ional i nstru­
ments that can restrain the exp loitation of the global commons whi le  the 
parties pursue a more cooperative solution. Un less we make rather san­
guine assumptions about the efficiency of mult i lateral bargaini ng, it seems 
unwise to adopt general rules against the use of trade measures as  broad 
as the rules suggested by the two GATT panels .  In  l ight of the existence of 
transaction costs in the real world and the perverse i ncentives created by 
the "carrots only" approach, trade measures l ike those used by the Un i ted 
States in the tuna case may well be  "necessary to p rotect human, an imal or 
p lan t  l ife or health" pending successfu l  conclusion of a mult i lateral agree­
ment with all relevant countries .  
C.  STICKS : POSSIBLE D I SADVANTAGES 
The use of sticks rather than carrots is  not without its own risks .  There 
is, in theory, a corresponding risk that, if allowed to use st icks, countries 
wil l  use them opportunist ically, simp ly to extract more favorable terms 
from target countries in multi lateral agreements .  That is ,  coun tr ies may 
take advantage of trade instru ments by employing them as strategic b argain­
ing chips ,  just as countries may use environmentally harmfu l  pol ic ies to 
extort carrots from those that value the environment .  I n  th is  sense, a rule  
al lowing the use of  trade measures does not  el imi nate strategic behavior in  
the  bargaining process. Given that strategic behavior is  inherent i n  the 
bargaining process under condi tions of asymmetric information, why might 
we be worried about the use of sticks? Sticks may raise issues of d istribu­
t ive justice and of economic efficiency .  
1. Distribut ive Just ice 
Advocates of the "carrots only" approach point out that a ban on 
uni lateral sanctions would redistribute wealth from the nat ions using sanc­
tions toward the targets of those sanctions. They tout this effect as a 
too cost ly for t h e  cou n t ry u s i ng  s t i cks .  I f  t h i s  s i gna l  l e ads t h e  coun t ry t h rea t e n i n g  s a n ct io n s  
to  d rop i t s  t h rea t ,  t h e n  t h e  u s e  of  s t i cks  can  a l so  c r e a t e  a perve rse i nc e n t ive t o  po l l u t e .  T h u s ,  
as E a t o n  and  E ngers show i n  a fo rma l  mode l ,  i f  o n ly " m i l d "  sanc t ions  are  ava i l ab l e ,  so t h a t  
some types of pol l u t i ng cou n t r i e s  c a n n ot be d e t e rred ,  t h e n  t h re a ts c a n  c r ea t e  t h i s p e t·ve rse 
i nce n t ive .  !d. at 1 7- 1 8, 20-22.  This i ns i g h t  u n d e rscores t h e  i mporta nce of preserv i ng a ccess to 
sanc t ions  t h a t  are suffic i en t  to  d e t e r  the t arget  o f  t h ose sanc t ions .  H i s to r i ca l  e v i d e n ce 
s uggests t h a t  t rade m e asures  h ave usu a l l y  b e e n  su fli c i e n t  to mod i fy po l i c i e s  c a u s i n g  e nv i ron­
m e n t a l  h a rms .  Sec infra notes  224-3 1 and accompany ing  tex t .  Thus ,  t hese  c o n s i d e ra t i on s  on  
b a l a nce m i l i t a t e  i n  favor o r  expan d i ng t he  se t  of  s t i cks ava i l ab l e ,  no t  i n  favc r o f  exc l u d i n g  
t rade  m e asure s  from t h i s  se t .  Sec supm t e x t  accompanyi n g  n o t e  88.  
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reason t o  favor such a ban,  not only o n  grounds o f  d istributive justice, but 
also on environmental grounds :  they point to evidence that " environmen­
t al qual i ty and income levels are h ighly correlated ." 11 8 Wealth transfers to 
developing countries raise their income levels and thereby increase their 
interest in  environmental protection . If we assume that the countries 
wielding sanctions tend to be affluent countries with large economies and 
that the targets of sanct ions are often smaller and poorer countries, then 
the use of sanctions wil l  have unfortunate redistributive effects compared 
to the "carrots only" approach. 
Concerns about distributive justice per se, however, do not lend support 
for directing carrots at those countries that harm the environment .  Trans­
fers from those countries that most value the environment  to those that 
h arm the environment are extremely clumsy instruments for redistribut ing 
wealth.  These transfers redistribute wealth on grounds imperfectly corre­
lated with the affluence or poverty of the coun tries in quest ion .  They will 
i nclude wealth transfers to affluent countries that harm the environment 
( such as Norway, which has resumed its hunting of minke whales) 1 1 l) and 
wil l  exclude transfers to poor countries that refrain from harming the 
environment .  This erratic policy not only offends notions of horizontal 
equity and fai rness, but also creates perverse incentives to harm the 
environment .  
A superior policy response would be to transfer resources from affluent 
countries to poor countries general ly, because such transfers can target 
those countries with the greatest need without creating any of the perverse 
incentives described here . 1 20 We have many other policies, such as the 
l iberal ization of trade in text i les, clothing, and other sectors important for 
the industrialization of developing countries, that would faci l i tate eco­
nomic growth in less developed countries without specifically reward ing 
those that harm the envi ronment .  Given the broad range of policies that 
can improve the prospects for economic development  in  poorer countries 
without the adverse effects associated with the "carrots on ly" regime, a 
prohibition on the use of trade st icks to protect the environment is a 
relatively unattractive and unimportant instrument for redistribu t ing glo­
bal wealth. 
1 1 8 . Sub raman i a n ,  supra note  I S , a t  1 48 .  
1 1 9 . See supra n o t e  26 and  accompany ing  tex t .  
1 20 .  In  the  domes t i c  context ,  red i s t ri b u t i on t h rough p rogressive i ncome t axes is  l ess cos t ly  
t han  red i s t r i bu t ion  t h rough i n e ffi c i e n t  l ega l  r u l es .  See Louis  Kap low & S t eve n S have l l ,  Wlt r  
!he Legal Sysle/11 Is  ress Ejficien l Tfwn lit e Income Tax in  Redislrihuting Income. 23 .1 .  LEGAL 
STUD.  667 ( 1 994) ;  S teven S have l l ,  A No1e on Ejjiciencv l 'S. Dislrihurional Equi1y in Legal 
Rulemaking: Should Distrihurional C'qui1y J'vfauer Ci1·en Op1imal Income Taxation :J . 7 1  AM. 
Ecoi'!. R E V .  P,\ P E R S  & P ROC. 4 1 4  ( 1 98 1 ) . S i m i : a rl y. i n  t h e  con text  o f  i n t e rna t i ona l  l egal 
ru l e s .  a l t e rna t ives to  the " " carrots on ly ' · regime l e ave ava i l ab l e  many super ior  i n s t ru m e n t s  for 
i m p rovi ng t h e  g loba l  d i s t r i bu t ion of we a l t h .  
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2 .  Economic Efficiency 
Should the strategic use of st icks to shift the threat poin t  i n  favor of the 
countries that wield them be a source of concern from an efficiency 
perspect ive? The fact that s ticks reduce the payoffs of polluting countries 
does not in and of i tself pose a p roblem: it is p recisely this mechanism that 
discourages excessive h arm to the environment. Nevertheless, the heavy­
handed use of sticks could raise problems for global economic efficiency by 
going too far i n  protecting the environment .  St icks that impose large costs 
on the targeted countries might induce them to forgo environmental ly 
harmful activit ies even when the economic benefits that they derive from 
these activit ies outweigh the costs. Over time, bargaining may allow these 
countries to resume these act iv it ies without provoking sanctions :  i f  their 
activities are indeed efficient, then they should be able to offer other 
countries concessions sufficiently valuable to pay for the right to pollute.  
As already discussed ,  however ,  b argain ing may fai l  to bring about efficient 
outcomes. I s  the st ick cure therefore l ikely to be worse than the carrot 
disease? There are two reasons to think that the use of st icks is st i l l  l ikely 
to effect an improvement over the "carrots only" regime. 
First, the transparently opportunist ic use of sticks to extort concessions 
is unl ikely, given the adverse impact these tactics would have on a sanction­
ing country's foreign relations. The doctrine of proportionali ty in  i nterna­
t ional J aw requires that any sanctions a country employs should be 
proportionate to the i nterests to be protected .  1 2 1 This well-established 
principle impl ies that economic sanctions causing effects d isproportionate 
to the environmental in terests at  s take would violate international l aw. 1 22 
The use of sanctions is constrained not only by international law generally, 
but also by the realit ies of the international political landscape .  No country 
wil l  resort to sanctions without some hesitat ion, because they can erode 
precious poli tical capital in the realm of international relat ions .  Even if all 
governments agreed that trade sticks are consistent with the GATT, they 
would be unl ikely to use sanctions often.  The threat of a hosti le reaction, 
and perhaps even retal iatory sanctions imposed by the target country, 
makes such an undertaking a r isky and serious matter. 1 23 Because trade 
sanctions and other threats are avai lable to all parties, each party is  l ikely 
to exercise restraint in employing them. 
For these reasons, we rarely observe the blatant use of e i ther sanctions 
or environmental ly harmful activi t ies simply to extort concessions from 
1 2 1 .  See Jost  D e lb ruck ,  Proportionaliry, in 7 E N CYCLO P E D I A  Of P U B L I C  l NTERNAT I O !'\ i\ L  
LAW 396,  399 ( Rudo l f  B e r n h a r d t  eel . ,  1 984 ) .  
1 22 .  Dunotf, supra n o t e  94, a t  1 447 .  
1 23 .  Sec B i l de r ,  supra note  88,  a t  84 ("Tens ions  may be i nevi tab le  i f  o t h e r  s ta tes  dec ide  
t ha t  the  u n i l at e ra l  ac t ion  s i gn i fi c an t l y  harms t h e i r  i n t e res ts ,  and p a rt i cu l a rl y  w h e re t hey 
perce ive i t  as i m p i ng i ng on  t h e i r  r i gh t s  . . . .  I f  t h e  s ta tes  a ffected shou ld  respond  by t a k i ng 
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others. A rule  allowing the use of trade sanctions offers the p rospect that 
the potential for opportun istic behavior on each side wil l  serve to inhibi t  
abuse on the other side.  Allowing countries to respond to the environmen­
tal threats posed by polluting coun tries with threats of their own preserves 
some symmetry that would be l acking under the "carrots only" ap­
proach. 1 24 Given the potential for mutual threats, if any abuse of sanct ions 
occurs a t  all , it i s  unl ikely to take the form of naked blackmai l .  Any abuse 
of sanctions is  more l ikely to be rather subtle, so as to appear proportion­
ate to the legitimate interests of the country wielding the sanction . 
Second, the use of st icks assures that the bargaining process is  not 
b iased against environmental interests . The "carrots only" approach leads 
inevitab ly to inefficiently h igh levels of environmental harm because it 
rewards rather than penalizes harmful behavior . 1 25 Whereas the "carrots 
only" approach guarantees perverse incentives for harmful behavior, the 
use of trade sticks creates a mere theoretical possib i l i ty of excessive 
deterrence . The realit ies of international pol it ics that inhib it the abuse of 
trade sanctions also greatly reduce the risk that countries will deter too 
much environmental harm. 
Although we cannot guarantee optimal environmental p rotection under 
a regime that allows trade sticks, the risk of too l itt le pollution hardly 
seems to be an important danger as an empirical matter. Recall that even 
in the absence of perverse incentives to harm the environment,  the status 
quo already features excessive incentives to harm the environment .  Given 
1 24. Bhagwat i , h oweve r ,  obse rves that  w h i l e  " t h e  s t rong  n a t ions  use  trade powe r  to  force 
t h e i r  pre ferred va lues  on  t h e  weaker  n a t ions ,"  t h e  " e q u a l ly au tonomous  va lues  of t h e  
weaker  n a t ions  . . .  c annot be  forced upon t h e  s t ronger  n a t ions  i n  t h e  s a m e  way." B h agwat i ,  
supra no te  1 8 , a t  1 71 .  He  com p la i n s  t ha t  t h is asy m m e t ry i m p l i es t ha t  "economica l ly s t rong 
n a t ions  a re a l so mora l ly super ior  and  t h e i r  govern m e n ts m u s t  no t  b e  cons tra i n ed by  m u l t i l a t ­
e ra l  ru les  from coe rc ing  o t h e rs i n to convers ion . "  !d. a t  1 74 .  Th i s  com p l a i n t ,  however,  res ts 
upon a n  i m p l i c i t  assu mpt ion  t h a t  t h e  a l t e r n a t ive wou ld  be  " mora l ly"  n e u t r a l .  O n e  cou l d  ju s t  
as e as i ly com p l a i n  t ha t  a "carrots o n ly" reg ime  wou ld  i m p l y  t h a t  e co n o m ica l l y  we ak n a t ions  
are  " mora l ly  super ior"  and  mus t  be  fre e  to  harm the  e nv i ronm e n t ,  i nc l ud i n g  t h e  g loba l  
commons ,  as they  s ee  fi t ,  w i t hou t  any  fear o f  sanc t ions .  See supra note  93 . 
Fur the rmore,  B h agwat i 's compl a i n t  s e e m ingly ex tends  to a l l  exerc ises  o f  power  by power­
fu l  coun t r ies ,  sugges t i ng  a genera l  duty n o t  to exerc ise  power .  It i s  also t r u e ,  for example ,  
tha t  r i ch  coun t ri es  can  o ffe r carrots  tha t  poor  coun t r i es cannot .  Any res t r a i n t  on  the  exerc ise  
o f  power ,  w h e t h e r  by carrot o r  s t ick ,  wi l l  r ed i s t r i bu te  power  away from the powerfu l .  To t h e  
ext e n t  t h a t  B h agwa t i ' s  com p l a i n t  p e r t a i n s  to probl e m s  o f  d i s t r i bu t ive j u st i ce ,  as d iscussed 
above, o the r  po l i c i es are be t t e r  su i t ed  to  add ress t h e m .  Like the red i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  wea l t h ,  t h e  
red i s t ri bu t i on  o f  power  can  o c c u r  t h rough  a var ie ty  o f  pol i c i es ,  s o m e  i l l - advised,  o the rs 
des i rab l e .  Some uses of power ,  even uses o f  s t i cks, are  b e n efic i a l .  See infra no te  1 26 .  
A more usefu l  approach wou ld  d i s t i ngu i sh  be twee n  sa l u t a ry and  h a rmful  exerc i ses  of 
power .  For examp le ,  the an alys is  in  t h is a r t i c l e  looks to the ques t ion  o f  w h i ch l ega l  reg ime 
wou ld  be  more l i ke ly to promote g loba l  w e l fa re ,  wi th  our  me asure o f  soc i a l  w e l fa re d es igned 
to respect  the  l egi t i m ate  pre fere nces  o f  a l l  par t i e s .  I t  does not  provide a bas i s  for  de t e rm i n ­
i n g  w h i ch party i s  " mora l ly super ior ."  T h i s  a n a lys is  suggests t h a t  i t  i s  be s t  to l e t  e a c h  par ty 
pursue t h e  sa t i sfac t ion  o f  i t s  own va lues ,  no t  on ly  t hrough explo i t a t i on  of t h e  e nv i ronm e n t  
b u t  a l s o  t h rough sanc t ions  i n  response to po l l u t i on  by o t h e rs .  
1 25 .  See  supru Par t  l i B  for a c r i t i que  of the "carrots on ly ' · approac h .  
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that countries already labor under severe free-rider problems in  t ackling 
global environmental problems, the notion that we should worry about 
excessive environmental protection is  rather fanciful .  If  anyth ing, because 
we are starting with the standard problems associated with the provis ion of 
a public good, countries need stronger incentives to take act ion, both to 
protect the environment and to induce other countries to do the same. If  
the use of trade st icks i n  this cause b rings some reward to countries that 
take action and some penalty for those countries that h arm the environ­
ment ,  these effects are far more l ikely to  improve matters than to overcom­
pensate .  1 26 
I I I .  TRADE M EASURES:  SOLUTION O R  PANDORA'S Box? 
The preceding analysis suggests that we should al low the use of st icks as 
well as carrots. This analysis applies general ly to all sticks, whether they 
take the form of trade measures or other policy instruments .  The free­
rider problems and asymmetries i n  information that inh ib i t  i nternat ional 
cooperation on global environmental problems, however, mi l itate in favor 
of a broad set of avai lable sticks, including trade sticks in par ticular .  If we 
offer governments a larger set of instruments from which to choose, we 
i ncrease the l ikel ihood that they can overcome barriers to  mult i lateral 
agreements. 
A rule allowing the use of trade measures, however, i s  not without its 
own particular costs and risks. If trade measures entail the ir  own economic 
costs, then a rule allowing their use may undermine global economic 
efficiency. Although trade measures can help protect the global environ­
ment, they can also distort trade. If  t rade measures often serve the inter­
ests of protectionism rather than genuine environmental in terests, then 
the costs flowing from the abuse of t rade measures could swamp the 
benefi ts  of  envi ronmental protect ion .  
A.  DISGU ISED PROTECTIONISM 
Commentators have suggested that an exception to the GATT that 
al lowed unilateral trade measures to protect the environment could be 
"captured" by domestic producers seeking protection from competit ion in  
in ternational trade. Domestic producers might raise trivial environmental 
concerns to disguise measures that are protectionist .  There are two ways in 
J 26.  From th i s  pe rspect ive ,  we are  for t u na t e  tha t  some cou nt r i e s  a re l a rge e nough to  
ove rcome free - r i de r  prob l e ms among  a l a rge n u mber  of  t he i r  const i t u e n t s .  Large cou n tr i e s  
absorb a l a rge e nough port ion of t h e  to t a l  wor l d b e n e fi t  from t he p ro t ec t i on  o f  t h e  g loba l  
env i ro n m e n t  tha t  t h ey h ave the  i nc e n t ive to t ake  ac t io n .  Large cou n t r i e s  are  a l so  g e n e r a l ly 
i n J·l u e n t i a l  e nough to w i e l d  s t i cks e ffect ive ly .  S m a l l e r  a n d  l ess powerfu l  cou n t r i e s  t h a t  are  no t  
t h e  t a rget  o f  t he se  sanc t ions  ' · free  r i de ' '  on  t h e  u n i l a t e ra l  ac t ions  take n by l a rge cou n t r i e s  
i nso fa r  as they  de r ive t h e  e nv i ronm e n t a l  b e n e fi t s  t h a t  flow from t h e se ac t ions  w i t hou t  
bear i ng  t h e  cos ts .  
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which countries may abuse environmental trade measures for p rotectionist 
reasons .  
F irst, domestic producers in  the country imposing the trade measures 
might support the measures as a means to achi eve environmental objec­
t ives, because while they are in p lace, the trade measures themselves 
protect domestic producers from foreign competit ion . 1 27 In this sense, 
domestic producers benefit from continuing i ntransigence on the part  of 
the foreign government, which keeps the trade measures in p lace. From an 
economic perspective, such trade measures m ight be costly because whi le 
they are i n  p lace, they can distort trade. 
Second, protection ists might support environmental policies that raise 
the production costs of foreign competitors, so that when trade measures 
persuade the foreign government to adopt such policies, they can compete 
more effectively aga inst imports from that country. In this case, these 
producer i n terest groups are in  a win-win situation : if the trade measures 
succeed in changing policies abroad, domestic producers succeed in  raising 
their competitors' costs; if the foreign governments do not change their 
pol icies, the trade measures continue to shie ld domestic producers from 
these competitors. Countervai l ing duties on the "ecodumpi ng" theory, for 
example, would offer these benefits to domestic p roducers. One crit ic of 
trade measures warns that "domestic i ndustries and labour groups . . .  are 
l ikely to h i tch their wagon to the ecological star to secure or legit imise 
protectionist outcomes . "  1 2:-: 
If  GATT Article XX is to permit trade measures, i t  must also place 
some l imits on their use . Without any l imits ,  the use of trade measures 
could undermine our regime of l iberal ized trade, which would entai l  
econom ic costs just as surely as environmental harms entai l  economic 
costs. The GATT should l imit  the use of trade restrictions so that they do 
not lead to an outcome worse than that produced by the "carrots only" 
approach . What l imits should we p lace on the environmental  policies that 
countries may pursue through trade measures? 
1 .  Geographic Location 
\Ve can d isti nguish between environmental DOIICles based o n  the  geo-
� 1 � 
graphic location of the  activity to be regulated: is it w ithin the terr i tory of 
, 
. l , , I " ) 7<) Th , . . . ,, anotner coun try, or m tne g10oa commons . - · e precemng cnt tque or 
1 2 7 . .  ).r.!e GATT. supm n o t e  1->,  a t  2 !  ( wa r n i n g  of p r o t e c t i o n is t s  . . b i a s i n g  the choice b e t we e n  
pos i t ive a n d  negat ive i n ce n t ives i n  favou r  of trade s a n c t io n s� · ) �  B i l d e r ,  5;uprn n o t e  ��8�  a t  92 
( " [ ivi ] e a :, u res re:; t r i c t i ng i m po r t s  o s t e n s i b l y  f or  <� nviro n rn e n t a i  r e a s o n :;  m ay �t c t u a i ly be i m ­
p o s e d  t \ )  p :o t r: c t  dorn e :-; t i c  i n d u s t r i e �) ctg a i n s t  fore ign con1p e t i t i o n  . . .  ) . 
1 26 .  :) u b nun a n i :l n .  supra n o t e  l S . at l 4t;. 
1 20 .  S'ee i)e l ·e/()pn u..'n is in ;he l_ rnv-!n tern a t ion a !  f·n \ ·irDn;nenie! L u ; t · . l U-� £-L\ P. \-' . L. F: f:.\ ' .  
l -4g4, 1 5 34<�,(1 ( l CJY l )  ( d i s t i ngu ish i11g r e so u rc e s  " \v i t h i n  t h e  t e r r i [uri :.d h u u n d�tr i e s  of o!! t s t a t e  
Ui' _gi·u u p  CJ!' S l d t C S , .  frt i fl1 t h D��!.� . . i n  V-l h i c h  n o  S t a te:: j ; ��S  p n.  .. : p r: r i y r i g n t � "  and t h o s �  " not 
cnJ� t �t i n c d  in  �1 ny  ( Jn t.? state . .  ) . 
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the GATT solution applies most clearly in  the case o f  natural resources 
held in common where multiple countries derive value from using the 
resources. The economic logic of this  cri t ique, however, sweeps more 
broadly to i nclude transborder environmental problems. For example, 
act ivit ies within one country's national borders can have physical effects i n  
other countries . 1 30 Thus ,  the 1 994 panel was wise to  rej ect  any territorial 
l imits on the environmental i nterests fal l ing within  the Article XX excep­
t ions,  whether b ased on the territory of the country us ing the trade 
measure or based on the territory of any other country. 
2 .  Use Value and Nonuse Value 
We also can dist inguish between environmental policies b ased on the 
type of interest we have in  the activity regulated : spillovers can be  psycho­
logical rather than physical . 1 3 1 People can value natural resources not only 
for their "use value" (either the actual current use value o r  the "option 
value" of potential  future use) ,  but also for their  existence per se.  The 
desire to protect marine mammals ,  for example, derives from " existence 
value" or "nonuse value" as well  as use value. Environmental ists do not 
wish to conserve marine mammals s imply so that they can be explo i ted in 
an efficient manner.  Their desire to protect dolphins and whales goes 
beyond the use value that people derive from whal ing or from the p leasure 
of viewing them in person or in photographs. People attach value to 
natural resources that they never intend to enjoy persona l ly .  
These nonuse values may derive from a variety of altruistic motives . 1 32 
They may represent the altruistic satisfaction one derives from the use of 
the resource by other people .  For example, this nonuse value may be 
"bequest value ,"  which flows from the use of the resource by future 
generations. Our desire to protect prist ine environments or  endangered 
species, for example,  may derive in large part from bequest values .  Altruis­
t ic nonuse value may also reflect " in trinsic value , "  which der ives from the 
benefits a resource i tse l f  enjoys whi l e  i t  is undisturbed by humanity. Our 
desire to protect individual marine mammals from cruelty or death, for 
example ,  may reflect intrinsic value . 1 33 
l JO .  S.cc supra n o t e  78 and  accompany ing  t e x t  for a d i scuss ion of  t h e s e  s p i l l ove r e fle c t s .  
1 3 1 .  Sec GATT, supra note  8, a t  33 n . 53 ;  R i c h ard B l a c k h u r s t  & Arvi n d  Subram a n i a n ,  
Promoting t'v!ulrilareral CooperaTion o n  the E11 1 ·ironmenT ,  i n  T H E  G R E E N I N G  O F  WO R L D  T R A D E  
I S S U E S ,  supra note I S . at  247;  Kar i -Goran M ale r ,  !n remarional  Ell \ ·ironlllen ral  Problems ,  6 
0 :\ f'O R D  REV .  ECO N .  P OI_ ' y  80,  100-0 1 (1 990) .  
1 32 .  See Alan R a n d a l l  & John R .  S to lL  ExisTence Va lue in a Torol Valua Tion Framework. in 
M !\ '! ;\ G I N G  A I R  Q U !\ LI TY i\ N D  S C E N I C  R E S O U RCES AT N ;\T I UN ;\ L  P A R K S  ;\ N D  W I LD E R :\ ESS  
A R EAS 265.  268 ( Robe rt D .  Rowe & L a u r a i n e  G .  Ches t n u t  eds  . •  1 903 )  [ h e re i n a ft e r  M M� .. \G­
I N G  A I R  Q U .-\ L I TY J .  
1:13 .  I n  t h e  ! 99-+ c a se . V e n e z u e l a  a rgu e d  t h a t  · ' t h e re w�ts n o  ev ide n ce i n d ict t i n g  t h �t t  
do l p h i n  popu la t ions i n  t h e  Lts t e r n  Tro pica l  Pac i tk w e re i n  dange r o f  e x t i n c t i o n . " a n d  t h a t  
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Nonuse value,  however, need not  depend on  any a l tru ist ic preferences. 
We can also derive satisfaction simply from knowing that prist ine environ­
ments and endangered species in other countries are preserved, indepen­
dent of any use that  might be made of them. These nonuse values give rise 
to "preservation external it ies . " 1 34 Final ly, we m ight dist inguish nonuse 
values that derive purely from some effect on our own psychological 
welfare,  l ike those that derive from our "sympathy" for other sentient 
beings, and those that depend on our polit ical theories, ethical  beliefs, or 
"commitments ."  1 35 
Nonuse value tends to pose serious practical problems for those t rying 
to measure its magnitude because i t  is a public good that people can often 
enjoy without changing their  behavior. 1 36 This feature impl ies the prefer­
ence revelation problems usually associated with pub l ic goods .  Use value 
t h erefore  the M M P A  was " n e i t h e r  n ecessary to protect  dol p h i n  l ife or  h e a l t h  nor p r imar i l y  
a imed  a t  cons e rva t i on . "  1 994 Decision , supra note  2 ,  para .  4 . 3 6 ,  at  47.  S i m i l ar ly ,  t h e  EC 
a rgued t h a t  " i t  cou l d  not  be sa id  t h a t  t h e  survival  of the popu la t i on  was c u rren t ly  a t  r i sk ," 
and t h at t h e re fo re the MMPA was no t  " n e cessary" for  t h e  protec t ion  of dol p h i n s .  !d. para .  
3 . 75 ,  a t  3 1 ;  see D u nofl, supra note  94, at  1 45 1 ( no t i n g  t h a t, on  the  record be fore the  1 99 1  
p a n e l . "substa n t i a l  ev idence  ex i s ted  t hat t h e  n u mber  o f  do lph i ns i n  t h e  ETP h ad re ma i ned  
cons tan t  i n  rece n t  years " ) . These  a rgum e n ts assum e  t h a t  b ecause these  do lp h i ns are no t  
e nd a ngered a s  a popu la t i on ,  t h e  M M PA is  no t  " necessary . "  Th i s  ass u m p t io n  retlec ts  an  
u n du ly n a r row v i ew  o f  t h e  reasons t h a t  a cou n t ry can  i nvoke to  protect  a n i m a l  l i fe or  h e a l t h  
u n d e r  Art i c l e  X X ( b ) .  O n e  can  h ave a l t ru i s t i c  concerns for t h e  w e l fare o f  i nd iv idua l  dol p h i n s, 
even i f  t h e  to ta l  dol p h i n  popu la t i on  i s  no t  dep l e t ed .  
The  ra te  of  dep l e t i on  of t h e  dolp h i n  popu la t i on  seems  m ore r e l evan t  to t h e  a n a lys i s  under  
Ar t i c l e  XX(g) ,  bu t  V e n ezue la ' s  a rgu m e n t  t akes  a par t i cu l ar ly  n a r row v i ew o f  t he  c i rcum­
s t ances  t ha t  m igh t  req u i re conserva t ion  m easures . Gove r n me n ts shou ld  b e  a l l owed to take 
act ion b e fore the r i sk  of  d e p l e t ion begi n s  to  t h rea ten  a spec ies  w i th  ex t i n c t i on .  When  
i nvok i ng Ar t i c l e  XX(g )  b e fore t h e  1 994 p a n e l ,  t he  U n i t e d  S ta t e s  m a i n t a i ned t h a t  t una  
fis h i ng i n  t he ETP " t h rea t ened  t he  sust a i n ab i l i ty o f  severa l  spec i e s  of  do l p h i ns . "  ! 994 
Decision , supra note 2, para .  3 . 5 0 ,  a t  26.  I n  1 9 9 3 ,  t h e  Na t iona l  Mar ine  F i she r i es S e rv ice  
( N M FS )  l i s ted two spec ies  o f  do lp h i n  in  the  ETP as "dep l e t ed . "  Sec Taking and  I m port i ng 
o f  Mar i ne  M a m mals ;  L i s t i ng  of t h e  Nor theas tern  Offs hore Spot ted Dol p h i n  as Dep l e t ed ,  58 
Fed.  Reg.  5 8 , 285 ( 1 993 ) ( fi n d i ng by the NMFS ) ;  Taking  and I mport i ng o f  Mar i ne  M a m m als ;  
L is t i ng o f  Eastern  S p i n n e r  Dol p h i n  as  Dep l e ted ,  58 Fed . Reg. 45 ,066 ( 1 99 3 )  ( same ) .  
1 34 .  See Richard B .  S tewart ,  In terna tion al  Trade a n d  Environment: Lessons ji·onl th e 
Federa l Experience , 49 WAS H . & LEE L. REV.  1 3 29,  1 340-4 1 ( 1 99 2 ) .  
1 35 .  A . K . Sen  d i s t i ngu i shes  b e twee n  t h ese two concepts :  "sympathy" a rises w h e n  o n e 's 
ow n psycho log ica l  w e l fare depends o n  t h e  we iLne of o t h e rs ,  w h e reas  ' · comm i tm e n t s "  d erive 
from mora l  b e l i e fs . Amar tya K .  S e n ,  Ra tiona l  Fools: A Critique of th e Belza 1 ·ioral Foundations 
of Econoli l ic The01y, 6 P H I L . & P U B .  AFF. 3 1 7 ,  326-29 ( 1 97 7 ) .  B e r n a rd Wi l l i am s  uses t h e  t e rm 
' · co m mi tme n t s ' ·  i n  a s i m i la r  sense . See Bernard Wi l l i a ms, A Critique of Uti!itarianislll , in 
J .J .C . S :vi A in & B E RN A R D  W I LLIA M S ,  U T I LI TA R I A N I S M :  F o R  & A G f\ I N S T  1 1 2- 1 3  ( 1 9 7 3 ) .  J o h n  
Hars�1 nvi ma kes a s i m i l a r  d i s t i nc t ion  betwe e n  · ' pe rsona l  p re fe re n ces ,  . . w h i c h  m ay be  ' · com­
p l e t e ly se l ti s h ' '  but  wi l l  usua l ly ass ign some weight  to the i n t erests  o f  o t h e rs,  and ' · mora l  
prefe re nces . · ·  John  C.  H a rsany i ,  Moru litv and the Th emy of' Ra tion a l  Be!wriour. in  UTI LJ T,\ R I ­
;\ N I S :V I 1\ N D  BEYO N D  39, 4 7  ( A m a rtya K .  S e n  & Bernard Wi l l i a ms eel s . ,  1 982) . 
l 3 fi .  See Pe te r  A .  D i amond & Je rry A .  H ausman ,  On Contingent Valuation Aieasurt!ll lent of 
Non use Va lues.  in CONTI N G ENT V,\ L U 1\T I O N :  A C: R JT I C.,\ L 1\SS ESS\ IE i\T 3 --t ( Je rrv A .  H �tusman  
e el . .  J l) lJ3 ) :  Ke n n e t h  M cCon n e l l .  Existence u n d  Beif l iCSt Va lu e ,  in M1\Ni\C.i i N G  /\ I R  Q u .-\ I . I T Y .  
supru note  1 3 2 .  a t  25-t .  2 6 2 .  
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can usually be measured more easily, because to enjoy use value, people 
must often take action,  such as travel ing to view an environmental s i te .  
Economists can estimate the use value associated with a s i te  using the 
technique of "revealed preference," whereby they infer p refe rences from 
observed behavior. Nonuse value, however, i s  not traded i n  markets, nor is 
i ts  enjoyment usually affected s ignificant ly by ind ividual act ions .  There­
fore, we cannot rel iably infer the ful l  nonuse value that  an  ind ividual 
attaches to a given asset from any observable behavior by that indi ­
vidual . 1 37 Because the measurement of nonuse values poses p ractical d iffi­
cult ies ,  we should be suspicious of self-serving claims of l arge nonuse 
values. If i t  i s  too difficult to establ ish a rel iable est imate of nonuse values, 
it may be tempting to exclude them from actual calculat ions of economic 
costs and benefits . 
Indeed, some economists suggest that purely as a matter of economic 
theory, the calculat ion of economic costs and benefits should not i nclude 
nonuse values. For example, Paul Milgram, although conceding that these 
values "have a role in the pol i tical p art of public-pol icy considerations," 
has asserted that they " are not . . .  properly included i n  benefit-cost 
analyses, because including them obscures those analyses  and  prevents 
them from fulfill ing their proper economic function . " 1 3x To support this 
view, he notes that cost-benefit analysis  cannot include values based on 
interpersonal altruism if the purpose of the exercise is to identify potential  
Pareto improvements-projects that in  theory could be implemented and 
financed to increase someone's welfare without decreasing the  welfare of 
anyone else . 1 39 He  concludes that  nonuse values " l ike altruist ic values . . .  
1 37 .  Measure m e n t  t e chn iques  for n o n use va lues  re ly  o n  con t i n ge n t  v a l u a t i o n  (CY) sur ­
veys, wh ich  ask peop le  d i re c t ly w h a t  t hey are w i l l i n g  to  p ay for  a give n e n vi ro nm e n t a l  b e n e fi t .  
Some economists ,  however, h ave ques t i oned t h e  r e l i ab i l i ty of  t hese s urveys .  See generally 
Co;-.;T I N G ENT YALU;\T I O N :  A C R I T I CA L  AssESSMENT, supra note  1 3 6. But see W. M ic h a e l  
H a n c m a n n .  Valuing the En l 'ironment Through Contingenl Valuation . 8 J .  ECO N .  P E R S P .  1 9  
( 1 994) .  
1 38 .  Paul  M i l grom, Is Svmpathy an Economic Value ?  Philosopl1y, Economics, and the 
Contingenr Valuation Method, in CoNTI NGENT V A LUr\T I O i': :  A C R I T I CA L  ASSESS M ENT, supra 
note  1 3 6, at 4 1 7 , 422; see Diamond  & H ausm a n .  supra note 1 36 ,  a t  9 ( a rgu i n g  t h a t  
" b e ne fi t-cost  a n a lyses . . .  s hou ld  no t  t a k e  i n t o  acco u n t  e t h i ca l  va l ues ;  i ns t e a d .  t h ey s h ou l d  
b e  b ased o n ly o n  se l f- i n t e res ted ( economic )  p refere nces " )  
l 3 9 .  See M i lgrom. supra note  1 38, a t  4 1 9-2 1 .  Tra d i t i o n a l  cos t -be n e fi t  a n a ly s i s  h a s  d i fli c u l ­
t i e s  i n  i d e n t i fy i ng pote n t i a l  Pare to  i mp rove m e n ts i n  t h e  presence o f  a l t ru i s t i c  p re fe r e n ces  
because  i n divi dua l s  wi l l  h ave prefe r e n ces over t h e  d i s t r ibu t ion  of  the  cos t s  of a projec t .  
M i l grom descr ibes a numer i ca l  exam p l e  i n  w h i c h  each  i n d iv idua l  i s  asked  for h i s  o r  he r  
w i l l i ngn ess to pay  fo r  a pa r t i cu l a r  projec t .  See id. a t  420- 2 1 . Each  i n d iv i d u a l  responds ,  
i nc l u d i n g  i n  h is  or  her  va l ua t i on  the benefi t s  flowi n g  to  t he  obje cts of  h is  o r  her  a l t r u i s t i c  
prefe re nces . on  t he  assumpt ion  t h at n o  one  e l se  w i l l  h ave to hear  a n y  costs .  The a n a lyst  
aggrega tes  these va lua t ions  to ca l cu l a t e  what  seems t o  be the tota l  b e n e fi t  o f  the p rojec t .  
Go ing  forward w i t h  t h e  proj ec t  w h e n ever " t h e  sum o r  each c i t i z en ' s  w i l l ingness  to pay  for 
t h e  p roj ec t  exceeds t h e  cost of t h e  projec t , "  id. at -1 1 9 , c :n  m i skad a pnl icymakcr i n to go i ng 
forward w i t h  a p roj e c t  t h a t  does n o t  ac tua l l y  y i e l d  b e n e h b  :n excess u f  co:; t s .  If t h e  �1 pparen t  
ben e fi t s  b a r e h' t:xceecl t h e  cos t .  for exam p le ,  t he re wi l l  b •.:: l l \1  w ay to fi n a nce  the  p rojec t  so as  
1 995] ECONOMIC ANALYSIS O F  TRADE MEASURES 2 1 69 
should ,  according to standard economic theory, be excluded from benefit­
cost studies ."  1 40 
Mi lgram's claims, however, merely reflect a part icularly narrow notion 
of the "proper economic function" of cost-benefi t  analysis :  in his view, the 
analysis must exclude any values not  pure ly egoistic and must seek poten­
t ia l  Pareto improvements. 1 4 1 I t  i s  M ilgrom who implicitly rel ies on ideas 
from outside the d iscipl ine of economics in the premises underlying his 
argument .  He excludes interests actually and s incerely valued by people 
from his definit ion of "benefits" without justifying his bel ief that altruistic 
values do not count  as economic value. Mi lgrom cannot derive his  conclu­
sions regarding altruistic preferences from economic theory, but i nstead 
must defend his assumptions expl ic i tly on some other basis .  
Economic theory alone provides no basis for exclud ing nonuse value 
from the social welfare function that we should seek to maximize through 
the formulation of public policy. Economics normally accepts an ind ividu­
al's preferences as worthy of satisfaction, without an inqu i ry in to the 
motives underlying particular preferences. 142 There i s  no apparent reason 
why economists should treat a preference that endangered species be 
preserved with any less respect than a preference for imported wine. A 
to e tfect  a P a re t o  i m p rove m e n t .  I f  costs are  a l l ocated among a l l  i n d iv i d u al s ,  fo r exa m p l e ,  
t h e n  t h e  b e n e fit s  o f  t h e  p roject  c a n  be l e s s  t h a n  a n t i c ip a t e d ,  because e a c h  i nd i v i d u a l  
s p e c i ll e d  b e n efi t s  o n  t h e  ass u m p t i o n  t h a t  o t h e rs wou l d  n o t  be  b u r d e n e d  w i t h  a n y  cost .  
In  t h e o ry .  cost-be n e fi t  a n a ly s i s  c o u l d  respo n d  to  t h i s  prob l e m  by c h a n g i n g  the p roced u r e .  
See H a n e m a n n ,  supra n o t e  1 3 7 ,  a t  33 n . 2 3 .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  a n  an alyst  c o u l d  d e s c r i b e  a p roj ect  
a long w i t h  i ts cost  and the way in  w h i c h  the costs wi l l  b e  d i s t r i b u t e d  among a l l  i n d iv i d u a l s .  
T h e n  t h e  a n a l y s t  cou l d  a s k  w h a t  o n e  wou l d  b e  w i l l i n g  to p ay (over a n d  ab ove t h e  s h are  o f  
c o s t  a l re ady a l locat e d  to  t h e  i n d iv i d u a l )  to  h ave t h e  p roj e c t  g o  forward o r  w h a t  o n e  wou l d  be 
w i l l i ng to p ay to preve n t  the proj e c t  from go i n g  fo rward,  g iven i ts d i s t r i b u t i o n a l  e ffe c t s .  If  t h e  
v a l u e  o f  g o i n g  forw a rd exceeds t h e  v a l u e  o f  n o t  go i ng fo rw a r d ,  t h e n  t h e  b e n e fi t s  o f  t h e  
proj e c t  ( u n d e rstood a s  i nc l u d i ng a p a r t i cu l a r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  i ts cos t s )  d o  n o t  exc e e d  i t s  costs .  
This exerc i s e ,  howeve r,  wou l d  not i d e n t i fy pot e n t i a l  Pareto i m p rove m e n ts .  Th ose who v a l u e  
go i n g forward ( t h e  " w i n n e r s ' ' )  m ig h t  not b e  a b l e  to com p e n sa t e  t h ose w h o  do n o t  ( t h e  
· ' losc1·s " )  a n d  s t i l l  come o u t  a h e ad .  The los e rs m ig h t  h ave a l t r u i s t i c  p re fe r e n c e s  for t h e  
w i n n ers,  so t h a t  a t t e m p t s  to s h i ft t h e  b e n e fi t  from t h e  w i n n e rs to t h e  l osers wo u l d  a lso e rode 
t h e  total  b e n e fi t .  
1 40.  M i l grom,  supra n o t e  1 3 8 ,  a t  4 1 8 . 
1 4 l. l t  is h a rd to u n d e r s t a n d  why eco n o m ists  s h o u l d  be i n te re s t e d  i n  p o t e n t i a l  P areto 
i m p rove m e n t s  per se ,  for exa m p l e ,  w h e n  p roj e c t s  are n o t  act u a l ly f"i n a n c e d  so as to  make 
eve ryo ne b e t t e r  off: t hose w h o  g a i n  do n o t  in r e a l i ty com p e n s a t e  t h ose who l o s e .  P r e s u m ably ,  
econom i s t s  favor p o t e n t i a l  Pareto i m p rove m e n t s  i n sofa r as t h ey y ie ld  eco n o m i c  b e n efi ts in  
excess o f  econ om i c  costs .  In  s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  t h e  concept  o f  a pot e n t i a l  P a r e to i m prov e m e n t  
fa i l s  to corre s po n d  w i t h  pol i cy c h anges b r i n g i ng b e n e f i t s  i n  excess o f  costs .  as i n  t h e  e x a m p l e  
prese n t e d  by M i lgrom, s e c  supra n o t e  1 3 9 ,  t h e n  i t  i s  t h e  conce pt  o f  p ot e n t i a l  P areto 
i m p rove m e n t  t h a t  we s h o u l d  1·ej e c t  as our obj e c t ive .  n o t  o u r  m e a s u re of  be n e f i t s .  
142 .  As o n e  econom ist  notes ,  M i l g ro m · s  v i e w  ' · h a rd l y  comports  w i t h  t h e  s t a n d ard v i e w  i n  
e c o n o m i c s  t h a t d e c i s i o n s  about  w h a t  p e o p l e  v a l u e  shou l d  be l e ft u p  to t h e m . "  H a n e m a n n ,  
supra n o t e  1 :1 7 ,  a t  3 3  ( ' ' W h e n  e s t i m a t i n g  d e m a n d  !'u n c t i o n s  fo r fi s h  pr ior  t o  V a t i c a n  i l ,  n o  
e c o n o m i s t  e v e r  p roposet.l remov i n g  C a t h o l ics b e c a use t h ey w e r e  e a t i n g  fi s h  u u t  o f  a s e n s e  o f  
d uty . " ' ) .  
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preference that animals be p rotected from cruel treatment  would seem 
just as entit led to satisfaction as a p reference for foreign automobi les .  
Nonuse value, no less than use value, i s  a genuine component  of economic 
welfare, regardless of whether th is  nonuse value i s  shared by others,  and 
even i f  others view these preferences as absurd . From this perspective , if 
ethical considerat ions make some preferences i llegitimate ,  those who wish 
to exclude these preferences from a cost-benefit calculat ion must bear the 
burden of justifying this exclus ion in terms of moral phi losophy. 1 43 
Even if we were to exclude all nonuse values from our calculat ions of 
economic value ,  the dist inct ion between use and nonuse values would not  
just ify the  interpretations of  Article XX adopted by the  GATT panels .  The 
1 99 1  GATT panel ruled agains t  any "extrajurisdict ional" appl icat ion of 
Article XX, whether in defense of use values or of nonuse values .  The 
1 994 GATT panel ruled aga inst the use of trade sticks to change fore ign  
government policies, regardless of  the  nature of  the  environmental i nterest  
at stake .  The economic cr i t ique of t hese GATT panel decis ions ,  presented 
i n  Part I I ,  does not depend on the inclusion of nonuse value in the 
definit ion of economic welfare. 
Furthermore, even Mi lgram concedes that governments may legi t i ­
mately seek to protect nonuse values in  the formulat ion of publ ic  pol icy, 
even if these values cannot be accurately quantified using cost-benefit 
analysis .  From this  perspect ive, the GATT panels, in  s tr ik ing down the 
U.S .  ban on Mexican tuna imports, impinged upon a legi t imate i n terest ,  
whether that ban served an i nterest i n  nonuse value or i n  use value.  Thus, 
even if we concede the practical impossib i l i ty of rigorous measurement of 
nonuse values, we must ,  as a theoretical matter,  st i l l  include them as part 
of economic value for the purpose of pol icy analysis . 1 44 
B .  PANDO RA'S BOX 
If nonuse values const itute a legit imate economic i n terest in  natural 
resources, then we can find i nternational public goods within each country, 
not simply in  the global commons, even in the absence of physical spi l l ­
overs. A resource need not be held in common for people i n  other 
countries to value i ts protect ion.  The same reasoning that  supports trade 
measures to protect the global commons also mil i tates i n  favor of trade 
measures to protect these resources within another country's borders .  In  
principle, there may be few l imits to  the  types of  i nterests any country 
1 -43 .  There are persuasive moral objec t i ons  to so! l l e  nonuse va lues .  see inji·(t P a rt I VA2b i i i ,  
b u t  M i l grom c l a im s  to be  a b l e  to exc lude  a l t r u i s t i c  pre fe rences  solelv on t h e  bas i s  o f  
economic t h eory. 
1 44 .  After a l l ,  any pub l i c  good ,  w h e t h e r  it ge ne ra tes  use va lue  or  non use v a l u e ,  w i l l  
p resen t  t h e  same prob l e m  t o  t h e  e xte n t  t h a t  w e  canno t  exc lude peo p l e  from e n j oy i n g  i ts 
va l u e .  The measureme n t  o f  t h e  v a l u e  of na t i ona l  de fense . for e:-.:a m p l c .  m i g h t  pose s i m i l a r 
d i l l i cu l t i es .  bu t  no economis t  wou l d  i n fe r  t h a t  na t l on �i l  d e fense  is no t  a ge n u i n e  p u b l i c  goo d .  
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might pursue regarding resources within another country. 
It is precisely this "sl ippery slope" that worries supporters of l iberalized 
trade. What is  to  prevent  any government from banning all imports that 
are made under less stringent  environmental regulations than those that 
apply in  i ts own country? Could Congress, as has been proposed, mandate 
coun tervai l ing duties in such cases on the ground that these imports 
amoun t  to ecodumping? 1 45 I f  so, then the prol iferation of these trade 
measures could unravel the system of l iberalized trade painstakingly nego­
t iated over many decades under the GATT. 
Thus, the GATT Secretariat warns that arguments based on psychologi­
cal spi llovers " risk becoming, in practice, open-ended ," whereas " the 
number of potentially harmfu l  physical spillovers is inherently more l im­
i ted and hence they are far less l ikely to open up a Pandora's box of 
demands . " 1 46 According to the GATT Secretariat, " i t  is d ifficul t to th ink 
of a way to effectively contain the cross-border assertion of priori ties . " 1 47 
Jagdish Bhagwati agrees that the use of environmental trade measures 
"creates the potential for chaotic spread of trade restr ict ions based on 
self-righteousness, compounded by a l ike ly encouragement of the process 
by protectionists . "  1 4s 
Similarly, the 1 99 1  GATT panel warned: " if  the broad interpretation of 
Article XX(b) suggested by the United States were accepted, each contract­
ing party could uni laterally determine the l ife or health protection policies 
from which other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopard iz­
ing their rights under the General Agreement . "  1 49 The 1994 GATT panel 
cited the same concern as the sole basis for its holding: 
I f  . . .  Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting part ies  to take 
trade m easures so as to force other contract i ng parties to change t h e i r  
pol ic ies . . .  , the balance of rights and obl igations among contracting 
parties, in  particular the  right of access to m arkets, would be seriously 
i mpaire d .  Under such an interpretation the General Agreement could 
no longer serve as a mult i lateral framework for trade among contracting 
parties . 1 50 
Unless we articulate some l imi t ing princip le ,  Article XX could under­
mine the system of liberalized trade envisioned by the GATT. The 1991  
GATT panel concluded that  i f  the  contracting parties "were to  permit 
import restrictions in response to d ifferences in environmental pol ic ies 
1 45 .  See supra n o t e s  3 6 - 3 9  a n d  acco m panying  text .  
1 46 .  G ATT, supra n o t e  8 .  a t  33 n . 5 3 .  
1 4 7 .  !d. a t  3 3 .  
1 48 .  D h agw a t i .  supra 1i o t e  1 8 . a t  1 74 .  
1 49 .  1 99 /  Decision . supra n o t e  2 .  p a ra .  5 . 27 ,  a t  1 99 .  
1 5 0 .  7 994 Decision . supra n o l c  2 ,  p a r a .  5 . 26 , a t  5 7 .  
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under the General Agreement, they would need to impose l imi ts on  the 
range of policy d ifferences jus tifying such responses and to develop criteri a  
so  a s  to prevent  abuse,"  which are best specified "by amend ing or supple­
menting the provisions of the General Agreement . " 15 1 
The 1 99 1  GATT panel rather dis ingenuously purported to leave the 
development of these l imi ts to  the GATT amendment p rocess, even whi le 
i t  created geographic l imits on the scope of the Article XX exceptions that 
cannot be found anywhere within the p la in  language of Article XX. 1 52 
S imi larly, the 1 994 GATT panel sett led on a l imi ting pr inciple,  unsup­
ported by any language in the GATT, wi thout considering any alternat ive 
responses to the Pan dora's box that i t  fears . 1 5 3  The mere fact that some 
l imits are i n  order does not j ustify the pw1icular  l imi ts i nvented arbi trar i ly 
by the GATT panels .  The GATT Secretar iat  and the GATT panels 
overstate the d ifficulty of finding and formulat ing more reasonable l imits 
on the use of trade measures to protect the environmen t .  In  particular, 
both GATT panels were so eager to create new l imits from whole cloth 
that they neglected the l imi ts already explic i t  in  the preamble to  Article 
XX. When we consider those l imits, as I suggest below, we fin d  that the 
use of trade measures does not automatically imply the "parade of hor­
ribles" i nvoked by the GATT Secretariat and the GATT panels .  Subject to 
l imits designed to guard against protection is t  abuses, trade measures can 
effect improvements in  global economic welfare by encouragmg more 
responsible environmental policies .  
IV. ARTICLE XX L I MITS ON THE USE OF TRADE M EASURES 
We can find the appropriate l imits to the Article XX except ions i n  the 
text of Article XX i tself, which contains c lauses designed to p reven t  the 
type of abuse that the GATT panels feared. The preamble to Art icle XX 
states that measures are not  to be "appl ied i n  a manner which would 
constitute a means of arb i t rary or unjustifiable discriminat ion between 
coun tries where the same condi t ions prevai l ,  or a disguised restriction on 
in ternational trade . "  1 54 This proviso is al l  we need to p l ace suitable l imits 
o n  the use of trade measures: there is no need to ame n d  the GATT or 
1 5 1 .  1 991  Decision . supra note 2, p a r a .  6.3,  a t  204.  
1 5 2 . .  S'ce supra P a r t  I c. G ATT Artic le  XXX prov i d e s  for a m e n d m e n ts .  bL< t  r e q u i r e s  
a c c e p t a n c e  by two- t h irds  o f  t h e  c o n t ract i n g  p<n t i e ; i n  most  cases  and u n a n i m o u s  �l pprc)lfa! in  
s o n 1 c  c a s e s .  Furth crrn o r e ,  an1 e ndn1 e n t s  b i n d  t h o�_;e co u n t c i c s  t h a t  accept  t f-1 e rn .  G/-\-r-r� 
supra note  l ,  a r t .  ��(XJ( �  p a r a .  1 ;  6 1  S t a t .  pt . ::; ,  �:-l t /\ 74. )) LJ J� . T . S .  at 2 8 :2 .  1n pract i c e .  i t  h a s  
prove n i n c-r e a s i ngly d i ffic u l t  to a n1 e n d  t h e  CJ i\TT: · I t  i s  g e n e rc.l l iy c o n s i d e r e d  c-d rn ost 
i rnposs i b l e  . . .  L· j e c ;:� u s e  o f  the s t r i nge n t  vote c1 n d  prnce ci u r a i  n: q u i re n: e n t �; .  c n u. p l e d  �..v i t h  t h ::: 
\Vi d e  d ivergence of i n te r e s t s  a n1 u n g  t h e  gre;: t t l�/ ::11 n1 ' " .T O H  I--I. J .�\C l·-.. SO>� :� 
\V I L L L\ \I J .  D.-\'v' EY,  I r<TE R !'<�\ T J O :\L·\ L ECO:.J 0 \1 i C  R�E L.-\T l U :\ �; ?) l.Cl- 1 1  ( 2d e d .  l C) S 6 ; .  S 1 ncc 1 9 5 5 ,  
t h e  c u n t ra c t i �tg p a r � i t s  h Jv e  �1n1 e n d c d  t h e  CJ A ..TT c1 n ! y o n c e .  
1 5 .3 . Sr!c .c..·upr[; P c l r t  I D .  
1 5 ·�- .  G.:\TT . . ':up,:·a n u t e  L �� rt . �X X ,  6 1  S t �t t .  p t .  5 .  a t  i\60-6 1 .  J �i u . .  �C . S .  J t  -�:: =� -
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read any implicit l imitat ions in to Article XX. 1 55 That is, these principles 
enable us to close the Pandora's box feared by the GATT Secretariat in a 
responsible fashion that st i l l  respects legit imate interests in  environmental 
protect ion.  In l ight of this p roviso, the use of trade measures to protect the 
environment does not pose as great a threat to l iberal ized trade as GATT 
alarmists claim. 
The phrase "disguised restriction on trade," after all ,  refers to the 
danger of hidden protectionism. If trade measures to protect the environ­
ment become instruments favored by protect ionist i nterests, then these 
measures not only become costly (because of the d istort ions they impose 
on trade), but also become more l ikely to be overused, possibly i nducing 
other governments to provide levels of environmental protection that are 
excessively costly .  To avoid these i nefficiencies, we need to p lace l imits on 
the use of trade measures in order to discourage their  abuse. Trade 
measures that are particularly l ikely to be protectionist should be identi­
fied and held to be violations of the GATT. Given th is  obj ective, what 
condit ions should we p lace on the use of environmental trade measures? 
First, at a minimum, the country using the trade measure generally 
should impose on its own producers the same environmental  standard that 
i t  wishes to impose on competing foreign producers. Unless there i s  some 
relevant d ifference in conditions between countries or some other consider­
ation that justifies different treatment as necessary to achieve the environ­
mental objective in question, a trade measure that appl ied a stricter 
standard to imports than that applied to domestic products would embody 
an " arbitrary or unjustifiable discriminat ion between countr ies where the 
same condi t ions prevai l" in violation of Article XX. 1 56 In theory, the 
1 55 .  Steve Ch a rnov i t z , Th e En viromncnl 1 ·s. Trade Rules: Defogging the Deba te, 23  ENVTL. 
L.  475. 5 1 3 - 1 5  ( 1 993 ) ,  e ndorses  t h i s  op t ion ,  but does not e l aborate  on  w h a t  subs tan t ive 
con t e n t  we shou l d  give t h i s  "d i sgu i sed  res t r i c t ion"  p roviso .  I sugges t  be low an  i n terpre ta t ion  
of t h i s  p roviso d es igned t o  re ass u re support e rs o f  l i bera l i ze d  t rade tha t  Art ic le  XX w o u l d  
rem a i n  re� i s t an t  to  cap ture by p rotec t ion i sm .  
1 5 6 .  Repor/ of the Panel, Th ailand-Restrictions o n  Importa tion o f  a n d  !ntem a l  Taxes on 
Cigareilcs, supm n ote  8 1 ,  p rovi des an exa m p l e  of a res t r ic t ion  t h a t  wou l d  be a n  · ' a rb i t ra ry or 
unj u :; t i fi e d  d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . · ·  In t h a t  case .  T h a i l �m d  c l �l i m e d  t h a t  i t s  b a n  o n  i m port e e! c iga­
re t t e s  c a m e  w i t h i n  Artic le XX(b)  �1 s a m e as u r e  to protec t  h u m ,, n l i fe and h e a l t h .  Thai l a n d .  
however, perm i t t e d  t h e  sa l e  of domest i c  c iga r e t t e s w h i l e  i t  proh i b i t e d  t h e  i m por ta t ion  of  
fore i gn cigai·e t t e s .  
\V h e t h e ;· " t h e  s a m e  cond i t i o n :; preva i l "  be twec: n  t h e  two cou n t r i e s  m ay be a m a t t e r  of 
c o n t nwe rsy i n  some cases .  I n  1992,  fo r e x a m p l e .  A u s t r i a  not  o n ly r e q u i r e d  t h at t r o p i c a l 
t i mb e r  h; � �1be led  as :; u ch ,  bu t  a l so i mposed a 70C::( t �1x  on t ro p i c a l  t i m b e r .  A u s t r i a  d ro p p e d  
b o ! h  i J ,�as  �i ft e r  t h e  Assoc i a t i o n  o f  Sou t h e �t s l  A:; i �; ;: N a t ions ( i\SEAN) compl <! i n ·�d t h a t  t h e  
! a\·'�' v i n l a t �� u  t h e  Gi\ T T  a n d  t h rea t ened  to r e t a l i a t e  a g z! i n s t  Au�� t r i a .  See Par!ia n z cn t  I?cscinds 
Troplcul iVnod Tux. A!aimnins Produu Eco - L u h'!! f<equirunenl. 15 l n t ' l  E n vt ! .  F<.e p .  ( BNA) 
g � n  ( Di�c .  i 6.  ! 99�  ) : Tropico/ !·Vood Labeling L £nr f{c_•;cint!ed r·uf!<)tt ·ing Thi:cars r o  B u n  .. -i t! 
J;nporrs. l t)  l n t ' l  En\'tL R e p .  ( BI\ii\ ) 220 ( f\;l�l r. �-L ! 993 ) .  Anl�)ng  o t h e r  i ssues  r a i s e d hy t h i :\ 
d i �; p u t c  i :-;  t h e  q u e s t io n  vvh e t h c r  t h e  J i tft r e n cc s  !cl !� ! v\-'e t� n  t i ·! <2 t rup ic�t !  r�t i n  fo r c � t  �-t n d  o t h � r  
fo r e s t :: ( p :� i· h a p�-� t h tJ:.;e u s e d  fo r ! u rnber  b y  dt_l nl t: s t. i �_, produce r:-; \v h o  Cllil1pc t c  \\.: i t l1 i rn po r t �; 
fi·u r!l ,6'!, S E t2..J·.j n �H icns) j usti-i�ed th r� d! ��cr i rT1 i :1 a to(y t � t \ .  
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measures a t  issue i n  the tuna d ispute, for example,  were supposed t o  apply 
environmental  standards to foreign tuna comparable to those appl i ed to 
domestic tuna .  This type of environmental standard i s  less l i ke ly to be  
tempting to the  domestic industry as  a source of  protection because i t  
imposes a burden o n  all producers, without d iscr iminat ing ( a t  l e ast  on i t s  
face) between foreign and domestic producers. This cond i t ion woul d  be  
s imi lar to  the  obligation of nat ional treatment under GATT Article I I I ,  
which requires contracting parties to treat imports as  we l l  as they treat 
" l ike domest ic p roducts . " 1 57 As John Jackson has described it ,  however ,  
the duty under  Article XX would be a " softer" obl igat ion than that 
imposed by Artic le III :  i t  would permit departures from the strict l anguage 
of Art ic le III " to the extent necessary to pursue the goals l isted in Article 
XX, but not to the extent of . . .  d iscriminat ion or protection of domestic 
production, i f  e i ther i s  not necessary to pursue those l isted goals . " 1 5 8  
Even if  a strict "national treatment" obligation were extended to  regula­
tions fal li ng wi th in an Article XX exception, however ,  th i s  ob ligat ion by 
itself would impose only a weak constrai nt .  For example ,  the b i l ls p ropos­
ing counterva i li ng  duties to offset ecodumping would sat isfy this require­
ment because they simply require foreign governments to adopt the same 
environmental  regu lations adopted in the United States .  1 59 We wou ld  
need  more str ingent l imits to  guard against the proliferat ion of protection­
ist measures feared by the GATT Secretariat .  
The second condit ion-that the measure must not be  a "di sguised 
restriction on trade"-provides the other restriction needed to prevent  
protectionist abuse . To be condemned as  a "d i sgu ised restrict ion, "  a trade 
measure should meet two requi rements .  First ,  the interest c la imed as the 
purpose for the measure-in the case of environmental trade measures, 
the environmental  interest asserted by the government i nvoking Artic le 
XX-must be a "d isguise . "  That is, i t  must fai l  as a genuine j ustificat ion 
for the measure . 1 60 Second, the measure must be a "restr ict ion on trade" 
1 5 7 .  Pro tocol M od i fy ing  Par t  J I  a n d  Ar t i c l e  XXVI of  the  Genera l  Agreem e n t  on  Tar i l1's 
:-� nd Trade ,  Sep t .  1 4 , 1 948,  a r t .  I I I ,  para .  2, 6 2  St :-� t .  3 6  79,  3680,  62 U . N .  T .S . 80, 82 ( "The  
products  o f  . . .  any contrac t ing  par ty i m por ted  i n to . . .  a ny o the r  con t rac t i n g  p arty sha l l  n o t  
be s ubject  . . .  to i n te rna l  taxes . . .  i n  excess of t hose app l i ed  . . .  to l i ke d o m e s t i c  p rod-
ucts . " ) ;  sec id. para .  4,  62 Stat .  a t  3oi·)l , 62  U . N .T. S .  a t  82 ( . . The products  o f  . . .  any  
con t rac t i ng  par ty  i m por ted  i n to . . .  any  o ther  con t rac t i ng  party sha l l  be  accorded  t re at m e n t  
no  l e s s  favourab le  t h a n  t ha t  accorded t o  l i ke p roducts  o f  n a t iona l  o r i g i n  i n  respect  o f  a l l  
l aws . . . .  " ) .  
1 5 8 .  J o H �  H .  JACKSON, T H E  W O R L D  TRi\ D I 'I G  S YSTEivt 207 ( ! LJ89 ) .  G iven  t h e  ' · ex t raj u ri sd ic­
t i omt l "  na ture  o f  some env i ronrn e n t �.ll i n t e res ts ,  it is fi t t i n g  t h a t  t h e  obl iga t i o n s  in Ar t i c l e  X X  
be "softer"  t h a n  t h e  abso l u te p ro h ib i t ion  o n  d i scr i m in a t i on  i n  Art i c l e  J I I .  T o  protect  
extraj u ri sd i c t iona l  i n t e re st s  e ffect ive ly  o ft e n  r e q u i res some d i scr i m i n a t i o n  b e tw e e n  p roducts  
based on cou n t ry o f  or ig i n .  See infra Par t  I V A  I c- e ,  note  2 2 0  and  �tccurn pany i ng  text .  
1 5LJ .  Sec supra notes  36-39 a nd accompany ing  text .  
1 00. One GATT pane l  report .  however ,  h� 1 s  g iven the  . .  d i sg u i sed  r e s t r ic t i o n · · prov iso a 
pec u l i a r  i n terpre t a t ion  t h a t  wou ld  r ende r  i t  r a the r  too t h l e s s .  I t  sugges t s  t h a t  a b l a t a n t ly and  
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in  real i ty .  That  is ,  i t  must in  fact offer significant protection from foreign 
competit ion for domestic producers. 
Before I e l aborate further on how these two conditions should constrain 
the use of trade measures to protect the environment ,  it i s  usefu l  to 
distinguish "direct" trade intervent ions from pure trade "sanct ions ." 1 6 1 
D irect trade i nterventions can attack the perceived environmental  prob­
lem without requiring any response from the foreign government ;  trade 
sanctions can only a l leviate the environmental  problem by changing for­
e ign government pol icies . Direct trade measures might ,  for example,  pro­
hibit the importation of a product that creates environmenta l  problems 
through its production process. A ban on tuna that is not dolphin-safe is an 
example of a d irect trade intervention.  Trade sanctions apply i nstead to 
products tota l ly unrelated to those that actual ly create the environmental 
problem. A ban on fish from Norway i n  response to i ts  resumption of 
commercial  whaling would  be an example of a trade sanction. 
Both d irect trade measures and pure trade sanctions can serve as sticks, 
insofar as both may impose pol i t ica l  costs on a foreign government .  D irect 
trade measures may induce foreign governments to change their pol icies, 
and the measures may be partly mot ivated by the desire to produce such a 
response, but no such response is  necessary for direct t rade measures to 
improve environmental protection .  Thus, the defense of st icks in Part I I  
applies t o  both sanctions and d i rect trade measures. 
A. D IRECT TRADE MEASU RES 
The 1 994 GATT panel ' s  claim that the MMPA coul d  not be a direct 
trade measure, and therefore could serve only as a trade stick, 1 62 was 
crit ical to its holding. Yet the logic supporti ng this c laim is obscure. The 
panel seemed d isturbed by the fact that the U.S .  ban on tuna imports was 
not l imited to ind ividual shipments of tuna that were caught using dolphin­
unsafe methods, but extended to any tuna from any countJy that fai led to 
meet U .S .  requirements. That is, the primary embargo did not merely 
enforce a facia l ly neutral "process standard ,"  excluding only i tems pro­
duced by an environmental ly harmfu l  process; the embargo extended 
beyond the i ndividual i tems "defiled" by foreign manufacturing pro­
cesses. 1 6" I t  does not fol low from th is fact ,  however, that this import ban 
t r an sparen t l y  p ro tec t ion i s t  measure wou l d  no t  be · ' d isgu i sed . ' '  See Reporr of rhe Panel, Unired 
Sta res-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Producrs frollz Canada , GATT Doc. L/ 5 1 98, 
para .  4.8 ( adopted Feb. 22, 1 982) ,  in GATT B A S I C  I N ST R U ivt E NTS ;\ N D  S E LECT E D  DOCUMENTS 
9 1 . 1 08  ( 29 t h  Supp .  1 983)  ( ho l d i ng  t h a t  a t r ade  res t r i c t ion  was  not  ' ' d i sgu i sed ' '  because i t  
was pub l i c ly a n n ounced a s  a t rade me asure ) .  S teve Charnovitz p o i n t s  ou t  t h a t  ser ious  
re l i a nce on  the "d isgu ised res t r i c t ion"  prov iso wou l d  requ i re rejec t ion  o f  t h i s i n te rpre ta t ion .  
C:ha rnovi tz ,  supra note 6 0 ,  a t  47-48 .  
1 6 1 .  See Subra m a n i a n ,  supm note  1 8 . a t  1 3 7--+ l .  
1 62 .  See 1 994 Decision . supra note  2 . paras .  5 . 27 . . 39 .  a t  5 7 .  6 1 .  
1 63 .  Ch arnov i tz  de fi n es :1 "process s t a n cLird ' '  as a regu l a t i o n .  app l i ed  t o  domest ic  prod-
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"could not possibly, by itself, further the United States conservation objec­
t ives" and could  have "any effect on the conservation of dolphins" only if i t  
could  " force other countries to change their  pol icies ." 1 64 The  1 994 GATT 
panel  report offers no analys is whatsoever that would  exp la in  i t s  reasoning. 
I wi l l  next analyze the MMP A import bans as examples of d irect trade 
measures, and in so doing wi l l  expose some of the defects in the 1 994 
panel ' s  reasoning. My analys is of the economic effects of d irect trade 
measures wil l  suggest that the hosti l i ty toward them exh ibi ted by both 
GATT panels was misplaced .  
1 .  The Case for D irect Trade Measures 
Consider the probl em of protecting dolphins from fishing fleets .  How 
might the United States address th is problem? Consider the range of 
possible responses, which I address in  order from the l eas t  to the most 
intrusive. 
a.  Labelling. One response to the p roblem might be to require l abels  that 
te l l  consumers whether or not the tuna they buy has been caught using 
dolphin-safe procedures. J f>s This  requirement would enable consumers 
who care about dolphin protection to avo id purchasing tuna that i s  not 
dolphin-safe .  Label ling, although a step in  the right d irection ,  cannot bring 
about optimal consumption decisions. As long as dolph in-safe fishing 
methods are costly, and the costs are reflected in higher p rices, each 
consumer wi l l  choose to consume too much tuna that is not  dolphin-safe . 
We would not expect efficient  outcomes un less each ind ividua l  consumer, 
when making these purchasing decisions, considered not only the value 
that he or she attached to dolphin protection, but also the value that 
everyone else in  the world attached to dolphin protection .  
u c t s  a s  w e l l  as  i m ports ,  based o n  p r o d u c t i o n  m e t h o d s .  C h a rnovi tz ,  supra n o t e  1 9, a t  3 - 5 .  He 
a l so d raws a d is t i n c t i o n  betwe e n  t ra d e  m e a s u r e s  i m posed aga i n s t  i m port s  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  
" d e fi l ed i t e m s "  a n d  t hose i mposed m o r e  g e n e r a l l y  a g a i n s t  p a r t i c u l a r  for e i g n  coumries, e i t h e r  
because t h e i r  gove rn m e n t s  fa i l to  a d o p t  e nv i ro n m e n t a l ly s o u n d  po l i c i es o r  b e c a use t h e i r  
i n d u st r i e s  fa i l  t o  adopt  e nvi ron m e n t a l ly s o u n d  p rod uct i o n  p ract i ce s .  !d. a t  38-42 .  
l 64 .  1 994 Decision , supra n o t e  2 ,  p a r a .  5 . 2 4 ,  a t  5 7 . 
l 65 .  See GATT. supra n o t e  8, at 34 (s ugges t i n g  · ' t h e  p ro m o t i o n  of e n v i ro n m e n t a l  l a b e l l i n g  
s o  t h a t  c o n s u m e rs c a n  e a s i l y  conce n t rate  t h e i r  p u rc h ases o n  p roducts  p r o d u c e d  i n  w h a t  t h ey 
co n s i d e r  to be e n v i r o n m e n t a l ly s a fe wayo. " ) ;  S u b r a m a n i a n ,  supra n o t e  1 8 ,  a t  1 5 0 n . 2 8  ( " A  l e s s  
c o n t e n t i o u s  a p p r o a c h  to  t h ese p r o b l e m s  m i g h t  b e  t h e  usc o f  l abe l l i ng req u i re m e n ts w h i c h  
wo u l d  a l low co n s u m e rs t h e  fre e dom to exercise t h e i r  p reference aga i n s t  ceo- u n fr i e n d ly 
p roducts o r  processes i f  t h ey so w i s h e d . " ) .  J agd i s h  B h a gw a t i  sugge sts  t h a t  as a n  a l t e rn a t ive  
t o  t ra d e  measures .  "vo l u n t a ry p r i v a t e  boyco tts  c a n  be a pot e n t  i n stru m e n t "  i f  lab e l l i n g  
re q u i r e m e n t s  pe r m i t  c o n s u m e rs t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  " d o l p h i n  safe "  l u n a from · ' d o l p h i n  u n s a fe "  
t u n a .  B h agwa t i ,  supra note  l 8 ,  a t  1 73 .  T h e  D o l p h i n  Prot e c t i o n  Con s u m e r  I n fo r m a t i o n  Act 
( D P C I A ) ,  l (i U . S . C .  § 1 3 85 ( l 99 4 ) ,  r e g u l a t e s  the use o f  the t e rm " d o l p h i n  s afe " by a n y  
p ro d u c e r ,  d i s t r i b u to r ,  o r  s e l l e r  o n  t h e  l a b e l s  o n  �t ny  t u n a  product  s o l d  i n  t h e  U n i ted 
S t a t e s .  The D PCIA h owev e r, docs not  r e q u i re the usc o f  such l a b e l s .  Mexico c h a l l e nged t h e  
D P C ! A  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  M M PA a s  a v i o l a t i o n  o r  t h e  G ATT. b u t  t h e  GATT p a n e l  r e j e c t e d  t h e  
c h a l l e nge t o  t h e  D P C I A .  See /99/ Decision , supra n o t e  2 .  p �1 r�1 . 5 .44. a t  2()c!.. 
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Without internalizing this positive external i ty from buying dolphin-safe 
tuna, ind ividuals would choose to purchase quantit ies of tuna that are 
suboptimal from the perspective of not only global economic welfare but 
also national economic welfare . Because each i ndividual makes only a 
small contribut ion to dolphin protection, and each derives only a t iny 
fraction of the total benefit from any given amount  of dolph in  p rotection, 
this problem is l ikely to be severe. Because dolphin protection is  a public 
good, each consumer wil l  have an i ncentive to "free ride" on the restraint 
exercised by other consumers. Each would prefer to allow others to bear 
the cost of dolph in  protection in  terms of h igher dolphin-safe tuna prices, 
while purchasing dolphin-unsafe tuna at lower prices themselves. Some 
ind ividual consumers might feel constrained by a sense of moral obliga­
t ion, but we cannot rely on this possibi l i ty to take us very far toward the 
optimum. Rel iance on voluntary restraint alone is  no more l ikely to bring 
about optimal p rotection of dolphins than reliance on purely voluntary 
contributions to the public treasury is l ike ly to finance the optimal quantity 
of publ ic  goods. Just as taxation is necessary to provide the optimal level of 
expend i tures on public goods, some sort of government intervention be­
yond mandatory labels i s  necessary to provide the optimal level of dolphin 
p rotection. 
b. Process Standards. The United States can regulate i ts own fishing fleet 
to ensure that it uses practices that provide optimal protection for dol­
phins,  but if these practices raise costs for U .S .  producers, then the 
government must also support these regulations with direct trade mea­
sures against imported tuna that is not dolphin-safe . Higher costs will ,  in 
turn, raise domestic tuna prices and expand the market for imported tuna. 
Sales of foreign tuna that is dolphin-unsafe and less expensive would 
displace sales of domestic dolphin-safe tuna. Furthermore, U .S .  fishing 
operations may move to Mexico to avoid U .S .  environmental regulations. 
In the extreme, if  foreign tuna disp laces domestic tuna entirely, then we 
succeed on ly in  destroying our domestic industry, without protecting dol­
phins. Thus, when foreign fleets expanded their dolph in-unsafe tuna­
fishing operations in  the ETP in response to U.S. regulations on U . S .  
fishing fleets, " [t ]h i s  s ituation led Congress to focus on what influence the 
United States might have to reduce the dolphin morta l i ty rate in  the 
foreign fishing fleets . "  1 66 
By not only improving the pract ices of our domestic tuna industry but 
also shielding it against those foreign competitors that do not use practices 
that are s imilarly dolphin-safe ,  we ensure that our efforts to change the 
!66. T a k i n g and I m po rt i n g  M a r i n e  M a m m �t b  I n c i ck n t <d t o  Co m m e r c i a l  F i s h i n g  O r c r a ­
L iu n s .  55  Feel .  R e g .  l l ,<J2 L 1 ! , 92 ! ( J 9fJ0 ) .  
2 1 78 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vo l .  83 : 2 13 1 
practices of our own producers wi l l  not be in  vain. Furthermore, the 
United States requires foreign suppl iers of tuna to use dolphin-safe p rac­
t ices, and these suppliers must ei ther comply or be displaced in the U .S .  
market by  compet i tors (domestic or foreign) tha t  do comply.  Thus, Con­
gress i ntended the MMPA "to reduce the foreign take of marine mam­
mals" as well as the U .S .  take of marine mammals. 1 67 We the reby p rotect 
dolphins through our d irect influence over  foreign fishing fleets seeking 
access to the U .S .  market .  Through these effects on both domestic and 
foreign fishing fleets, an import ban ensures that U .S .  consumers do not 
contribute to the ki l l ing of dolphins by consuming dolphin-unsafe tuna .  
c .  Primwy Nation Embatgo. But why should the United S tates b an a l l  
yel lowfin tuna imports from offending countries rather than l imit ing i ts  
ban to dolphin-unsafe tuna? Suppose that the Mexican tuna-fishing fleet in 
the ETP includes producers that use dolphin-safe methods and others that 
use dolphin-unsafe methods, so that a ban on al l  Mexican yel lowfin tuna 
from the ETP would apply to some dolphin-safe tuna.  Consider the less 
restrictive alternative with which the 1 994 panel compared the  U .S .  ban  on 
tuna imports :  suppose the United S tates had enacted only a ban on  the 
sale or importation of any tuna that was itself caught in a dolphin-unsafe 
manner.  1 68 Assume further that the United S tates has the means to 
distinguish dolphin-unsafe tuna from dolphin-safe tuna and thus to en­
force a "defiled i tem" import ban . 1 69 
Under a ban on dolphin-unsafe tuna, Mexico could export only dolphin­
safe tuna to the United States, but this narrow ban may fai l  to protect 
dolphins adequately. To see why a broader ban may be warranted,  consider 
the fol lowing scenario :  suppose that prior to the import ban, Mexico 
already produced more than enough dolphin-safe tuna to cover its exports 
1 67 .  H . R .  R EP. No. 970, supra note 46,  at  30,  reprinted in 1 988 U.S .C .C .A.N.  at 6 1 7 1 .  
1 68. The  U n i ted  Sta tes  e nacted such a p rocess s t andard i n  t he  I n te r n a t i o n a l  D o lp h i n  
Conserva t i on  Act of  1 992,  Pub .  L .  N o .  1 02-523 ,  sec. 2 ( a ) ,  § 307, 1 06 S t a t .  3425 ,  343 1 -32  
( cod ified  a t  1 6  U . S . C. § 1 4 1 7  ( 1 988 & Supp .  I V  1 99 2 ) ) ,  wh ich  a m e n d e d  t h e  M MP A  to  
i nc l ude  a proh i b i t i o n  on  t h e  sa le ,  s h i p m e n t ,  or impor ta t ion  i n to t h e  U n i t e d  S ta t es o f  any  
tuna  or  tuna  produc t  t ha t  i s  not  "do l p h i n  safe . "  The de te rm inat ion o f  w h e t h e r  tuna  is  
" d o l p h i n  s a fe ' '  i s  made on  a s h ip-by- sh ip  bas is ,  accord i ng to  the s tatu tory d e fi n i t i o n  and  t h e  
nsh i ng p ract ices observed on  each vesse l .  T h i s  ban  took e tlec t  o n ly rece n t l y ,  o n  J u n e  1 ,  1 994 .  
The  1 994 pane l  seemed to imp ly  that  t h i s  l e ss res tr ic t ive a l t e rna t ive wou l d  b e  l ega l  u nd e r  t h e  
GATT, bu t  some am bigu i t ies  i n  t h e  p a n e l 's reaso n i n g  cou ld  raise s o m e  d o u b t s  eve n  w i t h  
respect to t hese m easures .  See inji·a no te  1 8 1 .  
1 69. To the ext e n t  t ha t  do l p h i n -safe t u n a  and  dol p h i n - u nsafe t u n a  c a n n o t  be d is t i n ­
gu i shed ,  t h e n  the  j u s t i fica t ion for a broade r  ban  i s  c le ar :  o n ly a ban  on  a l l  M e x i c a n  t u n a  c a n  
e ns u re t h at n o  dol p h i n -unsa fe t u n a  e n t e rs t he  U . S .  m a r k e t  and  d i sp l aces d o lp h i n -safe t u n a .  
O n  t h ese facts. a ban on  a l l  Mex ican t u n a  wou l d  not  be  · ' a  means  of  arb i t r a ry or u n j u s t i fi ab l e  
d i scr im i n a t ion  betwe e n  cou n t r ies  where t h e  same con d i t i on s  p revil i l ,  o r  a d i sgu i sed  res tr ic ­
t i on  o n  i n t e rna t iona l  t rade , ' '  because re l eva n t  d i ffe rences in  condi t ions  in  M ex ico and i n  t h e  
U n i t e d  S ta tes wou l d  just i fy t he ' · d i scr i m i n a t i o n · · betwe e n  tuna  from those t w o  co u n t r i es .  
.j 
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to the United States .  In  that case, Mexico could simply allocate i ts  dolphin­
safe tuna to the Uni ted States and cont inue to produce the same quantity 
of dolphin-unsafe tuna as i t  d id  prior to the change in U.S .  pol icy .  Our ban 
on only the defiled i tem itself would  have fai led to reduce Mexican 
production of dolphin-unsafe tuna, and thus fai led to protect dolphins 
from a foreign tuna-fishing fleet supplying the U.S. market .  
Furthermore, if tuna production by the U.S .  fishing fleet shrinks as i t  
labors under the  costs imposed by  dolphin-safe methods, Mexico might 
expand both its tuna exports to the United S tates and i ts  p roduction of 
dolphin-unsafe tuna for sale in other markets, as Mexico shifts dolphin­
safe tuna away from these other markets .  The i ncreased demand for tuna 
imports to the U.S.  market could thereby stimulate even more dolphin­
unsafe tuna fishing by Mexico, with dolphin-safe Mexican tuna serving as 
the medium of transmission for the increase in demand .  I f  the Uni ted 
States el iminates dolphin-unsafe tuna p roduction by its fishing fleets, only 
to st imulate an offset ting expansion in  dolphin-unsafe tuna p roduction by 
Mexican fleets, then tuna imports undercut our efforts to protect dolphins 
through reform of our domest ic producers' practices. Indeed, i f  this ex­
pansion offsets domestic restrict ions,  our ban on dolphin-unsafe tuna 
woul d  produce no net reduction in the total world production of dolphin­
unsafe tuna, and thus prove total ly ineffective in improving dolphin protec­
t ion.  
A diversion of world supplies of tuna can undermine U .S .  efforts to 
protect dolphins by translat ing U .S .  demand for dolphin-safe tuna into 
demand for dolphin-unsafe tuna .  This diversion, however, would not be 
costless. The world  pattern of trade in tuna directs tuna to markets that 
yield the greatest profit ,  taking into account  transportation costs and other 
barriers .  A departure from this pattern presumably would entail some 
sacrifice in profits for tuna producers .  To the extent that the costs of 
changing to dolphin-safe technology exceed the costs of d iverting tuna 
suppl ies ,  however, foreign tuna producers wil l  choose to divert their sup­
plies rather than improve their practices. Nevertheless, i nsofar as transpor­
tation costs and other barriers reduce the profitab i l i ty of divert ing dolphin­
unsafe tuna to other markets and prevent  some diversion of tuna  supplies 
in this fashion , a ban on dolphin-unsafe tuna in  the United States can be 
more effect ive in reducing the total world production of dolphin-unsafe 
tuna.  
The United States succeeds in protect ing dolphins insofar as i ts policies 
reduce the profitabi l i ty of dolphin-unsafe fishing, so that those who engage 
i n  this practice are induced e i ther to convert to dolphin-safe methods or to 
leave the industry. Thus, a process standard is most effective when dolphin­
unsafe tuna lacks al ternative markets .  Insofar as the United States was " a  
major market for most of the yel lowfin tuna caught by ETP harvest ing 
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nat ions," 1 70 so that there were fewer alternative markets ready to absorb 
dolph in-unsafe tuna from these nations, U.S .  policy proved more i nfiuen­
t ia l . 1 7 1  To the extent  that Mexico does not already produce enough dolphin­
safe tuna to cover i ts  exports to the United S tates, a process s tandard can 
be more effective: the less dolphin-safe tuna that Mexico can sh ift from 
other markets to supply to the Uni ted States, the less l i ke ly M exico is to 
mainta in or expand dolphin-unsafe tuna fishing in response to the vacuum 
left behind by th is  d iversion of suppl ies .  1 72 
Nevertheless, the United States may be unsat isfied by th i s  part ial suc­
cess. The MMPA declares that " [i ] t  is the policy of the Un i te d  States" to 
"el iminate the marine mammal mortal i ty result ing from the i ntentional 
encirclement of dolphins . . .  in tuna purse se ine fisheries" and to " ensure 
that the market of the United States does not act as an incent ive to the 
harvest of tuna caught in  associat ion with dolph ins . " 1 73 To the exten t  that 
Mexico responds to a p rocess standard by d iverting dolphin-safe tuna from 
other  markets to the United S tates, that  standard would  fai l  to meet the 
obj ectives of the MMPA: demand for tuna i n  the United S tates  would be 
causing greater consumption of dolphin-unsafe tuna i n  the rest  of the 
world than would otherwise occur. That is, the world would be kil l ing more 
dolphins than i t  would if  the U .S .  demand for tuna were zero . 
Suppose that the United States i nstead i mposes an import ban  on all 
Mexican tuna, not just dolphin-unsafe tuna.  Dolphin-safe M exican tuna 
normally consumed elsewhere in the world wil l  continue to be  consumed 
there and not in  the U nited States .  G iven the United States' exclusion of 
this supply of dolphin-safe Mexican tuna, producers of dolphin-unsafe 
Mexican tuna wil l  have a harder t ime finding p rofitable markets and 
therefore wi l l  be less l ikely to maintain or expand their production . Thus, 
the b readth of the U .S .  t u n a  ban, far from implying that  i t  "could not 
1 70 .  T a k i n g  a n d  I m p o r t i n g  tvLn i n e  M a m m a l s  I n c i d e n t a l  to Commerc i a l  F i s h i n g  O p e ra­
t i ons , 55  Fed. Reg.  1 1 ,92 1 ,  I L92 l ( 1 99 0 ) .  
1 7 1 .  Th u s, i f  M exico exported i t s  entire t u n a  o u t p ut to t h e  un i ted  S t a t e s ,  t h e n  t h e re wou l d  
b e  n o  o t h e r  m a rkets  for dol p h i n -safe iV! e x i c a n  t u n a  t o  v aca te . Dolph i n -unsa fe Mex ican  t u n a  
wou l d  fi n d  n o  vac u u m  to fi l l  i n  Mex i c u ' s  t ra d i t iona l  m a rkets .  Producers of t h i s t u n a  wou l d  
h ave t o  refnrn1 t h e i r  pract ices,  e x i t  t h e  ] nd us t ry l  or  ll n U  n e\v n1 arkets .  
1 7 2 .  A p rocess st a n d a n.: -,,'uulcl be most  e fle ct ive in  p�otec t ing do l p h i ns i f  Mexico p ro­
d u c e d  n o  do l p h i n-s afe t u n <'. p r i o r  t o  t h e  b a n .  Then a l l  exports  of  d o l p h i n-safe t u n a  from 
t·v'Iexico to the U n i t e d  S t a t e :; \Vu u l cl i"'�pr r: s e n t  exp<l!1 ded  product ion of do l p h i n -s a fe l u n a :  
I�G n �  \Vl';i..d d  \:"tt c u t e  ��t h r-; r  r!·� �l !·K e t s .  1 ! ! t h i s  c a :.; c .  t u n a  expo r t e d  frcnn l'vl c.\ i cn t o  t h e  U n i t e d  
State�; \V�_::u ! d  r: ot i rnply e\p� !n dcrJ C•J n :;tt n1p t i o n  o f  d o l p h l n - u i1 s a fc t u n a  i n  o t h e r  n1 arke t s .  
I n  t h e o r>, ) t h e  rYII\1 P t'\ c o u l d  h d v e  r e l i e J  o n  2 p rocess st a nd a rd aion(� i n  t h e �;c part icu l a r  
c:i �-::.- u n1 :� t �i n c e s  :}Tiel ;:�p p i i e d  � t  b rn ; td i: ;· i n� p o �· t  ba:1 i n  o t h e �- c i r c u rn s � a n ce�.; .  I f  t h �: 1 99-J. G AT'T 
p�l!l i:: J h �i d  t h i :-:  �d t r: I-?l {�t i\'t i t! rn i r: d .  it "f�t i \ -� d  to ev�d u ; t t e  h ri\V e ff::.- ct ivc t h i s  pol i cy V/O U J cl  b e .  
S u c h  a pn! i cy '-VC1 u ! e_i rC\\-'� r cl c c·· u n t r i e ::: \">' i t l-:  Jo: p h i r: -u n s�1 fc p r a c t i c�s a n d  t h u :� �_- r e ;J t e  p e rverse 
i n c c n  t ive �..:: i t  '·.:. cnt l d  e n �.::o u r �tg�  � u r :  � � - i-1 �. h i n g  n a t i o n s  to dvu ! d  o r  ,-; l i m  ina t e  d �) l 1_-: h  i n - s �rfe il �: h  1 n g  
1 7 3 .  \ (;. u . s . (� .  ��· 1 -l- l  i ( b J ( i (_)() -!- ) .  
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possibly, by i tself, further the Uni ted S tates conservation object ives, " 1 74 as 
asserted by the 1 994 GATT panel, in fact ensures that the U .S .  tuna ban i s  
more effective than a mere ban on dolphin-unsafe tuna .  
d. Intermedimy Nation Embwgo. The foregoing analysis expla ins  how the 
United S tates can protect dolphins through a ban on a l l  Mexican yellowfin 
tuna from the ETP. Even g iven th is  ban, however, even if pr ior to the ban 
Mexico produced no dolphin-safe tuna or sold all i ts tuna to the Uni ted 
S tates, i t  may d ivert i ts suppl ies to in termediary countries in response to a 
ban,  thereby undermin ing the U.S .  effort to protect dolph ins .  The same 
reason ing that justifies a ban on imports from the primary n at ion can also 
just ify a s imilar ban on imports from intermediary nations. 
A process standard for U .S .  producers would tend to raise tuna prices i n  
t h e  U . S .  market, which would attract tuna imports from countr ies other 
than Mexico. If the Uni ted States were to ban only dolph in-unsafe tuna, 
then an in termediary nation l ike Japan could not re-export dolphin-unsafe 
tuna from Mexico to the United States .  It could, however, d ivert dolphin­
safe tuna (either from Mexico or from its own producers) to the U.S .  
market, where i t  would fetch a h igher price, and consume more dolphin­
unsafe tuna from Mexico. 
The Uni ted S tates could expand its ban to i nclude any Mexican tuna, 
whether dolphin-safe or dolphin-unsafe, that Japan may re-export to the 
United S tates. Even this ban on "tuna laundering," however, could st i l l  fa il 
to protect dolphins :  Japan could d ivert more dolphin-safe tuna from its 
own producers to the Uni ted States and consume more dolphin-unsafe 
tuna from Mexico. 1 75 A primary embargo on Mexican tuna would contrib­
ute to the rise in tuna prices in the United States, which in turn would 
attract Japanese tuna to the U .S .  market .  These exports to the U .S .  market 
would tend to dr ive up the price of tuna in Japan, and th is  inc ip ient price 
rise would in  turn attract dolphin-unsafe tuna from Mexico, where tuna 
prices would tend to drop as a resul t  of the loss of the U.S. market. 1 76 
1 74 .  1 994 Decision , supra no te  2 .  para .  5 . 24. a t  57 .  
1 75 .  As an  i n teres ted  t h i rd party  b e fore the  1 994 pane l ,  Aus t ra l i a  com p l a i n e d :  "The 
i n te rm e d i a ry na t ion  embargo was not  l i m i ted to re-exports ,  nor to t rade  wh ich  wou ld  equate  
to t he  q ua n t i t i e s  of  ye l lowfin t u n �1 impor ted f rom a cou n t ry subject to the  pr im a ry na t ion 
e m b a rgo."  !d. para .  4 .4, a t  38 .  The f irst  a l t e rn a t ive suggested by Aus t ra l i a  wou l d  be l ess  
e ftect ive for the reasons exp l a i n e d  above . The second a l t e rna t ive wou l d  be  i m pract ica l :  
Aust r a l i a  does not exp l a i n  how one cou l d  imp lemen t  such  a par t i a l  e m b a rgo. The U n i ted  
S ta tes  wou l d  h ave to  ca l cu l a te how much  t u n a  i t  wou l d  im port from each  i n te rmed ia ry 
n at ion  i n  a counte rfac tua l  wor ld  w i t hout  t h e  embargo. t h e n  sub t ract  t h e  q u a n t i ty of t u n a  
e ach  i n te rmed ia ry n a t ion i m ports  from pr imary n a t ions ,  i n  order  to a rr ive a t  t h e  import 
quo ta  app l icab le  to  e ach  i n termed i a ry na t ion .  
1 76 .  I t  was  prec ise ly  t h i s  phenomenon  t ha t  prom pted  the  European Pa r l i a m e n t  to  u rge 
t h e  EC Commiss ion  to draft l aws b a n n i ng t h e  i m por ta t ion  of t u n a  caugh t i n  purse se ine  ne t s  
or  d r i ft ne ts .  See European Purliamcnr Ca lls for E C  B a n  o n  Imports of Tun a  Caught in 
Purse-Seines .  8 I n t " l  Trade Rep .  ( 8 1'-IA )  1 739 ( N ov .  27 .  1 99 1  ) .  The  P� t r l i a m e n t  voted  "ou t  u f  
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To the exten t  that Mexico can profi tably d ivert dolphin-unsafe tuna to 
the Japanese market, i t  can l imit  or even defeat the U .S .  effort to reduce 
dolphin mortal i ty worldwide .  Mexican production of dolphin-unsafe tuna 
may remain the same, or may even expand at  the expense of U.S .  fleets, 
wh ich are now subject to the new process standard and may face higher 
costs than before. That is ,  dolphin-unsafe tuna from Mexico could displace 
dolphin-safe tuna product ion by U.S .  suppliers, not d irectly in the U .S .  
m arket, bu t  indirectly through the  medium of  the  Japanese market. In th is  
way, Mexican producers of dolphin-unsafe tuna can "circumvent" the U.S .  
i mport ban and undermine the effectiveness of U .S .  policy . 1 77 
A more effective measure would include a ban on all tuna from any 
country that imports tuna from Mexico . An embargo th i s  broad reduces 
the l ikel ihood that Mexican producers would find profitable markets for 
their  dolphin-unsafe tuna in  intermediary nations.  1 78 Under an in termedi ­
ary nation embargo, dolphin-unsafe tuna wi l l  not be d iverted from the 
Un ited States  to  other markets unl ess U .S .  tuna prices r i se  enough to 
d ivert tuna supplies through an even longer chain of  in terven ing national 
markets. F i rst ,  U.S.  tuna prices must be  h igh enough to attract tuna 
imports from a country that is  not subject to any embargo. That nation in 
turn must experience enough of a price r ise to  attract more Japanese tuna ;  
J apanese tuna prices also must rise enough t o  attract more M exican tuna 
exports to the Japanese market .  A broader import ban forces th i s  diversion 
to  occur through more costly routes .  As the import ban is extended more 
broadly, costs of d iverting tuna supplies to  circumven t  the ban will in -
concern t h a t  t h e  E u ropean Com m u n i ty has  become a d u m p i ng g ro u n d  for e as te rn  Paci fi c  
y e l l owfin tuna ,  w h i c h  a r e  oft e n  caug h t  by n e t t i ng opera t ions  t h a t  k i l l  l a rge n u mb e rs o f  
do lp h i ns . " /d. The P a r l i a m e n t 's agri c u l tu r e  com m i t t e e  " expressed s p e c i fi c  concerns  about 
t h e  I t a l i a n  t u n a -process i n g  i n d us t ry ,  wh i ch  has  s h i ft e d  from i ts  t rad i t i o n a l  r e l i a n ce on  I n d i a n  
Ocean  t u n a  to y e l lowfin t u n a "  and  h a s  d o n e  s o  " i n  response to t h e  fa l l  i n  wor ld  m arke t  
prices  for y e l low fi n t u n a  caused  by reduced  p u rc hases from m ajor  U .S .  t una  canners . "  !d. 
Given t h e  P a r l i a m e n t ' s  express ion o f  a l a rm ,  t h e  EC's  c h a l l e nge to t h e  M MPA before t h e  
1 994 p a n e l  i s  p a r t icu l a r l y  i ron ic .  
1 77 .  The a u thors o f  t h e  l eg i s l a t ion  tha t  p rovi des for a n  e mbargo o n  i n te rm e d i a ry na t ions 
i n c l u de d  t h i s  prov i s ion  " i n  order  t o  p reve n t  embargoed n at i ons from c i rcumve n t i ng U . S .  
res t r ic t ions,  t h us weake n i n g  t he e tTect iveness o f  U . S .  l a w . "  H . R .  R E P .  N o .  970,  supra note 46, 
at 30,  reprinted in 1 988 U . S . C . C . A . N .  at 6 1 7 1 .  
1 78 .  By t he  t i m e  t h e  U n ited S t a tes  banned  t u n a  i m ports  from M ex ico ,  t h e  l a rgest U . S .  
t u n a  ca n ners h a d  a l ready agreed to  s e l l  on l y  do lph i n-safe t u n a ,  a n d  M ex ico s e n t  o n ly t h re e  
percen t  o f  i t s  t u n a  exports to t h e  Un i t ed  S t a tes .  Mexico s o l d  most  of  i ts t u n a  to E u rope a n d  
J a p a n .  Thus, obse rvers pred ic ted  t h a t  t h e  p r i m a ry e m ba rgo · ' w i l l  h ave l i t t le economic  e ffect 
on M exico , · · b u t  expected t h a t  a second a ry embargo by t h e  U n i ted  S ta tes ,  " t h e  l a rge st  
consumer  market  for t una , "  aga i n s t  i n t e rmed i a ry n at ions  "cou ld  s ign i fic a n t l y  cu r t a i l  t h e  
vol u m e  a n d  pr ices  o f  Mexican t u n a  expor t s . "  Dav id  C .  Sco t t ,  lvfexico Chafes a s  US Revisits 
Ban on Tuna Imports ln l'O!ving Dolphin Kills , C H R I STIAN S c i .  MO NITO R ,  Feb.  27 ,  1 99 1 ,  at 6 .  
Thus ,  when t h e  E C  a n d  t h e  N e t h e r l ands  c la imed be fore  t h e  1 994 pane l  t h a t  " t h e  i n te rm e d i ­
a ry na t i on  e m b a rgo w o u l d  m ake no d i fTe rence for t h e  conserva t ion  o f  d o l p h i n s , "  1 994 
Decision , supra note 2,  para .  3 .59 .  at 28 ,  t h ey ignored t h e  exte n t  to w h i c h  U . S .  de m:md fo r 
t h e i r  t u n a  co n t r ibu tes to t h e i r  demand  for Mex ican t u n a .  
1 995] ECONOM I C  ANALYSIS OF TRADE MEASURES 2 1 83 
crease, d iversion will prove to be less profitable,  and the demand for 
dolphin-unsafe tuna from Mexico wil l  fall .  As the United States expands 
its import ban,  however, i t  also tends to inhibit tuna imports and raise tuna 
prices a t  home, thereby i ncreasing the total economic cost of the U .S .  
import ban ,  both to  the  United States and  to the  world as a whole. Thus, 
the United S tates may rationally decide to extend its import ban to 
intermediary nations, but no further .  
The foregoing analysis ind icates how a broader ban makes U.S. policy 
more, not less, effective in p rotect ing dolphins .  Moreover, this  ban achieves 
its effect on tuna-fishing p roducers direct ly, without any change in the 
policies of foreign governments.  One cannot legit imately make a bold 
categorical assertion, as the 1 994 GATT panel did,  that the U .S .  import 
ban "could not possibly, by i tself, further the United States conservation 
objectives . " 1 79 It i s  hardly impossible for the U.S .  import ban to further 
environmental objectives as a general matter .  Indeed, the avai lable evi­
dence i n  this specific case suggests that the ban has been quite successful 
i n  reducing profits for the Mexican tuna-fishing fleet, thereby reducing the 
level of i ts dolphin-unsafe operations. 1 80 Perhaps the panel means to claim 
that a simple process standard by itself would have been equally effective 
in this case, but  to support this claim would require detai led economic 
analyses of the conditions of supply and demand in the world tuna market 
and the costs of implement ing dolphin-safe technology. Nevertheless, the 
1 994 panel did not even attempt any such analysis to support its factual 
1 79 .  1 994 Decision , supra note 2 ,  para.  5 .24, a t  57. I t  i s  t heore t i c a l ly poss i b l e  t h a t  even t h i s  
b roader  ban  wi l l  be i n e ffec t ive i n  prot ec t i ng  do lph i n s .  S uppose t h a t  t h e  supp ly  o f  do lp h i n ­
safe t u n a  from U .S .  producers i s  a l ready s u ffi c i e n t  to  supp ly  t h e  t o t a l  d e m a n d  for t u n a  i n  t h e  
U n i t e d  S ta tes .  Th e n  even a ban  on  all t u n a  i m ports  cou l d  h ave n o  e ffec t  on  do lp h i n  safe ty, i f  
wor ld  t u n a  supp l i e s  c a n  be  cos t l e ss ly  d iver ted  to  d i fferen t  marke t s .  Domes t i c  do lph i n - sa fe 
t u n a  p rev ious ly  expor ted  w i l l  i n st ead  go to  t h e  U n i t e d  S t ate s  to  rep l ace Mex ican  t u n a  
i m ports ;  do lp h i n -unsa fe t u n a  from Mex ico w i l l  rep l ace U .S .  d o l p h i n - safe t u n a  previous ly 
supp l i ed to  markets  outs ide the U n i ted  S t a tes .  (To the exte n t  t h a t  t ranspor ta t ion  cos t s  or 
ex i s t ing  t rade bar r i e rs i n h i b i t  t hese  s h i ft s ,  t h e  product ion  o f  do lph i n -un safe t u n a  by M exican 
fi s h i ng flee t s  cou l d  s t i l l  fa l l . )  I n  t h i s  hypot h e t ic a l ,  however ,  no i m por t  ban  w i l l  h ave an  e ffec t .  
w h e t h e r  i t  app l i es to do lph i n -u nsa fe t u n a  o n ly or  i s  b roader .  Thus ,  t h e  1 994 pane l  a l l uded to 
an  a l t e rna t ive i m por t  ban  t h a t  wou l d  pe rform no b e t t e r  than the M M PA in t h ese c i rcum­
s tances .  
I n  t h i s  par t i cu l a r  hypo t h e t i c a l ,  i t  might  be  t rue  t h a t  the U.S .  import  ban "could not ,  by 
i t s e l f, fur t h e r  the U n i ted S ta tes conse rvat io n  objec t ives ,"  as asser t ed  by the 1 994 t u n a  pane l ,  
b u t  i t  s e ems  c l ear t h a t  t he  t una  pane l  d i d  no t  have  t h i s  scenar io  i n  m ind .  I f  t h i s hypot h e t i ca l  
i s  the  b as i s  for  t h e  pane l ' s  asser t ion ,  the  pane l  ce rt a i n l y  m a n aged to obscure  i t s  r eason ing .  
Furth e rmore ,  the  pane l  c i t ed  no evide n ce to suggest t h a t  the  r ea l  wor ld  con formed to t h i s  
hypo t h e t i c a l .  
1 80 .  The M ex ican  gove rnmen t  reports t h a t  t h e  t u n a  embargo h as i n  fac t  h u r t  i t s  t u n a  
i n dus t ry ,  es t i m a t i ng t h a t  due  to t h e  embargo . Mex ico has  l os t  b e tween  S30 m i l l ion  and  S40 
m i l l i on  each year in expor ts .  See U. S. Emb(//go Against Mexican Tun a  /'vfay Be Resol1·ed in 
1 995, Official Says, 12 l n t ' l  Trade Rep. ( BNA)  464, 464 ( M a r. 8,  1 995 ) .  Some press reports 
i n d i ca te  t h at t h e  embargo has reduced Mexico 's  t u n a  ile e t  by 5 0% . See Administruuon Calls 
for End to Tuna Embargoes for IA TTC Countries , supra note 65 , at 1 1 02; see also Kr:lU I ,  supra 
note  65 (descr ib ing  t h e  devastati ng c lfe ct of  t h e  embargo on t h e  Mex ican  t u n a  i n dus t ry ) .  
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c laim. 1 8 1 Instead, the panel appeared to rule against all trade measures 
broader than a process standard, adopting a per se rule that  would 
p rohibit  many trade measures that are useful in p romoting global environ­
mental protection,  and in some cases, that may even be  n ecessary to 
achieve any increase in environmental protect ion.  
e.  Economic Efficiency. If  j ustified by the value of dolph in  p rotection, 
process standards and other d irect t rade measures are part icularly i nnocu­
ous because they contribute d irect ly to efficiency .  They correct for market 
fai lure and d istort trade only as much as necessary to produce the publ ic 
good i n  quest ion :  dolph in  protection .  Through these measures, we are 
merely t rying to optimize our own production and consumption decisions: 
if the benefits to us ( in terms of the publ ic  good of dolphins saved)  exceed 
the costs we i ncur (flowing from higher tuna p rices) ,  then there has been 
an improvement in economic efficiency, even i f  no one else in  the world 
attaches any nonuse value to the dolphins saved. 1 82 Thi s  solution may not  
be the first-best pol icy response in an idea l  world, but  i t  i s  the best 
dolphin-protection policy the United States can implemen t  in the real 
world unilaterally-pending any multi lateral agreemen t-in the absence 
of any change in  foreign government policies, given that  we have no 
p rescript ive jurisdiction over  foreign nat ionals .  In this second-best world, 
1 8 1 . I t  i s  poss i b l e  tha t  t h e  1 994 p a n e l  had  a n a rrower  not ion  o f  what  i t  means  for  a 
measure  to  ach i eve i ts objec t ives d i rec t ly .  The  p a n e l  som e t i mes descr i bes  t h e  U . S .  ban  on 
tuna  i m ports  as a m e asure tha t  cou l d  " ach i eve i t s  i n te n d e d  e tTect  on l y  i f  i t  w e r e  fol lowed by 
cha nges in pol i c i e s  or practices" in fore ign  cou n t r i e s .  1 994 Decision , supra n o t e  2 ,  para. 5 .23 ,  
a t  56  ( emphas i s  added ) ;  see id. paras .  5 . 24 ,  5 . 36 - .37 ,  a t  57 ,  60.  These  m o re amb iguous  
p h rases m ight be  i n t e rpre ted  to con d e m n  a ny e nvi ronm e n t a l  t rade  m easure  tha t  works  by 
chang ing t h e  pract ices  of  fore ign nationa ls as  w e l l  as t hose t h a t  work by chang ing  t h e  po l i c i e s  
o f  fore ign govern111ents .  See Charnovi tz ,  supra no te  47,  a t  1 0, 58 1 .  
Such  a rad ica l  r ead i ng o f  t he  1 994 p a n e l  dec i s ion  wou l d  l e ave t he  U n i t ed  S t a tes  w i t h  o n ly 
i ts prescr ipt ive j ur i sd ic t ion ove r i ts own na t iona l s  and  i t s  own te r ri tory as a n  i ns t r u m e n t  w i t h  
wh ich  to protect t h e  e nv ironm e n t  ou t s i de  i t s  borders .  See id. a t  1 0 ,579-80 .  I n de e d ,  i t  wou l d  
l im i t  t h e  abi l i ty o f  a n y  coun try t o  p ro tect  t h e  env i ro n m e n t  within i ts borde rs from t h e  e ffects  
o f  fore ign act iv i t ie s  outs ide i ts borders .  Th i s  i n terpre t a t io n  wou l d  o ft e n  l e ave cou n t r ies  
v i r tua l l y  i mpote n t  in  t h e i r  e fforts  to protect  the  g loba l  e nv i ron m e n t ,  espec ia l l y  in  the  g lob a l  
commons,  where domes t i c  produce rs can  change n a t io n a l i ty to  avo id  d o m e s t i c  regu l a t i ons  
b u t  s t i l l  e njoy t he  same  access to the  na tu ra l  resource i n  q u e s t i o n .  
Fur thermore,  e v e n  given t h i s  rad ica l  read i ng, t h e  foregoi n g  an a lys is  provi d e s  a d e fe n se o f  
t h e  M M PA.  The  b road i mport  bans  i m posed b y  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  c o u l d  " ac h i eve i t s 
i n tended  e fTce t"  wi t ho u t  any q u a l i t a t ive ch ange i n  fore ign pract ices .  I t  cou l d  d o  so s imp l y  by 
reduc ing  t he  sa l e s  enjoyed by d o l p h i n - u nsa fe t u n a  produce rs and  t h e re by r ed uc ing  t h e i r  
ou tpu t .  Even i f  t h is q u a n t i t a t ive e ffec t  were deemed  a cha nge i n  fore ign prac t i ces . t h e re 
wou l d  rem a i n  t h e  e tfect o f  preve n t i ng an expansion i n  d o l p h i n - u nsafe t u n a  fi s h i ng .  W i t hou t  a 
broad i m port ban ,  t he  r i se i n  costs for U . S .  t u n a  produce rs a n d  the  a t t e n d a n t  r i se  i n  U . S .  
t u n a  pr ices cou l d  ge nera te  nmre d e m a n d  for d o l p h i n - u n s a fe t u n a  fi s h i n g  f o r  sa l e  i n  marke t s  
o u ts ide  t h e  Un i ted  S ta tes .  Thus .  t h e  U .S .  impor t  ban works in  part  by prevcnring a n  ad\'CI'SC 
"change ' '  i n  fore ign pract ices ,  not  s i m p ly by e n co u raging beneficial changes .  
1 82 .  Sec Charnov i tz ,  supra note 8 3 ,  a t  2. 1 9  ( ' ' [ T ]he  worl d wou l d  be  a m ore s a l u t a ry p l a ce  
fo r  . . .  do lph ins-at a cust cons u m i n g  n a t ions are  w i l l i ng to  bear . ' ' ) .  
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with no world government, the U.S .  policy is no broader than necessary to 
achieve its d irect effect on dolphin protect ion .  Foreign consumers remain 
free to consume as much dolphin-unsafe tuna as they did before the 
United States imposed any import ban . 1 83 Through i ts trade measures, the 
United States may induce other nat ions to adopt its standards for dolphin 
protection, but this effect is  not necessary for these trade measures to 
improve both global and U .S .  national economic welfare. 
From the perspect ive of global economic efficiency, there is no reason to 
object to process standards and other direct trade measures, as long as 
they actually promote gen uine environmental interests and are in  fact 
justified by the value attached to these interests . On those facts, neither 
the U.S. ban on imports from the primary nat ion nor the U.S. ban on 
imports from intermediary nat ions would be "a means of arbitrary or 
unj ustifiable d iscrimination between countries where the same conditions 
prevai l ,  or a disguised restriction on international trade," 1 84 because d iffer­
ences in relevant cond itions would justify the "discrimination" against 
tuna from these exporti ng countries .  If our measures have the effect of 
i nducing other countries to change the i r  policies in  the pursui t  of their 
own economic interests, our measures do so without any reduction i n  
global or  national economic welfare .  Why then should d i rect trade mea­
sures, whether d irected at only defiled products or a broader class of 
imports, be deemed i l legal under the GATT? 
f Compensation. Jagdish Bhagwati has pointed out that under GATT 
rules, GATT-il legal i ty need not imply that countries could never use these 
measures. In the same spirit as the "carrots only" solution, Bhagwati 
suggests that an importing country "buy" the right not to import a defiled 
product: 
For, you cou l d  certa in ly  compensate the country whose trading rights 
( i . e . ,  access to your market) are being de nied or suspended by either 
offering other concessions or . . .  h aving the other  country withdraw some 
"equiva lent"  concessions of her own to you or, better stil l  . . .  , t h ro ugh 
cash compensation for the gains from trade lost by the other country. 1 s5 
There are three problems with this suggest ion.  
1 83 .  I n  t h is s ense .  i t  i s  m is l ead i ng  for B h agwa t i  to c i t e  t he  M M PA as an  exam p le  o f  " ' t h e  
z e a l  t o  impose o n e · s  e t h ic a l  pre fe rences on  o t h e r  com m u n i t i e s  a n d  n at i ons"  or " t o  force 
o thers  i n to accep t i ng  onc · s own i d iosyncra t ic  choice of e t h ica l  concerns . · · B h agwa t i . supra 
note 1 8, at 1 70 .  
1 84. GATT, supro note 1 ,  ar t .  X X ,  6 1  S ta t .  p t .  5 ,  a t  Afi0- 6 1 ,  55  U . N . T . S. a t  262 .  
1 85 .  B h agwa t i . supm note 1 8 . a t  1 74-75 ;  sec Dolphins and the Trade LalVS ,  supra note 82 ,  at  
A24 ( e d i tor ia l  � ugges t i ng  t h a t . to compe nsate t u na-export ing cou n t r i e s  fnr the M M PA. t he 
U n i t e d  S ta tes  · ' can  give t h e tn t raLl e  co ncess ions  e q u a l  t o  t h e  va lue  o f  t h e  t u n a  sa les  they  are 
los ing" ) .  
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First, i f  the compensation takes the form of the withdrawal of trade 
concessions by the exporting country, then Bhagwati 's p roposal erodes the 
regime of l iberalized trade that we have tried to nurture through the  
GATT. Given the  polit ical disadvantages of both cash compensat ion and  
further trade concessions, the suggested compensation would  most l ikely 
take the form of the withdrawal of trade concessions-the  most costly 
possibil ity from the perspective of global economic efficiency. This method 
of compensat ion is the default option because i t  requi res no action on the 
part of the importing country. The government of the importing country 
wi l l  continue i ts  ban as long as i t  values this ban more than the concessions 
withdrawn by the exporting country. I ronically, Bhagwati 's  suggestion would 
lead to less free trade, not more free trade, especially i f  the withdrawal of 
trade concessions provokes retal iat ion and t riggers a trade war .  
Second,  if the value of the compensation to the pol lut ing country ex­
ceeds the cost of the environmental trade measure, then the net  effect is to 
reward the polluting country for i ts  behavior. In this case, Bhagwat i ' s  
p roposal makes the exporting country more l ikely to harm the environ­
ment than i t  would be otherwise .  That is ,  compensation could create the 
same perverse incentives produced by the GATT Secretariat ' s  "carrots 
only" approach. 1 s6 
Finally, the requirement that an importing country "pay" compensation 
to an exporting country would discourage the use of these environmental 
t rade measures. Given the general tendency toward excessive exploitat ion 
of the global environment,  this pol icy would only exacerbate exist ing 
market failures. Not only is i t  "objectionable in  principle if a defendant 
country working to safeguard the environment has to compensate coun­
tries that are not ," 1 s7 bu t  i t  is also l ikely to reduce global economic 
welfare . If d irect trade measures contribute to economic efficiency, then 
why would we want to discourage the use of these measures? 
2 .  Possible Objections 
Critics of these trade measures point to the danger that these restric­
tions might serve the interests of protectionists and might not be just ified 
by any genuine environmental i nterests . If  the value attached to the 
asserted environmental i nterests does not justify the trade measure, then 
the measure introduces a trade distortion rather than simply correct ing a 
market fai lure . Domestic producers may seek trade measures s imply to 
erect a barrier to imports. I t  i s  important to dist inguish between two 
1 86 .  Compensat ion  co u ld  o ffer pe rve rse i ncen t ives n ot o n ly to n a t ions  sub jec t  to a p r i m a ry 
emba rgo because o f  t h e i r  own p roduce r p rac t i ces ,  b u t  a l so to na t ions  sub j ec t  t o  a n  e mbargo 
as a n  i n t e rmed i a ry n a t ion .  The p rospect  o f  compensa t ion cou l d  e ncourage i n t e r m e d i a ry 
n a t ions  to i m por t  from p r i m a ry n a t ions ,  w h i c h  wou l d  s t i m u l ate demanu  fo r t h e  · · d ef i l e d "  
product .  
1 87 .  Charnovi tz ,  supra note 47 ,  a t  1 0 , 5 8 3 .  
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different s i tuations in  which trade measures might actually be  d isguised 
restrictions on trade : the first class of cases arises from a d iscriminatory 
effect on foreign p roducers; the second class of cases arises from environ­
mental problems that are, in  important respects, purely domestic. 
a. Discriminatmy Effect on Foreign Producers. To be a d isgui sed restric­
t ion on trade, a trade measure must serve to protect domestic producers. 
This effect is obvious when a trade measure d iscriminates on its face 
against foreign producers. 1 88 The MMP A, for example,  may be facial ly 
neutral in  terms of i t s  environmental standards and the rules i t  applies to 
countries , but it d iscriminates against i nd ividual foreign producers who may 
use practices comparable to  those of U .S .  p roducers but may nevertheless 
be barred from exporting to the United States because their country of 
national ity imports or produces dolphin-unsafe tuna. 
Even standards that are facially neutral with respect to ind ividual produc­
ers may serve to protect domestic p roducers. A standard can have a 
disparate impact on the costs of foreign producers, thereby effecting de 
facto discriminat ion against imports. If  foreign producers must comply 
with the relevant standard in order to enter the market, the importing 
country may choose a standard that is costl ier for foreign producers to 
meet . l 89 
Whether a regulation d iscriminates on i ts  face or only in  effect, this 
discrimination may be necessary to bring about an important benefit . 1 90 If  
a d iscriminatory regulation does not y ie ld any benefit of actual value, 
however, then i t  results only in deadweight loss. These d iscriminatory 
regulat ions protect domestic producers from foreign competit ion without 
justification . These economic costs can reduce both nat ional and global 
economic welfare. 
The danger of protectionist abuse, however, does not just ify a rule of per 
se i l legality under the GATT. All product regulations pose the same 
danger of protectionist abuse, yet everyone agrees that the GATT permits 
each nat ion to regulate many characterist ics of products sold within its 
borders. I t  is undisputed that the GATT allows each government to enact 
regulations to protect the health and safety of consumers, for example, or 
to protect the environment within i ts  borders .  Because these regulations 
are subject to the "national treatment" obl igation in Article I I I ,  they must 
apply to domest ic as well as imported goods. 1 9 1  They can nevertheless 
impose greater costs on fore ign producers than on domestic producers. 
1 8 8 .  See GATT, supra note 8 ,  a t  2 1  (warning  of p rotec t ion i s t s  "promot ing  po l i c i e s  t h a t  
d i sc r i m i na t e  aga ins t  i mports  a s  p a rt o f  t h e  so lu t ion  to  e nv i ronmen ta l  prob lems" ) .  
1 89 .  See id. (warn i n g  o f  p ro tec t ion i s t s  ' ' de l i b e ra t e ly promo t i ng p roduct  s t andards t h a t  
p l ace a proport iona te l y  gre a t e r  cost b u rd e n  o n  fo re ign p roduce rs" ) .  
1 90 .  See supra P a r t  I VA l c . 
1 9 1 .  See supra note  1 5 7 .  
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Governments can choose facial ly neutral standards that in  fact favor 
domestic producers and p lace imports at a competitive d i sadvantage . 
Although the governments designing these regulations can b e  captured by 
protectionist interests, we cannot prohibit  al l national product regulat ions 
without sacrificing the important benefits that they generally y ie ld .  Instead,  
to guard against disguised protectionism , GATT Article I I I  includes a 
proviso that subjects even facially neutral regulations to scrut iny for d iscrimi­
natory effects on imported goods :  "The con tracting parties recognize that 
in ternal taxes and . . .  regulations . . .  should not be applied to  imported or  
domestic products so as to  afford protect ion to domestic production . " 1 92 
Parties to the GATT may challenge facially neutral regul at ions or t axes 
enacted by other GATT members on Article I I I  grounds i f  these regula­
t ions have a disparate impact on foreign p roducers. For example ,  the 
European Community (EC) has compl ained that the U .S .  laws imposing 
"gas guzzler" taxes and Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards on 
automobiles d isproportionately and adversely affect imports from the EC 
and therefore violate the GATT. 1 93 Similarly, the United States has claimed 
that a tax imposed by Ontario on nonrefillable beer cans is  a d isgu ised  
trade barrier designed to  p lace U.S .  beer  at a d isadvantage i n  competit ion 
with Canadian beer .  1 94 The United S tates has also complained that the EC 
ban on the sale of beef grown with the assistance of art ificial hormone 
infusions is designed to inhibit  U .S .  exports of beef to the EC. 1 05 A 
comprehensive analysis of the appropriate standard to apply to these cases 
i s  beyond the scope of this article . 1 96 I only suggest here that the case-by­
case approach applied in these cases should also suffice to guard against 
protectionism in  the context of trade measures to protect the environment .  
Why should measures directed at environmental interests outside a 
country's borders be per se i l legal whi le those d irected at interests ins ide 
i ts  borders are subject to a "rule of reason" analysis?  Both measures can 
serve valuable economic interests .  Both measures are also subject to 
protectionist abuse : they can serve trivial environmental i nterests and raise 
1 92 .  P rotocol  Mod i fy ing  P a rt I I  and Art ic le  XXVI of  the  Gene ra l  Agr e e m e n t  on  Tar i fTs 
and  TrJdc ,  supra note  1 57 ,  a r t .  I I I ,  para .  1 ,  62 S ta t .  at 3680, 62 U . N .T.S .  a t  82.  
1 93 .  See 1 5  U . S . C. §§  200 1 -2003 ( 1 988  & Supp. V 1 993 ) ;  · · cas Guzzler " Ru ling Sralled 
Th anks to U. S. , Sources Say, 1 1  I n t ' l  Trade Rep .  ( B N A )  1 022  ( June  29, 1 99 4 ) .  
1 94 .  See Kei t h  Bradsher ,  U. S. a n d  Can ada A'fake Deal o n  Beer Amid Trade Talks, N . Y .  
TJl\ IES ,  Aug. 6, 1 993 ,  a t  D l ;  F r e n c h ,  supra n o t e  6 ,  a t  1 2 .  
1 95 .  See Cou nc i l  D i rect ive No .  85 / 649,  a r t .  6 ,  1 985 O .J .  ( L  382)  282 ,  2 3 0 ;  Cou nci l 
D i rect ive No.  8 1 / 602,  a r t .  2, 1 98 1  O . J .  (L  222 )  32 ,  33 ;  B h agw a t 1 ,  supra no te  1 8, a t  1 80-8 1 ;  
J o h n  H .  J ackson, Dolph ins and Hormones: GA TT and th e Legal Em·ironmen t  for Intern ation al  
Trade After th e Uruguay Round, 1 4  U.  ARK. LITTLE Roo.:. L.J .  429,  435-36  ( 1 9 9 2 ) ;  John H. 
Jackson,  World Trade Rules and Eill'ironmenlill Policies: Congruence or  Conftiu ?,  49 W;\S I I . & 
LEE L .  REV .  1227 ,  1 237 -38 ( 1 992 ) ;  EC O.ffcrs Plan A imed at Defusing Bilateral Dispute 01 ·cr 
Hor111one Ban, De Clercq Says, 5 l n t ' l  Trade Rep .  ( BNA) 1 5 2 2  ( Nov. 23, 1 988) .  
1 96 .  For a d iscuss ion o f  suggested  a p p roaches t o  these  cases ,  s e c  ESTY , supra note  6 .  a t  
1 1 4-30 ,  and  Bhagwa t i . supra note 1 8 , a t  1 76-83 . 
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barriers to imports .  If  both types of measures can offer s imilarly important 
benefits and also pose the same type of r isks, then what j ustifies the 
dist inction drawn between them by the 1 99 1  GATT panel? 
The MMPA, for example,  appl ied environmental standards to foreign 
fishing fleets in  order to serve precisely the same interest that justified the 
application of comparable standards to domestic  producers: the protection 
of dolphins .  To protect this i nterest effectively, the standards applied to 
imports as well as domestic tuna, and the corresponding import ban 
extended to i ntermediary nations as well as primary nations and to dolphin­
safe tuna as well  as dolph in-unsafe tuna.  S imi larly, i f  hormones were to 
pose a danger to European consumers of beef, then i t  would not do to 
regulate only European beef. Health and safety regulat ions apply to im­
ported products in order to protect p recisely the same interest that  just ifies 
the application of the same standard to domestic products: the protection 
of the consumer. 
The tuna example, however, pertains to activit ies and resources in the 
global commons. What about the exploitat ion of resources located entirely 
within the territory of foreign countries? I n  the absence of any physical 
spi llovers, should we impose the same standards on foreign producers that 
we impose on domestic producers? Consider the EU ban on the imports of 
fur from countr ies that permit the use of leg-hold traps. If the interest to 
be served by the regulation is the prevention of cruelty to animals caught 
in these traps, then i t  is insufficient  s imply to proh ibi t  the use of such traps 
within the EU. To protect the economic value associated with the preven­
t ion of such cruelty, the EU must prohibit  imports that would othe rwise 
s imply displace domestic furs produced by more humane methods. 
So what should be deemed i l legal under the GATT from the perspective 
of global economic welfare? The cri tical issue is whether the global eco� 
nomic benefits of the measure outweigh i ts global economic costs. The 
measure i t self wi l l  be costly only if it d istorts trade from a more efficient 
pattern, not if i t  merely corrects for a market fai lure.  If i t  addresses a 
genuine environmental problem and the economic value associated with 
environmental protection just ifies the regulat ion, then it  does not d istort 
trade on balance . 1 97 If a measure thus serves a genuine environmental 
objective, it should not be deemed a d isguised restriction on trade, and it 
should be legal under GATT Article XX. The same logic applies whether 
the resource i s  p rotected for i ts  use value or its nonuse value, whether the 
t rade measure applies to defiled products or i s  broader, and whether the 
resource is  on our territory, in the global commons, or on foreign territory. 
Therefore, d irect trade measures should generally be subject to a " rule 
of reason" analysis t hat looks for a d iscriminatory effect on foreign produc­
ers.  The more p ronounced the protection afforded domestic i ndustry, the 
1 97 .  Sec Stewar t .  supra note 1 34 ,  at  1 334-35.  
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more suspect the measure . I f  a protectionist effect exists ,  then there must 
be a rat ional relationship between the measure and an  environmental 
objective that j ustifies the measure. The more attenuated the connection 
between a discriminatory measure and i ts objective, such that i t  i s  l ess 
l ikely to contribute significantly to the objective , the less j ustified the 
d iscriminatory measure becomes. The touchstone, however, should be  
whether the d iscrimination is  so  irrational a s  to be arbitrary or  unjustified, 
or whether the just ification asserted is  so feeble as to suggest a d isguised 
restriction on trade.  Both GATT panels neglected to engage in  any such 
"rule of reason" analysis of the relevan t  facts in the case of the MMP A, 
resorting instead to facile solutions with no textual basis in Article XX. 
b.  Domestic Environmental Problems. Although the discr iminatory effects 
of trade measures cannot be distinguished in  principle from those caused 
by purely domestic product regulations, some environmental t rade mea­
sures would raise concerns unique to "extrajurisdict ional" trade measures. 
Even process standards that have no d isparate impact on the cost of 
imports can raise these concerns. Environmental trade m easures may be 
suspect not because they have an asymmetric impact on domestic and 
foreign producers, but because our environmental standards yield asymmet­
ric benefits for our nationals when applied at home and abroad. That i s ,  
they protect local public goods rather than predominant ly global publ ic 
goods; they address what are largely domestic environmental problems 
(DEPs) rather than transborder  environmental problems (TEPs) . 1 98 
Consider the proposed legislation in the United States that  would im­
pose countervai l ing duties to offset "ecodumping." ' l)<J Does the same reason­
ing offered to defend the U .S .  restrictions on tuna imports or the EU 
restrictions on fur imports, even if only nonuse value is  a t  s take, also apply 
to trade measures that extend all of our own environmental standards to 
the manufacture of imported goods? These countervai l ing duties would 
lead consumers to avoid goods p roduced by processes that harm the 
environment  in other countries and can also induce foreign governments 
to adopt our standards so as to avoid these duties .  Would these efforts to 
harmonize all nat ional environmental regul ations of production processes, 
1 98 .  Subram a n i a n  d i s t i ngu i shes  "be twe e n  env i ro n m e n t a l  prob l ems  whose e ffec ts are l oca­
l i sed w i t h i n  the coun try where t h ey a ri se-domest ic  e nv i ron m e n t a l  p rob lems  ( D E Ps ) ,  a n d  
o thers whose e fiects cross na t iona l  boundar ies-transborder env i ron m e n t a l  p rob lems (TEPs) . "  
Subraman ian ,  supra note 1 8 ,  a t  1 36 .  H e  uses  t h i s  d i s t i nc t ion  t o  " e n a b l e  t h e  p rotect i o n i s t  u se  
o f  e nv i ronme n t a l  a rgum e n t s  to be d is t i ngu i shed  from the i r  more  leg i t i m a t e  use ."  !d. 
l lJlJ .  Subram a n i a n  i nc ludes  c r u e l ty to a n i ma ls a nd e n d a ngered spec ies  as  TEPs ,  b u t  
c l ass i f i e s  · ' ecod ump i ng" d u t i e s  a s  address i ng  D E Ps .  See id. a t  1 3 S .  H e  offer s  no  t e s t  for 
d i s t i ngu i sh i ng D E P s  from TEPs,  h oweve r ,  o t h e r  t h <Jn  to s t a te  t h a t  D E P s  give rise to i ssues 
· ' re l a ted  to com p e t i t iven ess , "  w h ereas TEPs ra i se  i ssu e s  ' · re i <� t ed  to the e nv i ron m e n t  per se . ' '  
/d. a t  1 36. T h e  a n a lys i s  i n  t h i s paper  i s  an  a t tempt  t o  make t h is  d i st i nc t i o n  opera t io n a l  a s  a 
l ega l r u l e .  
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even i n  the absence of any physical spil lovers from production abroad, be 
just as l ikely to enhance efficiency as the tuna and fur restrictions? If 
duties to offset "ecodumping" are legal under the GATT, then the Pando­
ra's box feared by the GATT Secretariat i s  wide open .200 What distin­
guishes "ecodumping" duties from the MMPA and other environmental 
trade measures? 
Although we might defend these trade restrictions as efforts to protect 
the nonuse value we attach to "human, animal or plant l ife, or health," or 
to "natural resources" abroad, just as we protect the value of the same l ife, 
health , or resources at home, there are some reasons to be  particularly 
skeptical of this claim in the vast majority of cases. For example, most 
environmental standards giving rise to "ecodumping" claims, unl ike the 
MMP A, would be directed at  resources not shared in the global commons 
but instead separable in to d ist inct stocks, one present in each country. 
This raises the possibi l i ty that the natural resource is a local public good,  
not  a global public good .  
For example, consider environmental policies designed to protect domes­
tic ground water from contamination. Suppose foreign manufacturers do 
not operate under equally stringent regulations, and we impose countervail­
ing duties on imports of their products, claiming that the measure p rotects 
the nonuse value we attach to the condition of ground water in other 
countries .  Because we are no longer talking about the same stock, as in the 
case of dolphins threatened by tuna fishing practices, the motivations for 
the same standard may be different :  domestic use value wil l  be an impor­
tant reason supporting the protection of ground water at home, whereas 
the use value we derive from protect ing ground water abroad is l imited to 
preserving the health of our nationals who live or travel overseas. Any 
other interest we may have in fore ign ground water is simply nonuse value.  
The same reasons do not support the extension of our regulations over our 
own producers to foreign producers. 
In protecting resources in the global commons, the application of environ-
200. Subrama n i a n  c r i t i c izes t h e  no t ion  t h a t  d i fferences  i n  pol l u t ion  s t Jn dards  shou ld  g ive 
r i se  to c l a ims  of u n fa i r  com pe t i t i on :  " Ap ar t  from b e i ng protect ion i s t  per :se, it is a lso 
vu lne rab l e  to t h e  s l i ppery s lope  J rgu m e n t :  w i t h  equ :J !  cons is tency a rgu m e n ts cou l d  be 
advanced for remed i a l  ac t ion aga i ns t  . . .  d i fle r ing  s t andards  on  work e rs '  r ights ,  e d uca t ion  
and  h e a l t h . "  !d. �H 1 4 1 .  S i m i l ar ly, as an  i n t e res ted  t h i rd par ty  b e fo re the  1 994 pane l ,  
Venezue l a  asked wha t  l i m i t s  one m igh t  p l ace o n  measu res · ' t n  pro tec t  h u m a n ,  an ima l  or 
p l a n t  l i fe or h e a l t h "  under  Art i c le  X X ( b )  if the M M PA could be j us t i fied  as  such a measure :  
[W]hy m igh t  no t  another  coun try i m pose res t r i c t ions  n n  products m a n u fact u re d  i n  
coun t r ies  where worke rs rece ived r e l a t ive ly  l ow  wages . .  c' Why m igh t  no t  a 
cou n t ry ban i m ports of agricu l t u ra l  p rod ucts  from count r i es  t ha t  fai l e d  t o  a d m i n i s ­
t e r  food a l locat ion p rogrammes  for the  poor"7 The  U n i ted  S ta tes  pos i t ion  fa i l e d  to  
s uggest  how the  contrac t i ng par t i es  cou ld  p reve n t  t h e  bmad use of t rade  [·e s t r i c ­
t i ons for  a w ide  range  of pu rposes . . . .  
/ 994 Decision . supra note  2,  p�1 ra .  4 . 34 ,  a t  46-47 .  
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mental standards to our own producers offers some evidence that our 
claim of nonuse value i s  genuine .  When the resource in question is located 
ent i rely within a foreign country, others may be  suspicious of our claims of 
a s ignificant i nterest in that  resource based largely on nonuse value .  Even  
if we  impose s imilar standards on our own producers through domestic 
regulat ions, as long as these regulations are p lausibly expla ined on the 
basis of domestic use value, they do not  offer evidence that our claims of  
nonuse value are  genuine .  
The existence of a separate s tock of the resource in  a foreign country, 
however, is not by i tself sufficient  to render a facial ly n eutral  standard 
part icularly suspect. The EU restriction on fur imports, for example,  
appl ies the same rule to separate  stocks of animals i n  other countries ,  but 
can only be j ustified as a measure to protect nonuse value .  There i s  no 
plausible just ification based on use value for a ban on l eg-hold traps .  
Because the standard der ives purely from nonuse value,  the just ification 
for the standard calls for its application to imported fur as well  as domestic 
fur .  Thus, the application of the same standard to domestic producers 
offers evidence of genuine nonuse value. 
When use value supports our domestic regulat ions, but no s ignificant 
use value supports the application of these nat ional standards abroad, the 
asymmetry i n  the nature of our  interests raises the poss ib i l i ty that  our 
application of these standards to imports in  real i ty s imp ly protects our 
domestic regulated producers from less costly foreign compet i t ion .  As the 
GATT Secretariat observed :  "Firms which find their market shares and 
profits under competi t ive pressure are prone to l abel as unfai r any source 
of cost advantage enjoyed by their foreign rivals ."20 1  One m ight claim that 
these trade measures protect nonuse values and thereby promote eco­
nomic efficiency. In these cases, however, because governments are subj ect 
to capture by the special in terests of domestic producers, we have special 
reasons to doubt any such cla im.  G iven a p lausible exp lanat ion of the 
domestic regulation based on use value and the poss ib i l i ty of a protection­
ist  reason for the extension of the standard to imports ,  we should be 
suspicious of any defense of such trade measures based on nonuse value .  
The fact that such trade measures place domestic producers in a win-win 
s ituation should make these policies especially suspect if the in terests that  
support the regulat ion at home do not carry over to support the appl ica­
tion of the same standard abroad.  
2 0 1.  GATT, supra note 8 ,  a t  28;  see  id. a t  39 (" [A Jdopt ion  o f  an e nv i ro n m e n t a l  po l i cy can  
cause  d i rect  p res sure  for add i t i ona l  protect ion ,  as t h e  domes t i c  i ndust ry m av now c l a im t h a t  
t here  i s  no  longer a ' l evel p l ay ing  f i e l d . ' " ) :  B h agw a t i ,  supra note 1 8 . at ! 68
"
( ' .The no t ion  o f  
u n fa i rness i s  . . .  a t tract ive to t h o s e  w h o  s e e k  re l i e f  from i n te rn a t i o n a l  com pe t i t i on ' ' ) ;  
Be rna rd Hockman  & M ichae l  Le idy ,  En Fironmen tal  Policy For111a tion in u Trading Econollly: 
A Public Choice Perspeclil'e . in THE G RE E N i i\Ci OF WORLD TR,\DE  I S S U E S .  supra no te  l 8 ,  a t  
22 1 ,  233 .  
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For example, suppose we were to defend these measures as necessary to 
protect nonuse values, including those derived from an altruist ic concern 
for the use value derived by the citizens of foreign countr ies from their 
own natural resources .  There are several objections a foreign government 
could raise in response. 
i .  Economic efficiency .  First, the measure would be based on a misunder­
standing of what regulations would  best serve the interests of those foreign 
cit izens. If  we seek to maximize their welfare, then our policies are based 
on a mistake of fact. Harmonization would almost certa in ly be economi­
cally i nefficient .  The use value attached to the resource abroad by foreign 
nat ionals may be less than the use value we attach to the resource here at 
home. Other coun tries, especially those less wealthy than the Uni ted 
States, may be less will ing to expend scarce resources on environmental 
protection, which they may regard as a luxury they cannot afford?02 The 
same environmental standard may not only produce less benefit in another 
country, but also cost more to implement .  In  either case, a lower environ­
mental standard would be optimal for the foreign country. 
i i .  " Eco-imperialism" and national sovereignty .  The United States might 
nevertheless assert that i ts cit izens' altruist ic preferences should prevai l  
over the preferences expressed by foreign nat ionals through the policies of 
their governments, on the theory that we know better than they what 
policy is actually in their interests. A foreign government could just ifiably 
respond that this argument smacks of paternalism. The satisfact ion of our 
altruist ic preferences entai ls applying these preferences to others who do 
not share them. Other nations thus may reject our interference as "ceo­
imperial ism" and an in trusion upon their national sovereignty.203 Even if 
trade measures designed to change the environmental policies of another 
government are not disguised protectionism, they may stil l be thought to 
infringe on the national sovereignty of the foreign government .  
A clarification i s  i n  order regarding t h e  sense i n  which a n  environmental 
trade measure (ETM) might be thought to intrude on national sovereignty. 
As S teve Charnovitz has observed :  "Although ETMs are sometimes de­
scribed as violating the sovereignty of the country on the receiving end, 
this is an overstatement .  ETMs simply set conditions for trade .  Thus, their 
202.  As the  GATT Secre ta r i a t  po ints  o u t :  "Th e re are objec t ive cons i d e ra t ions  wh ich 
sugges t  t h a t  cou nt r i e s  ncar the top of t h e  deve lopment  l adder  arc l i ke l y  to  h ave d i fferen t  
pr io r i t ies  from cou nt r i e s  furt h e r  clown the  l ad d e r, and t h a t  as  a resu l t  t hey  a re  l i ke ly  to  h ave 
and e n force s t r i c te r  e nvi ron men ta l  s t andards ."  GATT, supra note  8, at 29; see B h agwat i ,  
supra note 1 8 , a t  1 66-67;  R ichard  B .  Dagen & Michae l S .  Kno l l ,  Dwies 1 0  Ofj:\·cf Compelifit·e 
Advamages, 1 0  MD. J. 1 :-n' L  L.  & TRADE 273, 286 ( 1 986)  ( " Many cou n tr ies  t h a t  a re poorer 
t h a n  the U n i ted S ta tes  might not  be  wi l l i n g  to  pay the h igh costs t h a t  t h e  U n i t ed  S ta tes  is 
w i l l i n g  to pay to protect i ts workers and envi ronm e n t . ' ' ) .  
203.  See E sTY. supra note 6 ,  a t 1 85 ;  B h agw a t i ,  supra note I S , a t  1 7 1 :  G ijs M .  D e V r i e s ,  How 
10 Banis/1 Eco- !mperiulism , J .  Corvt . ,  Apr .  30 ,  1 99 2 .  at SA.  
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maximum effect i s  to p revent  trade. ETMs cannot force another country to 
take any action. "204 Thus, these measures are not,  strictly speaking, an 
attempt to exercise extraterritorial prescript ive jurisdiction over foreign 
nat ionals. Indeed, they are an exercise of the traditional sovereign power 
any nation enjoys over  its trade with other nat ions .  From th i s  perspect ive, 
i t  i s  the GATT, as interp reted by the 1 99 1  and 1 994 panels ,  that  impinges 
upon national sovereignty, not  environmental trade measures .  
On the other hand,  as Jeffrey Dunoff notes :  
Of course, by participating i n  the international trade regime,  nations 
cede some d egree of sovereignty. For example,  n ations l argely surrender 
the abi l ity to erect p rotectionist trade barriers.  However,  in exchange, 
the trade regime significantly furthers the interest in sovereignty . . . .  
[T]he trade regime severely l imits the abi l i ty o f  one state to interfere in 
the internal or domestic affairs of another state by prohibit ing states 
from conditioning market access u pon another nation's domestic p rac­
t ices.205 
To cite this countervail ing sovereignty interest, however, merely begs the 
question: how much sovereignty over trade did the GATT signatories yield 
when they joined? What counts as an " intern al" or "domestic" affair? Did  
the  United S tates give up i ts  rights no t  only to "erect protectionist trade 
barriers"206 but  a lso to impose certain environmental trade measures ?  If 
so, which ones? There are sovereignty interests on both sides of th is  
debate, and we need a more specific sovereignty principle i f  we are to 
resolve these issues. 
I mean to suggest here that a measure may be particularly offensive to 
sovereignty interests insofar as i t  challenges the judgment made by a 
nat ional government regarding the policies that best serve i ts  own people . 
If we recognize a nat ional government as the legitimate representative of 
i ts citizens, then we should generally respect the choices i t  makes on their 
behalf. We may seek to undermine or to change those pol ic ies on behalf of 
our own cit izens or on behalf of third parties, as is the tradit ional preroga­
t ive of national governments, but to invoke the interests of a foreign 
government 's own citizens challenges that government 's authori ty to speak 
for its own people.207 
204.  Charnovi tz ,  supra no te  24, a t  38 .  
205 .  Dunoff, supra note  94 ,  a t  1 424 .  
206 .  !d. 
207. Through ce r t a i n  po l icy cho ices  a fore ign gove rn m e n t  may we l l  u n d e r m i n e  i t s  own 
c l a im  to speak for i ts c i t i ze n s  on  ce rt a i n  ma t t e rs .  A governmen t  t h a t  e ngages in h u m a n  r i gh t s  
v io l a t ions ,  for examp le ,  l oses l eg i t i m acy a s  t he  represe n ta t ive of t h e  i n te res t s  o f  i t s  peop l e  i n  
t h i s  respect .  T h u s ,  a l though t rade  sanc t ions  imposed on  a govern m e n t  to  protest  po l i t i c a l  
repress ion m a y  n o t  refl ec t  respect for t he  repress ive governme n t ,  t hey a re n eve r t he l e ss 
cons i ste n t  w i t h  respect for t h e  prefe re nces o f  fore ign n a t iona l s .  
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i i i .  Ethical objections: i l legit imate p references. If we p resume that the 
policy choices made by a foreign government reflect the p references of its 
constituents, then our altruistic preferences over these matters, even if 
genuine and sincerely held by our citizens, might be vulnerable to criticism 
on ethical grounds .  Whereas use value derives from the satisfaction of 
what Ronald Dworkin calls "personal preferences ,"  nonuse value derives 
from the satisfact ion of "external preferences. "208 Dworkin contends that 
uti l i tarian arguments should exclude external preferences because their 
inclusion would undermine "the right of citizens to be treated as equals."209 
His examples i nclude racist and homophobic preferences.2 10 A complete 
analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this article .  I do not wish to 
enter that debate here, except to note that much of the nonuse value 
associated with natural resources, l ike bequest value and intrinsic value, do 
not seem to be vulnerable to the type of objection Dworkin makes, be­
cause they exhibi t  equal concern and respect for al l  persons . 2 1 1 
Other philosophers point out that measures of social welfare should not 
give weight to p references that reflect moral or ethical views. If we were to 
count  ethical preferences and to respect them all as equally val id, then 
optimal policies would depend on the popularity and intensity of all moral 
beliefs, including those that might p rove unsound or i l logical upon reftec­
t ion. 2 1 2  In the international environmental context, Bhagwati denounces 
208. RONALD DWO R KI N ,  T A K I NG R I GHTS S E R I O USLY 234-38 ( 1 977) .  
209. ld. a t  236. 
2 1 0 .  M i l gram a l so c i tes  racis t  preferences  as g iv ing r i se  to d i s turb ing  examples o f  nonuse 
va lues. See M ilgram, supra note 1 3 8,  at  42 1 .  
2 1 1 .  S i m i l a r l y ,  a l t hough Harsany i  wou l d  exc lude " a n t isocia l  preferences, such as sad ism,  
envy, resen tmen t ,  and m a l i ce ,"  from the  ca l cu l a t i on  of "soc ia l  u t i l i ty , "  he  wou ld  presumably 
i nc l ude  bequest  va l ue  and i n t r i n s i c  va l u e  b ased on  sympa thy for o the r  s en t i en t  be ings, which 
wou l d  be cons is t e n t  w i t h  " t h e  fundam e n t a l  b as i s  of a l l  our moral commi tmen ts ," name ly, 
"gene ra l  goodw i l l  and h um an sympathy ."  H a rsany i ,  supra note 135, at 5 6 .  
2 1 2 .  B ernard W i l l i ams  argues t h a t  a u t i l i t a r i an  shou ld  not  coun t  e t h i ca l  preferences, for 
they may be i r r a t iona l  from a u t i l i t a r i an  p o i n t  of v iew.  See W i l l i ams ,  supra note 1 35 ,  at 
1 04-06. Thus ,  e t h i ca l  p re fe re nces  wou l d  be prob l e m a t i c  as jus t ifica t ions  for e nv i ronmenta l  
t rade measures, o r  i n deed ,  for any other ac t ion . Su ppose t ha t  the des i re  o f  some to preserve 
do lph i ns ,  for examp le ,  rests  on mora l  b e l i e fs a lone ,  and  t hese b e l i e fs are con t roversi a l .  T f  
many  o t h e rs b e l i eve s t rongly t ha t  i t  wo u l d  b e  mora l ly wrong to use t rade  me asures to induce 
Mexico to  protect  do lph ins ,  t h e n  we wou l d  h ave to cou n t  t h i s  "pub l i c  bad"  as a cost of us ing 
t hese m e asures .  I n  t heory,  t h is "pub l i c  bad ' . cou l d  outweigh t he  " pu b l i c  good" of dolph in  
protec t ion . 
Thomas Scan lon  po in t s  ou t  t h a t  we can  exc l ude  cer ta in  pre fere nces from our eva lua t ion of 
c l a i ms o f  soci a l  j u s t ice  w h i l e  s t i l l  avo id i ng pa te rn a l ism :  
The reasons . . . fo r  exc l u d i ng "mora l"  or  "an t i soc i a l "  preferences . . .  do  not  assert 
t h a t  t h e  fu l fi l l m e n t  of t hese  p re ferences  is no t  good for t h e  i n d iv idua l s  i n  quest ion .  
Al l  t ha t  i s  asse r ted i s  that  t h ese prefe rences  ' ' h ave  no c la im on us"-tha t  is ,  on 
soc i e ty-for t h e i r  fu l fi l l me n t . Deny ing t h a t  t hey h ave such a c l a i m  need not  i nvolve 
' · t e l l i n g  peop l e  wha t  is good for t h em"-it  represen t s a mora l  j udgment .  not a 
judgment  of va lue  tha t  is i n  con f l i c t  w i t h  t he i rs . 
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the use of " trade sanctions t o  force others i nto accept ing one's own 
id iosyncratic choice of ethical concerns ."2 1 3 We use trade measures, how­
ever, not to force others to accept any ethical beliefs, but rather to i nduce 
them to refrain from activities that harm resources from which we derive 
nonuse value.  Furthermore, much of the nonuse value associated with 
environmental interests may be based on sympathy rather than moral 
commi tments. One may p refer  that dolphins or  other animal s  be protected 
from harm, for example ,  without necessarily believing that harming them i s  
immoral . One  may bel ieve that the ki l l ing o f  animals is moral ly acceptable 
and yet simultaneously be  distressed by their deaths. Thus, after we 
exclude all moral preferences from consideration, we st i l l  must weigh 
other nonuse values, including those that depend on altruistic preferences, 
as components of global social welfare. 
Altruist ic preferences that do not respect the preferences of the objects 
of our altruism, however ,  seem morally questionable. I f  our pol icies re­
flected the same concern and respect for the personal preferences of 
foreign nationals as for those of U.S .  cit izens, it i s  not l ikely that we would 
demand harmon ization of standards. Because these altruis t ic  p references 
fai l  to extend equal concern and respect for the personal  preferences of 
others, one might just ifiably disregard them as not worthy of satisfact ion .  
Although a source of economic value,  the sat isfaction of these p references 
may not be a legitimate objective for public pol icy. I f  so, then we may 
exclude this value as an argument in our social welfare funct ion . 
iv. Disguised protectionism. Suppose, however, that the sati sfaction of 
these altruistic preferences does count as part of social welfare, or that we 
defend our trade measure on the basis of some other type of nonuse 
value-perhaps bequest value or intrinsic value .  Our justification for using 
the measure would st i l l  be  vulnerable on two related grounds .  First ,  one 
might doubt that  enough genuine nonuse value is at stake to just ify the 
measure. If i n  fact we attach l i t t le nonuse value to resources in  other 
countries, then there is l i tt le justification for environmental  trade mea­
sures. If  local use value i s  the most important reason to protect these 
resources, then each country wi l l  capture most of the benefi ts of environ ­
mental regulation and accordingly will be less l ikely to ove ruse the re­
source . In th is  case, the extension of these standards to imported goods 
remains part icularly suspect . If such a trade measure simply caters to 
domestic producers that prefer not to face lower-cost competit ion from 
abroad, then the extension of the same standard across borders would 
serve protectionist interests, not promote efficient leve ls of environmental 
Thomas M .  Scan lon ,  Tlze lvlora! Basis of lnretpersona !  Co111parisons, i n  INTE RPERSO!'\,\L 
CO!v!P ..  \ R J S O N S  or WELL-BEif'G 1 7, 28 ( Jon  Els te r  & John  E. Roemer  e el s . ,  1 99 1 ) .  
2 1 3 .  B h agwat i .  supra note 1 8, a t  1 70 .  
1 995] ECONOMIC ANALYSI S  OF TRADE MEAS URES 2 1 97 
regulat ion.2 1 4  
Second, even if  the nonuse values were genuine a n d  substantial i n  some 
cases, the effects of the policy dovetai l  too closely with obvious protection­
ist in terests. These nonuse-value motivations are, in practice, s imply too 
difficult to d ist inguish from protectionism, even if they are d istinguishable 
in principle .  The GATT may prohib i t  policies that are observationally 
indist inguishable from protectionist trade barr iers i n  order to guard against 
disguised p rotect ionism .  Without a prophylact ic rule, one would expect 
protection ists to i nvoke this  potential loophole so often that very few (if 
any) of these trade measures would be cases that were truly just ified by 
genuine and substantial nonuse values .  Recurr ing legislative proposals in 
the United States to levy countervai l ing duties in response to "ecodump­
i ng" suggest that the GATT Secretariat's concerns about protectionist 
abuses are not unfounded. 
v .  Global public goods. Note that the same objection to trade measures 
to protect the environment does not apply to resources in the global 
commons, where al l  countr ies have a stake in a common stock of the 
resource . In this case, there is no difference in the nature of our i nterests 
in the regulation of foreign producers and the regulation of domestic 
producers, because both sets of producers threaten the same stock of the 
resource . If we seek to protect these resources, for whatever reasons, then 
we must restrain exploitation by other coun tries as wel l  as exploitat ion by 
our own domestic producers. G iven the identi ty of our environmental 
interests in regulating our domestic tuna-fishing fleet and in excluding tuna 
exported from certain foreign countries, for example, there is  no special 
reason to doubt that our interest i n  protecting dolphins from foreign 
fishing operat ions is  genuine :  our interest in  our trade measures coincides 
with our i nterest in  regulat ing our domest ic producers. 
The just ificat ion for un i lateral trade measures to protect the global 
commons does not depend on any paternalist ic concern for the i nterests of 
fore ign nationals .  These measures by the U nited States cannot be consid­
ered i ntrusions on national sovereignty any more than unilateral exploita­
tion of the global commons by lVlcxico could be so considered . 2 1 5 We seek 
merely to express our preferences regarding a resource held i n  common 
with all  humanity, and to protect the resource to a degree commensurate 
with the value we attach to it .  
2 1 4 .  See Subram a n i a n .  supra note  l S. a t  ! 5 1  ( a rg u i ng t h a t  ' · i n  re la t ion  to d o m e s t i c  
e n v i ro n m e n t a l  pr-.)b lems the  u se o f  t r<tdc measures is fl awed because i t  i s  l a rgely 
protec t ion i s t  in i n t ent ' · a n d  " a i m e d  at ncgct t i n g  th:: v e ry s o u rce o r  comparat ive a d v a n t a g e  
w h i c h  c o u l d  l egi t i m a t ,: l y  b ·:: conferred  by d i iTc renccs  in  c n v i >•J n m •: n t a i  e n dowments .  p o l l u ­
t ion assi rn i Li t ion c a p ;:lc i t ies  o r  sociai prcfe r c n c .� s  regard i n g  e n '/ i i'Gilnl e n t cl l  outcon1es' ' ) .  
:2 L 5 .  Sec: Chltrnovitz. supra !tote 4 7, �lt I 0,.5 70 ( a rguing t h lt l  . .  �t cuuntr��� a fleeted by �1 n �;If,;fP;\ 
prin1ary � \-nb�:rgu is on \vcak ground i n  argu i ng t h at i t.-.;  ki i l i ng n f  doiph ins  on t h<:� high seas is �1 n; att�r for 
its O\Vn governn1e:H·s jurisdict ion.�· bcc:::ntst , \ the dciphins in th·.: C=C·� ��n du not belong to any cnuntry"'). 
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Note that measures to protect endangered species that are unique to 
foreign h abitats also lack the ind ic ia of protectionism presented by 
"ecodumping" duties .  There is  no part icular reason to suspect that our 
interest in protecting endangered species, such as the tiger and the rhinoc­
eros, serves protect ionist interests and not the protection of nonuse value. 
Because there is no stock of these species in  the United States for domes­
tic producers to exploit ,  no trade measure designed to protect them from 
exploitation abroad would automatically serve the private in terests of com­
peting domestic producers . 2 1 6 
3 .  A Proposed Rule 
For the foregoing reasons, I suggest that we presume that a trade 
measure that restricts imports from another country, because that coun try 
provides environmental protection that fal l s  below a particu lar  standard, is  
an i l legal disguised restriction on trade if :  ( 1 )  the environmen tal protect ion 
in question appl ies to a stock of a natural resource within the foreign 
country, in the absence of physical spil lovers; (2) the foreign p roducers to 
be  regulated compete with a domestic industry subject to s imi lar regula­
t ions to protect a stock of the same resource in  the importing country; and 
(3)  use value i s  an important consideration that supports the regul ation of 
the domestic stock, but not of the foreign stock. We should  infer from 
these circumstances that these regulations address purely domestic environ­
mental concerns, not any genuine nonuse value based on some transbound­
ary environmental concern . We should presume that the trade measure 
simply reflects the desire to protect domestic producers from fore ign 
competition . This presumption would prohibit ,  for example ,  any attempt 
to impose countervai l ing duties on goods produced in a fore ign country 
solely because producers in that country enjoy more lax environmental 
standards than their competitors in  the importing country. In these cases, 
2 1 6 . Conce ivab ly ,  a ban on i mpor ted  goods de r ived from e nd ange red  spec ies  cou ld s t i l l  
s e rve t h e  i n terests  of  some domest i c  i n d us t ry.  F o r  examp le ,  some dome s t i c  producers m igh t  
se l l  subst i t u t es for i vory or  w h a l e  b l ubber. Th i s  b a n  wou l d  represen t  a p o l a r  case  o f  a fac i a l l y  
n e u t ra l  regu la t ion  t h a t  ra i ses t he  cost of  some  fore ign producers more t han  i t  r a i s e s  t h e  cost  
of  comp e t i ng domest ic  producers .  In t h i s case,  the environm e n t a l  regu l a t i o n  h as no e ffec t  on 
the costs o f  domes t i c  producers bu t  exc ludes some fore ign compet i tors e n t i re ly .  S h ou l d  such  
cases ,  l i k e  " ecocl u m p i ng" d u t i es .  be  deemed  suspect under  t he  GATT desp i t e  t he i r  fac i a l  
n e u t ra l i ty") 
Two cons ide ra t ions  suggest  t h a t  t rade measure s  to protect  e n dangered spec ies  shou ld  b e  
perm i t t ed .  F i rs t .  domest ic  producers a r c  u n l i ke l y  to pe rce ive a grea t  t h re a t  from t h e  
products  o f  enda ngered spec ies ,  g iven  t h a t  t h ese spec ies  are scarce b y  d e fi n i t i o n  an cl 
t h e r e fo re u n l i ke l y  to  be  cheap or to t h rea ten  a l a rge m a rke t  share .  Th i s  fact  makes  i t  
improbab le  t ha t  p ro tec t ion is t s  w i l l  s e c k  s u c h  t rade measures  s i m p ly i n  o rd e r  to  exc l u d e  
fore ign compe t i t i o n .  Second .  t h e  verv scarc i ty  o f  endange red species m akes  t h e m  an i n h er ­
en t ly  p l a us ib l e  source  of non use va l u e .  A un ique  s tock  of such a resource  i s  l i ke ly  to be a 
t ru l y  g loba l  pub l i c  good, no t  m e re ly  a l oca l  pub l i c  good .  
i 
l 
l I 1 
1 ' 
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we may sti l l  seek to impose our preferences on others, but we must rely on 
carrots rather than on trade sticks. 
This presumption, however, could lead to an anomaly. For example,  why 
should a country be any less able to use trade measures against the 
exploitat ion of an endangered species abroad s imply because it  happens to 
have a domestic s tock of the same endangered species? The presumption 
of disgu ised protectionism seems overbroad in this case, insofar as endan­
gered species present an inherently p lausible case of a global public 
good .2 1 7 For this reason, the presumption should not be irrebuttable .  
I p ropose, however, that  a country seeking to apply trade measures in 
this situation should be able to overcome this p resumption only by invok­
ing a mult i lateral agreement (l ike the CITES2u') that reveals a broad 
international consensus among countries without s imilar stocks of the same 
resource within their borders. This consensus condemning the environmen­
tally harmful  activity in  question would  rebu t  the presumption that genu­
ine and substantial  nonuse values do not support the extension of this 
environmental standard across borders. This rebuttal should be  persua­
sive, because countries without any apparent protectionist in terest would 
provide the required evidence of nonuse value .  Because this consensus is 
important only as evidence of genu ine and substantial nonuse values, i t  
should no t  matter whether the  target of  the  trade measure has  signed the 
multi lateral agreement, nor should i t  matter when the target country 
signed the agreement if i t  has done so. As long as this consensus actual ly 
exists, i t  dispels the suspicion that protectionism alone explains the trade 
measure.  Therefore, GATT Article XX should permit the use of trade 
measures to protect this nonuse value . 
Finally, we should presume that all trade measures to p rotect the 
environment that do not fall within the suspect class described above 
instead come within the Article XX exceptions, absent some more elabo­
rate showing of protectionism. Detecting other cases of disguised protection­
ism may not be easy, bu t  this problem is not any different  in principle than 
that which arises whenever any internal regu lation that is neutral on i ts 
face is  challenged as protectionist . In the absence of the indicia that tr igger 
the presumption of i llegal i ty described above, all measures should be 
subject to the same case-by-case scrutiny for unjustified d iscrimination 
against imports .  
B.  TRADE SANCTIONS 
Trade sanctions, l ike direct trade measures, can bring foreign producers 
in line with a particu lar environmental standard, but they usually do so by 
causing foreign governments to change their policies. Many of the same 
2 1 7 . See supra note :?. 1 6 . 
2 1 8 .  S e e  supra n o t e s  28-29 a n d  accum pa ny i n g  t e x t  fur a d i s c u s s i o n  of t h e  CITES . 
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considerations that arise with d irect trade measures also ar ise w i th  trade 
sanctions :  the environmental standard may have a d iscr iminatory effect on 
foreign producers'  costs or may address a purely domestic env ironmental 
problem. Trade sanctions, however ,  also pose some addit ional d ifficul t ies .  
First ,  as  the GATT Secretar iat noted, a country can apply trade sanc­
t ions to a broader range of products: the scope for trade p rovis ions 
applicable to related products " is relat ively l im ited, whereas there is  
essential ly no l im i t  to the use of trade measures on unrelated goods and 
services ." 2 1 9 Second,  th is  broader reach also impl ies that the appl icat ion of 
trade sanctions i nvariably entai ls  economic inefficiency. Suppose we im­
pose trade sanctions on products unrelated to the environmental problem: 
for example, barriers to Norwegian fish because Norway engages in whal­
ing.  It i s  one th ing to ban the importation of whale products that are 
prohib i ted  uniformly within our borders (so that we have no domestic 
whale p roduct market to protect) ;  i t  i s  another matter to apply trade 
sanctions that have the incidental effect of protecti ng our fishi ng i ndustry .  
A ban on Norwegian fish does l i tt le i n  and of itself to save whales or 
otherwise improve the environment .  Its d i rect effect i s  p rotectionis t ,  and 
for fami liar reasons ,  these trade barr iers s imply reduce economic effi ­
Ciency. 
Trade sanctions d iscr iminate between l ike products produced by s imi lar 
p roduction processes. This  feature d is t inguishes trade sanct ions from fa­
cially neu tral process standards, but not from broader d irect trade mea­
sures. Unlike all d irect trade measures, however, trade sanct ions invari ab ly 
d istort t rade when they are appl ied because they produce no d i rect ben­
efit .  Trade sanctions are purely puni tive : they protect the e nvironment 
only through the coercive effect upon the target country .  They d istort 
trade even i f  they serve genuine environmental i nterests and p roduce 
valuable benefits only when and i f  the foreign government  changes i t s  
pol ic ies .  
So, was the 1 994 GATT panel just i fied in  d is t ingu ishing trade sanctions 
from d i rect trade measures, even if i t  m ischaracterized the MMPA as 
includ ing trade sanctions? Or if we were to agree that the MMPA i ncludes 
trade sanctions, would that be a reason to find that i t  violates the GATT? 
Or shoul d  the effect a trade measure l ike the MMPA has on a foreign 
government's pol icies count  as part of the just ification for the trade mea­
sure? Does the fact that trade sanctions not only discriminate  expl ici t ly 
against foreign producers, but also invariably d istort trade i mply that  they 
should be il legal per se ? For example, should we deem any trade sanction 
to be "a  means of arbitrary or unjust ifiable d iscriminat ion between coun­
tries where the same cond i t ions prevai l ,  or a disguised restrict ion on 
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international trade?"220 
From the perspective of global economic welfare ,  the relevant question 
with respect to trade sanctions is  whether the economic benefits of sanc­
tions outweigh the costs imposed through a d istortion of trade . Because 
the protection of the environment addresses a famil iar market fai lure, 
trade sanctions in this context could serve to i mprove economic efficiency 
rather than undermine i t .  For the reasons discussed i n  Part I I ,  even purely 
coercive trade sanctions can play a valuable role in  protect ing the environ­
ment. Unless we can apply these trade sanctions to unrelated products, we 
may have no effective instruments other than carrots with which to protect 
the whale population in  the global commons, for example ,  because we do 
not consume any whale products. 
Indeed, if trade sanctions fal l  on products unrelated to the foreign 
environmental policy in question, protectionists wil l  be less l i kely to find i t  
in their i nterests to propose them. The industry that stands to gain from 
the change in the foreign government's environmental pol icy i s  less l ikely 
to be the same industry that will be protected from competit ion through 
the direct effect of the trade sanctions. If the same domestic firms domi­
nated both industries, then they would be in a win-win situation with trade 
measures in place, and they would have strong incentives to lobby for such 
trade measures. Insofar as we tend to find d ifferent firms in  d ifferent 
industries, however, we would expect these trade sanctions to be less 
vulnerable to capture by protection ists?2 1 
Furthermore, trade sanctions have the advantage that they can be 
targeted on the foreign industry that yields the maximum political pressure 
on the fore ign government. We can also choose trade sanctions that 
impose minimum political cost at home, thereby making the threat of trade 
sanctions all the more credible .  This freedom to choose the optimal 
sanction increases the l ikelihood of a favorable response by the foreign 
government and thereby reduces the risk of a prolonged dispute. Indeed, 
the most effective sanction need not be applied at al l ;  the mere threat of a 
sanction may have the desired effect if i t  i s  credible. A quick end to the 
dispute, in turn, implies that sanct ions need not be in place for very long 
(if at al l ) ,  and that the total economic costs of trade d istort ions due to the 
sanctions would be correspondingly small .  
220.  GATT, supra note  l ,  ar t .  XX, 6 1  Sta t .  p t .  5 ,  a t  A60- 6 1 ,  5 5  U . N.T.S .  a t  2 6 2 .  
22 1 .  I ndeed,  some t rade sanct ions  pose v i rt u a l ly n o  r i sk  tha t  t h e  concess ion sought  from 
the  t arge t coun t ry w i l l  se rve t he  i n t e rests  o f  dom es t i c  p roducers.  Trade sanc t ions  imposed 
for human  r igh ts  v io l a t ions . for exam p l e ,  w i l l  h ave a t  most  an  a t t enua t ed  e ffect  on the 
comp e t i t iveness  o f  t h e  target cou n t ry 's  export i ndus t r ies .  When sanc t ions  b r i ng  pol i t ica l  
changes ra ther  t h a n  s tr ic ter  regu l a t ions  o f  fore ign  producers ,  t h ey are par t i cu l a riy u n l i ke ly 
to se rve protec t ion i s t  i n t e res t s .  
2202 THE GEORG ETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol . 83 :2 1 3 1  
1 .  D i sguised Protectionism 
Nevertheless, the GATT Secretariat perceived a serious risk of protec­
t ionist  abuse with trade sanctions: " Protectionists woul d  welcome such 
un i lateralism. They could explo i t  i t  to create embargoes, special  import 
duties and quotas against rivals by enacting national legis lat ion that uni lat ­
era l ly defines environmental agendas that other countries are l ikely to find 
u nacceptable ."222 Protectionists might also advocate trade sanctions that 
they bel ieve will be ineffective, in order to enhance the probabi l i ty that the 
foreign government wil l  not change i t s  policies .  Even i f  there were evi ­
dence to support these fears, however, i t  would not just ify a fiat  ban on al l  
trade sanctions. 
a. The Rule of Reason. First, the existing proviso in Artic le XX condemns 
any "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between cou ntr ies where the 
same condit ions prevai l"  or any "disguised restriction on i n ternational 
trade ."223 This proviso applies to the type of abuse descr ibed by the GATT 
Secretariat . Although this standard might allow some subtle abuse to 
occur, i t  would deter any obviously protect ionist abuse-such as trade 
sanct ions that offer substant ia l  protection from foreign competit ion for 
some significant domestic industry, but call upon the t arget country to 
adopt environmental standards that are so lacking i n  scient ific support as 
to h ave no rational basis. These sanctions may be utterly unj ust ified if  they 
are not rational means to any environmental end, or if  they serve only 
manifestly trivial environmental i nterests. 
b. Effectiveness of Trade Sanctions. Second, our exper ience with trade 
sanctions does not support the fear that they will be subject  to widespread 
abuse. The possibi l i ty of protect ionist abuse poses an empirical question, 
and the available evidence suggests l itt le risk of the abuse feared by the 
GATT Secretariat .  Trade sanctions in  defense of environmental  interests 
have proven to be fai rly effective . They have rarely been used when the 
t arget country is un l ike ly to respond with commitments to str icter environ­
mental standards. History provides little evidence of protect ionists obtain­
ing sanctions that have been chosen because they would  be l ikely to 
remain in p lace . Indeed, the mere threat of trade sanct ions often brings 
about the desired change in pol icy. This record suggests that a policy 
al lowing trade sanctions is unlikely to be costly in pract ice .  
Consider, for example, the h istory of certifications under the Fel ly 
Amendment .  In a recent survey of eighteen Felly episodes from 1 974 
through 1 993, Steve Charnovitz found that fifty percent were successful in 
causing significant change in the policy of the target country in the direc-
222.  GATT supm note S, a t  33.  
223.  GATT supm note l ,  a r t .  X X .  6 1  S t a t .  pt .  5,  a t  A60-(l I .  5 5  U . N . T S .  at 262.  
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tion sought by the U .S .  government, eleven percent were part ly successful ,  
and only thirty-nine percent were unsuccessful .224 This rate of success is 
quite impressive, especially given that the United States never actually 
imposed Felly penal ties during this period.225 The mere threat of trade 
retal iat ion was sufficient to produce the desired policy reforms in each '
successful case .226 In  1 974, for example, this threat i nduced Japan and the 
Sovie t  Union to agree to the I nternational Whaling Commission ' s  ( IWC) 
quota for minke whales.227 In  1978, it induced Chile, Peru, and South 
Korea to join the IWC.228 In 1 986, it induced Norway to suspend commer­
cial whal ing.229 In 1 989, this threat i nduced Taiwan to enter into a driftnet 
agreement with the Un ited S tates, and in 1 99 1 ,  i t  induced Japan to end its 
trade in sea turtles and prompted South Korea to enforce i ts  driftnet 
agreement with the United States.23° Furthermore, the threat of ce1tijication 
(that is ,  the mere threat of a threat) has also been effective i n  other 
7 � 1 cases.--' 
Indeed, even our experience with trade sanctions imposed or threatened 
for commercial, rather than envi ronmental, objectives suggests that sanc­
tions are more l ikely to serve constructive purposes than to promote the 
special i nterests of protectionist groups .  Section 301  of the Trade Expan­
sion Act of 1 974 authorizes the United S tates Trade Representative (USTR) 
to take all "appropriate and feasible action" to el iminate a foreign govern­
ment "act ,  policy, or practice" that (a)  violates, or is " inconsisten t  with, 
the in ternational legal rights of the United S tates, "232 or (b) is  "unreason­
able or d iscriminatory and burdens or  restricts United S tates com­
merce . "233 Section 30l (b) grants particularly broad authority. It can include 
virtually any foreign government practice uni laterally deemed "unreason­
able"  by the United States, whether or not the practice violates any 
international legal obligation and whether i t  relates to U .S .  imports or  to 
U.S .  exports or to any other matter of commercial significance. The USTR 
has broad authority to retal iate if negotiations fail to end the allegedly 
224. C h a rn ovi tz ,  supra note 24, a t  l 6 . 
225 . The Un i ted  S t a tes dep loyed t rade sanc t ions  under  t he  Pe l l y  A m e n d m e n t  for t he fi rs t  
t ime on  Apr i l  l l , 1 994 , agai ns t  Taiwan .  See Thoma s L .  Fri e d m a n ,  U. S. Puts San ctions on 
Taiwan ,  N . Y .  T t iVI ES ,  Apr .  1 2 , l 9 lJ4 ,  at D l . 
226. See Charnovi tz,  supra note 24, a t  1 1 - 1 3 . 
227 .  See id. a t  1 1 . 
228 .  See id. 
229.  See id. at 1 2 . 
230 .  See id. a t  1 2- 1 3 .  
23 1 .  See id. a t  1 5 .  For e xamp le ,  a ft e r  t he  enac tmen t  o f  t he  P e l ly Ame n d m en t  i ts e l f  i n  1 97 1  
ra ised t h e  t h rea t  o f  cert i fica t i on ,  Den mark ,  Norway,  a n d  West Germany agree d  t o  p h <tse out  
t h e i r  h igh -seas sa l mon fi sh i ng .  Gene S .  M a rt i n ,  J r. & J ames  W. Bre n n a n ,  Enforcing the 
internation al  Cont•en rion .fiH !11e Regulariun of Wlwling: The Pe//y and Packl1·ood-Magnuson 
Amendmen ts ,  l 7  D Ei'iV . .J . 1 1\T ' L  L. & Po t  · y 293 . 294-95,  29S ( l lJ8 lJ ) .  
2 3 2 .  1 9  U .S C. � 24 l l ( :t ) ( 1 ) . ( d ) ( 4 ) ( A )  ( 1 988 ) .  
233 .  !d. § 24 1 1 ( b ) ( l ) . 
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unfair t rade practice. A p rovision l ike section 301 (b) ,  designed to serve 
U .S .  commercial interests and to grant broad discretion to  the USTR, 
might seem to be a particularly at tractive target for protect ionists seeking 
a pretext for trade sanctions. 
In a survey of section 301 invest igations, however, Alan Sykes concluded 
that "the USTR seems to have resisted capture by import-competing 
in terest groups, and Section 30 1  has not become a pretense for imposing 
new protectionist measures for the benefit of the President ' s  constitu­
ency . "234 The "overwhelming majority" of section 301 cases have involved 
p ractices impeding U.S .  exports; section 30 1  "has been invoked infre­
quently with the objective of p rotecting U .S .  firms from import competi­
t ion . "235 He found that threats pursuant to section 301 have been "quite 
successful at securing concessions by foreign governments . "236 He  also 
observed that the "actual imposition of sanctions has been infrequent" 
and "for  the most part sanctions have even tual ly been l ifted .  "237 As  he  
summarized h i s  analysis :  " [T)he overall impression is  that  the  statute 
works fairly well .  Foreign governments accede to U .S .  demands,  at least in 
part ,  i n  the c lear major i ty of cases when the United S tates  presses i ts 
position to a conclusion .  Retal iat ion is infrequent . . . .  " 23K This restrained 
use of trade sanctions should not be ent irely surprising, given the potential 
for in ternational polit ical fal lout from a more aggressive approach.23l) 
234. Alan  0 .  Sykes. Construcrive Unilateral Th reats in Internationa l  Commercial Relations: 
The Limi£ed Case for Seclion 301 . 23 LAW & POL.'Y I NT'L  Bus.  263, 3 1 7  ( 1 99 2 )  ( st a t i ng t h a t  
" t h e  worst fe a rs o f  c r i t ics regard i n g  capture ,  opport un i sm ,  and  u n i l at e r a l  i s m  h ave s i m p ly no t  
mater ia l ized to da te " ) .  Sykes f in ds i ns tead t ha t  " a  p l aus ib l e  case c a n  be  m ade t h a t  t h e  
s ta tu te has  b e e n  a p rac t i ca l  success . "  !d. a t  268.  
235 . !d. a t  2 6 5 .  Sykes finds o n ly I I  out o f  94 cases " had  as t h e i r  sol e ob jec t ive t h e  
reduc t ion  of import  compe t i t i on  i n  t h e  U . S .  m arke t . "  !d. a t  308 .  T h e  o t h e r  8 3  cases h a d  
· ' c l e a r  m arket-ope n i n g  objec t ives or  re l a t ed  goa l s . ' '  !d. Con trast  t h is exper i e nce w i t h  o u r  
expe r ience  w i th  an t i dump ing  or  cou n t e rva i l i ng d u t i es ,  which ,  l i ke d i rec t  t r ade  measur e s. can 
p u t  domest ic  prod uce rs i n  a wi n -wi n s i t ua t i on : i f  the  fore ign  gove rn m e n t  con t i n u e s  to  
subs id ize  o r  t he  fore ign fi rm con t i n ues  to dump ,  t h e n  t h e  du t i e s  r ema in  i n  p l ace :  i f  t he  
a l l egedly u n fa i r  fo re ign t r ade  p ract ice  ceases ,  t h e n  i mports become more  expensive . E i t h e r  
way. t he  domest ic  i ndustry g a i n s .  These t rade remed i e s  h ave been  u s e e!  freq u e n t l y  by 
domest ic  prod ucers seek ing  p ro t e c t i o n  from i m ports.  Sykes obse rves t h a t  · ' S e c t io n  30 1 i s  
sh arp ly  d i st i ngu i s h ab l e  from"  t h ese o ther  s t a t u tes .  wh ich  " are i n t r i ns i c a l ly p ro t e c t i o n i st a n d  
a r e  ord i n ar i ly  de t ri m e n ta l  to t h e  n at i o n a l  econom ic  i n terest . "  !d. at  265 . 
236.  !d. at 268. Sykes fi n ds t h at 3 1  of t h e  48 cases brough t u n d e r  so:::c t i n n  3U l ( a )  w e re 
successfu l ,  and  on ly  one  of t he  re m a i n i n g  1 7  was a c lear  fa i l ur e .  !d. at 3 1  0- l J .  He a b n  !i nds  
that  27 of t he  35 cases  b rough t u n der  sect i o n  3 0 l ( b )  were  s u ccessfu l .  !d. e ll  ?, l -1- . -;· h e c; r: ,  l i ke 
t h e  s e c t i o n  .)Q l ( a )  c a s e s �  \V e r e  " fa i r ly successfu l a t  i n d uc ing foreign gove r n rn c n ts to �: l i nl i l! ll l r: 
or mod i fy t h e i r  pract ices . "  fd. O f  t h e  re m a i n i n g  e i g h t  C �l S C S .  O n ly o n e  '.\ :.i� �� CUill p k t e  
"fa i l u re"  i n  terms of m o d i fy i n g  t h e  fore ign prac t ice .  !d. a t  3 1 5 .  
2 3 7 .  !d. at  : 6 8 .  T h e  U n i t ed S t at e :.  h n cl  t o  resort t o  re t a l i a t i o n  i n  o n l y  'i'c '·.' t:: :' n '.: : ,_, �- -l· f; 
sec t ion  JO I ( a )  C �l S e �l '  a n d  i t  s u b s e q u � n t l y  l i fted  �; anct ion �� e n t i re ly i n  t-...vo o f  t h c � t: c:. i S ·.� S .  /d. a :-
3 l l .  The Un i ted  S t a t e �; � �p p i i e d  s a n ct i o n s  i n  o n l y  t \.VU ou t  t'f 35 sect ion 3U i ( b ;  ,_·:_ L\r.: �.; _ : � � 1 G  : 1 < 1 s  
l i fted s a n c t i o n s  in one of t h e :;;e t\vo c �t s c s .  !d. a t  3 i 4- J 5 . 
2J8 .  !d. at 3 1 6 . 
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2. "Publ ic Choice" Theory 
Final ly, even if protectionist  in terest groups do lend poli t i cal support to 
these trade sanctions, to the extent that they serve genuine and substant ial 
environmental interests, th is  support may be a welcome development .  In 
these cases, perhaps environmental ists can capture protectionism rather 
than being captured by protectionists .  With appropriate constraints on the 
Article XX exception, we m ight harness protectionist pol i tical  forces and 
put them to work on behalf of the cause of environmental protect ion .  The 
preceding analysis has been consistent with the assumpt ion that each 
governmen t  chooses the level of environmental protection that  is efficient 
from the perspective of nat ional welfare . Thi s  assumption puts the case 
against the use of trade sanctions i n  the best possible l ight :  the case for the 
use of trade sanctions becomes even stronger i f  we relax this assumption 
and suppose i nstead that the domestic pol i t ical process may fai l  to repre­
sent environmental i nterests properly. 
After al l ,  the same posit ive theory of pol i t ical economy that predicts 
protectionism as the outcome of special- interest polit ics woul d  also suggest 
that the polit ical process will tend to protect the environment too I i tt le . 240 
This  "public choice" theory views public pol icy in  a representat ive democ­
racy as the outcome of the interplay among special interests in the polit ical 
process, elected officials, and candidates for polit ical office. Because polit i­
cians seek to enhance their chances of electoral success, they wi l l  promote 
those policies that most effect ively yield votes and campaign contributions 
from the i nterest groups that "buy" these policies with their pol i t ical 
support . Well-organized groups are the most successful at lobbying for the 
policies they desire . Public policies thus wil l  tend to serve their in terests 
and to neglect the diffuse interests of  poorly organ ized groups. 
The standard "public choice ' '  expl anation for the popularity of protection­
ism (in spite of i ts economic costs) relies on the fact that the benefits of 
free trade are oft e n  distributed widely among a large and d iffuse group of 
cit izens (mainly consumers), while the costs are concentrated on particular 
industr ies .24 1 In divi dual  firms in import-competing sectors have much to 
gain  from protection, and e ach may find that i t  h as a su fficient incentive to 
lobby on its own for protectionist  polic ies .  Frec-·r ider problern::, among 
orod ucers 21r·� reduced sti l l  further  \vhen the indus trv has a. SElal i  number ' -
trac�te a�;s-JJciat icJrL Ecich indi"·vi <j lJ al C()XlS1Jrn e r ,  0 11 t l-tr.� ��ftl1er ha11cL h .c ��  only Cl 
s·mal1 sta}�e ·i n t ing f=JTCJ'tect iol1ist po1 ic ies  8ncl \.,vi l l  prol; zdJ "ij' fi.nCl tl-1at  
the costs ('l, a si.gn �hc�1 n t  ;_ c) tJ't)yiri.g exceed a�1y conceiv8.b lc  _gair� . .  {�Jt1-1Dtlgh 
t�lc tot�d t� �-::-ne ·fi ·t �-� r�!f fr.':: �: -r � · �1.dc n1 ��"y e.xc e e cl the �{Jt c1 l  cc_,s t hose s e c t c rrs 
-- --- ·-- --·-- -· --- -· 
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that bear the costs of free trade have strong incent ives to lobby for 
p rotection, while the beneficiaries of free trade each have l i tt le incent ive 
to lobby against i t .  As a result, elected officials are more responsive to 
p roducer interests than they are to consumer i n terests. 
Crit ics of un il ateral trade sanctions usually take this cynical view of 
domestic pol i t ics when they seek to st ir fears of protect ionism,  yet they do 
not always extend the same "public choice" i nsights as readi ly to the 
formulation of environmental policy?42 The same logic, however, would  
suggest that governments wil l  t end  to  p rovide too l i tt le  environmental 
protection : i ts  benefits are spread widely (and moreover,  they wi l l  go i n  
large part to future generations) ,  and the costs are often  concentrated on 
par ticular i ndustries that profit from environmentally harmful activit ies . 243 
Insofar as the beneficiaries of environmental regulat ion are underrepre­
sented in  the pol i tical process, we would expect excessively l ax environmen­
tal  regulat ion.244 Although environmental ists may wie ld some polit ical 
power and succeed in obta in ing some environmental regulat ion,  "publ ic  
choice" theory indicates that the influence they wield wi l l  not be commen­
surate with the value of the in terests they seek to protect ,  and that the 
regulation they obta in wi l l  be less stringent than i t  should be .  
We would expect th is  problem even wi th  environmental harms fal l ing 
completely within our borders .  With respect to the protection of resources 
wi th transboundary spi l lovers (physical or psychological ) ,  the problem is 
far worse. It is all the more important in this context tha t  we bolster 
pol i tical  support for environmental protect ion.  The presence of protection-
242.  See, e.g. , Arye L. H i l l ma n  & H e i nr i c h  W.  U rsprung,  The Influence of' Ent ·ironmenta! 
Concenzs on the Political Detennination of' Trade Policv, in TH E G R E E N I N G  OF W O R L D  TRADE 
I SS UES,  supra note 1 8 , a t  1 95 .  H i l l m a n  and U rsprung p rese n t  a model  o f  the for m u l at ion  o f  
t rade  po l i cy and  pred ict t h at domest i c  producers w i l l  e n l ist  env i ro n m e n t a l i s t s  i n  s upport o f  
protec t ion i s t  pol i c ies  and  po l i t i c i ans .  I n  t h is mode l ,  e nv ironme n t a l i s t s  favor protect ion  
beca use protec t ion  reduces  e i t h e r  consumpt ion  or product ion  t ha t  harms the  env i ro n m e n t .  
The i r  pred ic t ion  t h a t  protec t ion i s t s  w i l l  "capture"  env i ronmen ta l i s t s ,  however .  d er ives from 
a model in wh ich  e nv i ronme n t al is ts  do not  h ave t h e  opt ion  o f  seek ing  s t r i c t ly e nv iron m e n t a l  
po l i c i es .  I n  a wor ld  i n  wh ich  po l i c i e s  o the r  t h a n  trade po l i c ies  a r e  ava i l ab l e , e nv i ro n m e n t a l ­
i s t s  a r e  u n l ike ly  t o  find  protect i o n ism to be  t h e  b e s t  ave n u e  to w h i c h  to d evote  scarce 
p o l i t i ca l  resou rces ( at l east as long as  GATT i ns t i t u t ions  do not  i n s i s t  o n  a t t ack ing l eg i t ima te  
e nvi ronmen ta l  po l i c i es  as bar r i e r s  to  t rade ) .  
243 .  Hoc kman  and  Le i dy s tudy t h e  po l i t i c a l  economy o f  po l l u t i on  a b a t e m e n t  po l i c ies ,  bu t  
t h ey fa i l  to app l y  t h e  i n s i gh t  so o ft e n  app l i ed  i n  t h e  t r ade  context .  Because  t h ey a s sume  t h a t  
env i ronmen ta l  i n terests  a r e  adeq u ate l y  represented i n  t h e  po l i t i ca l  process,  t h ey conc lude 
t ha t  ' · the  leve l  o f  abatem e n t  m ay be  h igher  o r  lower  than the  'op t i m a l ' l eve l .  depend ing on  
the  re l a t ive stre ngt h of the  groups  i n volve d . "  Hockm a n  & Le idy,  supra note  2U l .  at  227 :  see 
id. at 229 . .232.  Yet t h e  usua l  " ' p u b l i c  cho ice"  mode l  suggests t h a t  t h e  po l i t i c a l  process i s  
sys temat ica l l y  b i ased i n  favor o f  p roducer  groups ove r env ironmen ta l  g ru u ps .  
2 4 4 .  Some b e n e1ic i ar ies ,  l i ke fu t u re genera t ions  or w i l d l i fe ,  h ave no d i rect  say  i n  the  
po l i t i ca l  p rocess .  To t h e  ex ten t  one  b e l ieves the  we l fare o f  t hese bene fi c i a r i e s  be longs i n  t h e  
socia l  we ! Lt re funct ion ,  o n e  \vou !d  expect  t h e  po l i t ica l  p rocess t o  p roduce far l es:; e nv i ronmen­
ta l  p rotec t ion t han  i s  opt i m a l .  See. e.g. . P E T E R  S I N C E R .  P r-tACJJC\ 1 .  ETH I CS 4i\- 7 1 .  9.1- 1 05 
( 1 97 9 )  ( �1 rgu i ng t h at u t i l i t a r i �t n  ca l cu l u s  s hou ld  i nc lude  t h e  we l fare o f  a n i m a l s ) .  
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ist in terests in support of environmental measures makes the threat of 
trade sanctions more credible and therefore more effective in deterring 
excessive exploi tation of the environment by foreign producers. 
3 .  A Proposed Rule 
For the foregoing reasons, GATT Article XX should also allow the use 
of trade sanctions to protect the global environment .  The 1 994 GATT 
panel erred i n  adopt ing a per se rule aga inst trade sanctions. We should 
permit a country to use trade sanctions to promote any environmental 
interest that we would allow that country to promote through direct trade 
measures .  The analysis discussed above in Part IV A3 for d i rect trade 
measures should also be used to define "di sguised restriction on interna­
tional trade" and "arbi trary or unjustifiable discriminat ion between coun­
tries" i n  the context of trade sanctions. I n  seeking a rational relationship 
between the sanctions and the e nvironmental obj ective, however, we should 
not rely on an analysis of the l ikel ihood that the particular target country 
in question wil l  respond with concessions, lest  we encourage the t arget 
country to become intransigent in anticipation of such an analysis .245 
V .  CONCLUSION 
This article presents the case for a "greener" i nterpretation of GATT 
Article XX from an economic perspect ive . Environmental protect ion, no 
less than free trade, promotes global economic efficiency. To give absolute 
priority to free trade over the environment simply ignores an important 
component of global economic welfare . 
The exceptions in  Article X X  should i nclude not only measures to 
protect environmental in te rests within the borders of the country using the 
measures, but also trade measures to protect environmental i n terests 
throughout the world .  To adopt the narrow i nterpretations advanced by 
the GATT panels would force countries that  value these interests to "buy" 
greater environmental protection from other countries through the carrots 
they offer in multi lateral agreements .  Game theory reveals how this  regime 
would create perverse i ncentives for greater degradat ion of the globa l  
environment and  undermine incent ives for greater environmental protec­
t ion.  A regime permit t ing the use of trade measures to protect the environ­
ment would avoid these perverse i ncent ives. 
The un l imi ted use of trade measures to v ind icate environmental inter­
ests worldwide, however, could be subject to abuse and could t h e reby 
undermine the  regime of l iberal ized trade created by the  GATT. Fortu-
245 . C h a rnov i tz  warns  t h a t  · ' e ncour ctgi ng il cl t i on s  t o  res ist env i ro n m e n t a l  trade measure ,; 
. . .  w i l l  p rove c o u n t e rp r o d u c t i ve . "  C h a rnovi tz .  .\ l ijHit note  47 ,  a t  1 0 , 5 80 .  Cktrnuv i t z  notes  
tha t  " fvkx i c o  appeared  more  i n t e res ted i n  lodg ing  c l  l e g a l  c h a l l e nge i n  G ATT i n  1 99 1 .  t h z1 n  
i n  coopera t i ng  w i t h  o t h e r  co u n t r i e s to e rec t  a new c! u i p h i n  p ro tec t ion  regime . . .  Jd. 
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nately, Article XX contains a proviso that would bar a country from 
i nvoking an Article XX exception for a measure that amounts to "a 
disguised restriction on internat ional trade" or "a means of arb i trary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries . "  This  p roviso,  properly 
interpreted and vigorously enforced, should provide sufficient  protection 
against abuse of Article XX. 
In particular,  this art icle has proposed an i n terpretat ion of the proviso 
that provides a more balanced accommodation of our environmental inter­
ests and our i nterest in l iberal i zed trade than that suppl ied by the GATT 
panels '  cramped readings of Article XX. First ,  the proposed rule would 
general ly require the country using the trade measure to apply the "na­
t ional treatment" principle: that  i s ,  to impose on i t s  own p roducers environ­
mental standards that are a t  l east as stringent as those it wishes to impose 
on compet ing foreign producers. Unless that  country can ident ify some 
relevant d ifference in  condit ions between the two countr ies or  some other 
consideration that just ifies differen t  treatment as necessary to achieve the 
environmental objective in question ,  a trade measure depart ing from the 
"national treatment" principle would embody an "arb i trary or unjustifi­
able discriminat ion between countries where the same condit ions p revai l" 
i n  violat ion of the Article XX preamble. 
Second, the proposed rule presumes that a trade measure that restricts 
imports from another country, because that country provides environmen­
tal protection below a part icular standard,  is a d isguised restrict ion on 
trade in  violat ion of the Article XX preamble if the measure addresses 
what are primarily domestic environmental p roblems. Specifically, I sug­
gest that this presumption of i l legal i ty should apply if: ( 1 )  the environmen­
tal protection i n  question applies to a stock of a natural resource within 
the foreign country, in  the absence of physical spillovers ;  (2)  the foreign 
producers to be regulated compete with a domestic industry subject to 
s imilar regulations to protect a stock of the same resource i n  the importing 
country; and (3) use value i s  an important consideration that supports the 
regulation of the domest ic stock, but the same cannot be said of the 
foreign stock. This type of trade measure poses an especially great r isk of 
protectionist abuse; that i s ,  i t  i s  particularly l ikely to be  applied in  the 
absence of a genuine environmental in terest substantial enough to just ify 
the measure, and therefore i s  particularly suspect .  The presumption wou ld  
prohibit ,  for exa m p l e ,  any general attempt t o  impose countervai l ing duties 
on goods produced in a fore ign country s imply because the exporting 
country imposes less str ingent  environmental standards on i ts  producers 
than the i mport i ng country imposes on competing producers at home . A 
country could rebut this presumption , however ,  if it can point to a muit i !at­
eral agreement that reveals a broad i nternat ional  consensus ( among coun­
tries without similar stocks o f  the resource in quest ion w i t h i n  t h e i r  borders) 
on the standard that  i t  seeks to impose o n  the target country.  All trade 
I 
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measures to p rotect the environment that fall outside this presumption, 
such as those designed to protect the global commons or species found 
only abroad, pose l i t t le risk to the GATT regime of l iberalized trade and 
therefore should fal l  within the Article XX excep tions, unless there is  
more specific evidence of p rotectionism . 
The much narrower readings of Article XX adopted by the GATT 
panels may well prove to be  short-sighted, even from the perspective of 
those with a monomaniacal preoccupation with the promotion of free 
trade above all else .  The creation of barriers to environmental protection 
in the name of free trade has eroded respect for GATT institutions in  
particular and  poli tical support for free trade i n  general .  The political 
support for free trade is  fragile enough already :  to force an unnecessary 
col l ision with environmental protection is s imp ly unwise, not  only in terms 
of sound economic policy, but also in terms of public relations. The GATT 
panels and the GATT Secretariat only p lay into the hands of protection­
ism when they adopt positions l ikely to cement environmentalists into the 
political coalit ion oppos ing free trade. 
The GATT panels were understandab ly concerned about the potential 
for protectionist abuse of Article XX. Their crude but sweeping rules 
against trade restrictions, however, make no attempt to d istinguish be­
tween legit imate environmental concerns and protectionism, and in the 
process do the cause of free trade a great disservice : the pol i tical backlash 
against free trade may also fail to make the same distinction.  An alterna­
t ive interpretation of GATT Article XX that strikes a more sensitive 
balance between our interest in free trade and our interest in preserving 
the global environment would do a better job of serving each interest . 
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APPENDIX 
This appendix offers a formal model to i l lustrate the s ignal ing game 
described in Part I IB2b Suppose there are two countr ies :  the victim (V) 
and the polluter (P) . Let p represent the level of pollut ion selected by P. 
The government of V enjoys welfare level \V(p ), which is a function of p 
that  declines monotonically: W '  (p) < 0. 
The government of P enjoys net  pol i t ical benefits B(p) from tolerat ing a 
quant i ty of pollution equal to p .  Suppose that B (O) = 0,  but  the marginal 
benefit of polluting is posit ive a t  p = 0:  B '  (0) > 0 .  Thus, P wou ld choose a 
posit ive level of pollution if i t  were s imply to maximize i t s  own object ive 
function in the absence of any inducements (st icks or carrots) from V. The 
marginal benefit from pollution, however, declines monotonical ly in p :  
B"(p) < 0 .  Indeed, the marginal benefit becomes negative beyond some 
level p0, where B ' (p0) = 0. Thus, P would find p0 to be i ts  p rivately opt imal 
level of pollut ion in the absence of inducements from V .  
There are two possible types o f  pollut ing countries :  the  polluter may 
derive e i ther high ( H) or low ( L) benefits from pollution . Type H derives 
net benefit B H ( P  ), and type L derives net benefit BL(P ) .  For any given p ,  let  
H derive marginal benefits larger than those derived by L: 
( 1 )  
Inequali ty ( 1 )  i s  the standard "sorting" o r  "single crossing" condi t ion 
assumed in signaling games,246 which in  th is model allows p to serve as a 
signal of type .  Let BI- d P H0) = 0 define P H0, and let B L '  (p L0) = 0 define P L0.  
In  the absence of inducements ,  H would find pH0 to be pr ivately optimal ,  
and L would find PL0 to be privately optimal .  Condit ion ( 1 ) implies that  
P ( )  < p () L H · 
The signaling game begins at the start of period l .  " Nature " chooses P's  
type at random: P is type H wi th  p robabi l i ty x and type L with p robabi l i ty 
1 - x. P chooses a level of pollution for period 1 .  At the end of period 1 ,  V 
offers P a carro t  that would confer  a pol i t ical benefit on the government of 
P .  Let C represent both the value of this  carrot to the government of P and 
the pol i t ical cost of this carrot to the government of V ,  which we take to be 
equal to one another. V makes th is  offer on a " take it  or leave i t"  basis .  
At the start of period 2, P can e i ther accept or reject this offer. If P 
accepts this  offer , then i t  must choose p = 0 for period 2 ,  as demanr!ed by 
V in its ofi'er .  If P instead rejects th is  ofi'er, then P can choose any level of 
pol lution it wants in  period 2. The game ends at the end of period 2 .  Thus, 
if P rejected the offer, then in per iod 2,  type H would choose PH0, and type 
L woul d  choose P L0 .  Assume that  i n  period 1 ,  both types of P d iscoun , 
2-1-h . See. e.g . .  A .  M ! C I ! .·\E l .  S P E :\ C E ,  M A R K E T  S ! Ci � A LI N (; 1 .5  ( 1 97 4 ) :  P·.Jl i c h a e l  S p e n ce . .!oh 
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their payoffs in  period 2 by the same d iscount factor o .  
In th i s  game of incomplete information, P knows i ts  type from the  start ,  
but V cannot observe P's type .  If V could observe P's type ,  then ,  i n  order 
to minimize the pol itical costs that V would have to bear, V would offer 
the smallest carrot that would induce P to accept the offer. Let CH 
represent the value of this carrot for type H :  CH = Br1 (pH0) . Let CL 
represent the value of this carrot for type L: CL = BL(PL0) . Condit ion ( 1 )  
implies that CL < CH. 
We will use "perfect Bayesian equil ibrium" as our equi l ibrium con­
cept. 247 An equil ibrium is a set of  s trategies for each player (V, H ,  and L)  
and a se t  of bel iefs for V about P's  type ,  such that no player can gain by 
deviat ing from its strategy and the bel iefs are not inconsisten t  with Bayes '  
Rule .  For example,  consider the possib i l i ty of a separating equil ibrium, in 
which each type chooses a different p in  per iod 1 .  There are two necessary 
condit ions: L would not want to choose H's  p ,  and H would not want to 
choose L's p .  We complete the description of an equil ibrium by specifying 
V's beliefs about P's type when V observes a p other than those correspond­
ing to the equil ibrium in  question (for p "off the equilibrium path" ) .  I f  we 
choose t hese bel iefs to ensure that neither H nor L wish to deviate from 
our proposed equil ibrium, then our necessary condit ions wi l l  also be 
sufficient for the existence of an equil ibrium. 
In a separating equil ibrium, V can d ist inguish H from L. Therefore, i t  
would offer CH to H and CL to L. Because L would rece ive the worst offer 
(CL) in any such equi l ibrium, an obvious choice for its equi l ibrium p in 
period 1 is pL0 .  Any other p for L would be dominated by pL0, given that L 
would rece ive CL in period 2 in any separating equi l ibrium. 
What about H ?  One might be tempted to apply the same reason ing to H 
and conclude that pl -!0 would be a good candidate for an equi l ibrium p for 
H .  Given that H receives the better offer (CH),  however, there is the 
poss ib i l i ty that L wil l want to mimic H . 241l If L is better off choosing the p 
selected by H, then that  p cannot sustain a separating equi l ibrium. Let p11 ' 
denote the equi l ib rium p for H .  A necessary condition for a separating 
equilibrium is that L's losses from imitating H in  period J are equal to or 
greater than L's gains in period 2 from doing so :  
(2)  
I f  condition (2) does not  hold for PH = p l-!0, then i t  w i l l  hold for some 
PH ' > PH0, because BL ' (p)  < 0 for any p > PL0 ·  Thus,  i n  this separating 
2-+7.  For a part i c u l �i r ly  access ib l e  d e fi n i t i o n  o f  t h i s concept , see  E R I C  R.-\ S M U S E N .  G A :- I E S  
i\ N D  l N FO R\IAT I O N :  A ;-.;  l NT R O D UCT!O;-.i TO G A M E  T H EO R Y  ] ) () ( I  LJ89 ) .  
240. W e  d o  n o t  have t o  wo rry about  H wa n t i ng t o  m i m i c  L b y  c hoos i ng p 11 1 : not  o n ly wou l d  
t h i s  p b <� �� s u b o r t i m �i l  cho ice  for H i n  t e r m s  o f  i t s  payofl i n  per iod I .  t h i s m i m i cry wou ld  o n ly 
y ie ld �� l ow e r  o ffe r ( CJ . )  i n  per iod 2 t h a n  H cou l d  o t h e rwise obt<: i n .  
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equi l ib rium, H must choose a h igher level of pollution than i t  would  
otherwise find  optimal . Because th i s  case i s  of  particular in terest ,  assume 
that condition (2) fail s  for P H' = P H0 . 
Assume also that H wou ld  choose the P H• consistent with (2) that i s  the 
least  costly for itself. Let  PH' '' denote the l east-cost separating P H· , defined 
by the equali ty :  
(3 )  
To complete our  descript ion of a perfect Bayesian equi l ibr ium, we must 
specify V's bel iefs off the equ il ibr ium path. (Bel iefs off the equil ibr ium 
path are arbitrary i nsofar as Bayes' Rule does not constrai n  V's  posterior 
bel iefs in the event of an unexpected p . )  Suppose that i f  p < P H"" , then V 
bel ieves P is type L,  but if p :2:. P H* * , then V bel ieves P is type H .  
To sustain this  separati ng equ i l ibrium, i t  must b e  true that  H would not 
find i t  i n  i ts i n terest to choose i nstead any p < PH** , i nclud ing p = pH0, 
because such a p would lead V to make the smaller offer CL.  That is ,  the 
maximum gain for H in  period 1 from swi tching, which H would obtain by 
a switch to PH0, must be at most equal to the cost of this switch i n  period 2, 
when V wi l l  respond with a smaller offer:  
(4) 
To prove condit ion ( 4) ,  note that condit ion ( 1 )  impl ies :  
(5)  
I n e qua l i ty (5)  and equa l i ty (3)  together imp ly that  inequa l i ty ( 4) must 
h o l d . 
Because we h ave chosen PH ··· to ensure that L does not want t o  mimic 
H ,  and indeed L cannot gain by chr ·Jsing any p other than PL1l, and we 
h ave just shovm chat H can not gain by choosing any p other t h a n  PH ' , we 
b a'/C shown that our separating equi l ibrium i s  a perfect Bayesian equilib-. T ' . . 1 . '  . " 1 1  ' ., . 1 .  . , .,. ,  · n  l n urn . _ n1s  ·::qu 1 wnum L,ustrates tne poss101 1 1 ty mat r-1 W l u  cnoose some 
0 • 1 ' 0 ' " • 0 • ') • 0 ...] 0 • • 1 • 0 I' 11 1gner .J e�le i  c� k IJC) j_ nrt i011 ,  P1--1 rather tt1a1  PHl , 1n order t(J ulStl11gtt 1Sn  rtse1 ·1 
fr·oirl �L. a11d thr::reby e n s ure t h a t  it recei·ves t b e  large r zJff��r (Cr-1) . 
.c=on�� idel· 11()\A/ tbe possibil ity of a pool ing eCJLiil ibritn11 � i n  �"vhich bcJtb I-� 
cf10C)Se tl1e sarne lJ � a11d -\l '·/Vi l l  t!e 1Jn ab}e tc; di�tingtl is h t l1e t\'/0 .  
rc�- sponc1 --.;vi th a n  offer c1f C1-1 , \Vl-1 i cfl i t  }(l1f)"'•lv'S \,vi 1 1  t�c ace<: 
:.;;·;ith. a11 c)ffe r of CL> \v_b1ch i ��- 1 e ss co�; 
r=; rc)1J abi l i  y ./\_ , urn.e 
r:- .,.--, .-, -.  i .  - :_ ,  � ·;_ ' ) .;. ""'• ..• - 1,· �I 1,-i -:1) -:: ,u, ·.: · .,· , r ·,, t'.Ji -.)_ ·:,'' .·.�--', ·,- o!',-:1 �:-:.. ·.l"" ·s:L' �,',. _•;:.•, •. . ·[�:. t_�- ; L; u 1 :.... ;_ U c� '- �--· . - , � -· ..... � - • _. ... _:_ - - - - - -- .;. �- � 
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Thus, V offers CH in  a pool ing equil ibrium.249 
To sustain a pooling equil ibrium, it must be true that nei ther L nor H 
can gain by switching to another p .  A good candidate for the equil ibrium 
p' would  be pH0: H can do no better by switching to any other p. For p * = 
PHo to be a pooling equilibrium, i t  must also be true that L would p refer no 
other p ,  i ncluding PL0. Note that L cannot gain by choosing a l arger p ,  
which cannot increase L's payoff i n  period 2 and simply reduces i ts  payoff 
in period l. Suppose that if L deviates from this pooling equil ibrium with a 
smaller p instead, i t  reveals its type :  that is ,  i f  V observes any p < pH0, 
then V bel ieves P is type L and offers CL; otherwise, V offers CH. 
A pooling equil ibrium requires that L's maximum gain in period 1 by 
switching to a smaller p, which L would obtain by a switch to PL0, be no 
greater than L's loss by revealing i ts type and receiving a smaller offer in  
period 2 :  
(7) 
As long as condition (7) holds, our pooling equilibrium is a perfect B ayesian 
equi l ibrium. This pooling equil ibrium i llustrates the possibi l i ty that L wil l  
choose a higher level of pollution, PHo rather than PL0, in order to mimic H 
and receive a larger offer (CH rather than CL) . 
24lJ . If cond i t ion  ( 6 )  d i d  no t  ho ld ,  t h e n  a poo l i n g  e q u i l i b r i um wou l d  no t  ex i s t .  V would 
o fle r C1  in  ou r  hypoth e t i ca l  poo l i ng e q u i l ib r i u m ,  bu t  g iven the prospect of  t h is otfer .  the two 
types would pref e r  to separa te :  t h e  bes t  p fo r L wend el be p�. 1 1 •  an cl H wou l d  prefe r  p 1 1 1 1  over 
PLIJ 
